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gendering shame
The evidence of decades of trans-
cultural studies indicates that social 
codes and moral strictures are socially 
constructed, but based on nonspecific 
biological elements. Apparently, we 
have an inborn capacity for the response 
we call shame. but we are taught which 
of our actions are shameful. We cannot 
become victims of shame until we are 
taught about shame. yet, despite the evi-
dence, there is still an insistence among 
both religious fundamentalists and many 
sociobiologists that our sense of shame 
is an unalterable part of a specific moral 
conscience that we are born with.  
A belief in such “inborn” shame  
is the basis of the Western mythology 
of transgression. 
Jamake Highwater, The Mythology of Trans-
gression: Homosexuality as Metaphor (11)cha
pte
ne
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hame is a common sensation. An unpleasant contraction felt when 
  one is caught red-handed, shame is manifest on a blushing face. 
It makes one feel both exorbitantly aware of being and, at the same 
time, desperate not to be: to disappear or hide. As such, it is an anti-
thetic emotion, described in terms of freezing, withdrawal or paralysis, 
as well as burning, aggrandisement or transgression. because of the fact 
that shame is felt in and on the body, and, at the same time, breaches 
the body’s limits, it makes one feel too large or too small, both indis-
cernible and overexposed. A shamed person is therefore perplexingly 
(un)framed. Indeed, the angst inscribed in the experience of shame 
is that of “losing face”: the fundamental “(Who) am I?” becomes inevi-
table. In this book, the “I” whose identity is thus unfixed is gendered 
feminine.
Shame, at the same time, is a cultural phenomenon. Inscribed 
within basic discourses of the culture of the West, it becomes an in-
strument of power and subjection. As such, it not only merits a full-
fledged study, but also calls for a remedy. As a function of the lan-
guage rooted in androcentric metanarratives, it has detrimentally 
affected women since the time immemorial—not only at the level de-
scribable in terms of sociopolitical dynamics between (traditionally 
conceived) genders, but also at the level of the body: a non-discursive 
entity beyond language. born in discourse, cultural shame transcends 
discourse; yet, even though the body will not lend itself to deconstruc-
tions, rhetorical strategies of shaming, which involve the attribution 
of values to the body, will. The underlying assumption of the argument 
presented in this book is that, like shame, the rhetorical disempower-
ment of shaming discourses will manifest itself in and on the shame-
less body: at home with one’s body, the de-shamed self becomes “rift-
less.” No longer politically disciplined or coerced, such a self may seek 
its own definition beyond inherited categories: Woman’s1 self, no longer 
determined by the androcentric language, loses rigid fixity imposed 
by patriarchal categories: instead, it brings a plethora of possible alter-
natives into play. 
It is, obviously, easier said than done: we are born into and raised 
in a language that has always already defined our reality. And yet, lit-
 1 Whenever in my work I refer to “woman” (and/or “man”) as generalised, cultural 
constructs, I start the words with the capital letters or use plural forms. I address 
complexities inscribed in the concept of “Woman” and her affinity to shame 
in greater detail in the second, theoretical, chapter of this book.
erature, the testing ground for ideas, remains far from “exhausted.” 
poised against language, self-conscious and self-reflective, literature 
has the power of annulling and redefining categories not only by de-
constructing fundamental oppositions upon which central metanarra-
tives rest, but also by its capacity of exposing the reader to an experi-
ence which in itself transgresses discourse. An act of reading, as well 
as an act of writing, is an existential act, throwing one into the liminal 
space where the organising principles of the dominant discourses col-
lapse. It is such an experience, born in my immersion in the literary 
discourse of Canada, that inspires this book: my theoretical reflection 
concerning the fundamentals of culture is derived from the “literary 
testing ground” of Lorna Crozier’s poetry, whose intuitive attempts 
to use language against itself result in the disempowering of the rhet-
oric of shame without resorting to the use of unyieldingly rigid, accept-
able, institutionalised, “intersubjectively verifiable” categories. My book 
begins where she has left off: it uses Crozier’s literary intuitions as a pre-
text to revise existing theoretical visions of shame in order to propose 
a non-essentialist theory which would acknowledge the value of meta-
phorical, non-categorial, poetic language as a means to both describe 
and create reality.
My study’s departure point is, at the same time, a point of conver-
gence of the literary discourses, mainstream feminist theories and psy-
chological studies focused upon the nature of the shame affect. It is 
upon such a fundament that I aim to translate the psychological theory 
of shame into the language of feminism, thus working out a set of tools 
by means of which it would be possible to formulate a gendered theory 
of Woman’s shame. First, however, things first.
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1.1. shame psychology:
androcentrism in therapy
I knew that I needed to intervene. As I continued to gaze into her face 
and into her eyes, I said, “Imagine me right there beside you as your ally, 
right there in that room with you. I want you to picture me standing 
there. Can you see me?” After a pause, Theresa nodded her agreement, 
her eyes closed. “Yes  . . .  I can see you  . . .  with me.” 
Gershen Kaufman, The psychology of Shame. Theory and Treatment 
of Shame-based Syndromes (306)
hame psychology is a field of study originating in the work of Silvan 
   Tomkins, and further evolving in the writings of such major figures 
in the field as Gershen Kaufman, benjamin Kilborne, Michæl Lewis, 
Donald L. Nathanson, Stephen pattison or Léon Wurmser. Although, 
in general, it is unaffiliated specifically to either cultural studies or femi-
nist theory, shame psychology offers the most expansive studies 
of the eponymous affect, and was one of the first academic disciplines 
to acknowledge shame as a factor crucial to the formation and devel-
opment of one’s identity. Thus far, as a rule, specialists in the area have 
mostly focused their attention on the negativity of the experience 
of shame and its destructiveness to the process of identity formation. 
In their works, shame has emerged as “the most disturbing experience 
individuals ever have about themselves”—one wounding the self from 
within (Kaufman and raphael xiii). The wound, however, as Gershen 
Kaufman and Lev raphæl imagine it, is not mortal: therefore, the re-
searchers have proposed that shame be fought by means of boosting 
their patients’ self-esteem and helping them discover their “inner 
power.” The validity of their therapeutic goals notwithstanding, 
the clinical practice seems to rest upon theoretical foundations rein-
forcing, rather than eliminating, the essential reason why their patients 
became patients in the first place, which claim the following examples 
seem to confirm. 
Gershen Kaufman’s description of one of his “clinical [cases]” (305), 
providing the motto opening this section of my book, involves a story 
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of Theresa, a patient of his, and a victim of childhood sexual abuse, 
who suffered consequences of prolonged exposure to shame. “physi-
cally violating the body,” writes Kaufman, “invariably generates pro-
found shame; in response to shame one naturally feels to blame” (305). 
In Theresa’s story two different representations of patriarchal power—
the father and the therapist—come to perform, respectively, two oppo-
site functions: that of the abuser and that of the saviour. However, 
most intriguing about the motto is that its rhetoric seems modelled 
on representations of gender omnipresent in romantic narratives. In her 
therapist’s account, Theresa becomes a damsel in distress, who pas-
sively awaits masculine assistance. The man, on the other hand, ac-
tively intervenes, by means of penetrating the woman with his probing 
look and then entering her mind. Evidently, the therapist-patient rela-
tionship reflects the agent-patient hierarchy characteristic of the tradi-
tional Western order of gender relations.
Other shame psychologists offer similar narratives. For example, 
in Nathanson’s Shame and Pride. Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self, 
Michæl Lewis’s Shame: The Exposed Self, or Léon Wurmser’s “Shame: 
The Veiled Companion of Narcissism,” theoretical ponderings of the au-
thors are often intertwined with the personal confessions of their fe-
male patients. regardless of whether these stories are narrated 
in the first person, or already “appropriated” by the therapist, the pa-
tients are presented as coming to therapy in order to seek illumina-
tion: an epiphany by the light of the therapist’s authority. The process 
of helping a shamed woman seems to require that she surrenders her-
self to the authority, or—like Theresa—closes her eyes in an act of ther-
apeutic submission. The three “case studies” below manifest different 
facets of the complex relationship between a male therapist and a fe-
male patient:
Consider Laura, a young woman who came into therapy to see if she was 
“crazy,” as her father had always taught her. Well, no, she certainly was not 
crazy, but she seemed frozen inside, the needing and feeling part of her 
locked deeply away. Therapy proceeded slowly, intellectually, until the fourth 
session. I sensed she was feeling shame, a prisoner of exposure. She appeared 
to be feeling acutely self-conscious during our meetings. After she agreed 
with my observation, I asked her if she was willing to try something. Looking 
at me quizzically, she nodded. I invited her to relax in the chair and close her 
eyes, adding that I would close mine and I would not peak. She laughed. 
(Kaufman 161)
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Sandy and I are well into the initial history, that group of sessions during 
which a therapist should be the most intrusive. At forty, she has a graduate 
degree that allows her to make a good living, but is otherwise unhappy 
with her life. What she wants out of therapy is clear: “I want confidence—
believing in yourself. I am so afraid of intimacy that I am afraid if I meet 
the right person I won’t know what to do. Near the end of our first meeting 
she touched her cheek fleetingly as if to check its temperature, then breathed 
a sigh of relief and said, “At least I didn’t say ‘I’m sorry’ every five minutes 
like I used to.” . . .  We have agreed that, in order for us to learn what lies be-
neath her symptoms, I will be permitted to ask several deeply personal 
questions. (Nathanson 315)
A patient of mine had a sexual encounter with someone outside of her mar-
riage. She told me that this encounter had occurred several years earlier 
and that she had felt terribly ashamed. She saw herself as violating the family 
unit and, because of this shame, found herself so unhappy that she finally 
confessed her transgression to her husband. It is important to note what she 
reported she felt after she finally confessed. She said, “After I told him, and he 
said that he understood and still loved me, I felt as if weight had been lifted 
from me.” In other words, confession had redeemed her, since she would 
confess to the one whom she transgressed against and who forgave her. 
(Lewis 134)
The first patient, Laura (not unlike Theresa), passes from subjection 
to one patriarchal authority (the father who proclaimed her “crazy”) 
to another (a therapist whose professional training allows him to verify 
the father’s statement). Laura is “frozen inside” and “a prisoner of ex-
posure.” The goal of her therapist, therefore, is to warm her up and 
make her feel comfortable. The first stage of her therapy—slow and in-
tellectual—is a form of a foreplay followed by a breakthrough: Laura 
relaxes and places her confidence in the man (she trusts he will not 
peek). As evidenced by the quotation above, the (supposedly remedial) 
discursive act of baring oneself in front of a therapist resembles 
“a sexual act based on male norms” (bernstein 23). The process of free 
associations in particular requires that “the patient [yields] to psycho-
analysis, . . .  [abandons herself] to a process, a phrase that implicates 
the talking cure as a version of sexual seduction” (bernstein 25). Con-
currently, Sandy—the second case study—comes to her therapist 
for lessons in intimacy, and consents to the man’s intrusiveness. 
The mention of the patient touching her—possibly hot, possibly 
blushing—cheek and breathing a sigh of relief adds an erotic dimension 
to Nathanson’s description.
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The anonymous woman of the third quote is healed through acts 
of confession: first she confesses her transgression to her husband 
and then—to her therapist. In order to be cured, she needs to tell 
a shame-full story twice, a sine-qua-non of the commencement 
of the process of recovery. psychotherapy—especially when based 
on Freudian psychoanalysis—is similar to confession (not only in its de-
mand that the shameful truth be revealed, but also because it is regu-
lated by the hierarchy inscribed between the therapist and the patient). 
Like confession, also psychotherapy commonly relies on storytelling 
and interpreting. both often focus on sexuality, and particularly on 
“whatever is considered pathological, perverse or illicit” (bernstein 16). 
Like confession, psychotherapy promises absolution through purgation.
What is more—to return to the earlier analogy—in order for psycho-
analysis to work, the psychoanalyst has to be consecrated as the father 
confessor, endowed with a “magnified scope of visual, aural, and silent 
sources of knowledge” (26), an almost godlike ability to read the un-
conscious. The “talking cure,” in other words, requires that the unques-
tionable superiority of the therapist be accepted by the patient, 
and therefore the “talking” part of it gives way to the more important 
notions of control and silencing. In the light of what has been stated 
so far, it seems apparent that for a shamed woman thus construed psy-
choanalysis can be used as a way to further subjugation, rather than 
liberation.2
 2 A Canadian author who intimates the problematic relationship between a woman 
and her therapist from the perspective of both, a patient and a feminist, is Janice 
Williamson. In her Crybaby!—a narrative which revolves around the memory 
of childhood sexual abuse—she anxiously observes how someone’s memories can be 
usurped and either certified or invalidated by instances of power. She also offers 
an insight into how a woman patient is construed as powerless and hence having 
no access to the truth. “In our culture”—as Williamson asserts—“the figure 
of the child has a lot in common with the woman who speaks into the wind; in spite 
of experience and accomplishments, the problem of legitimacy persists” (176). Corre-
spondingly, a woman who narrates her shameful story is a child-woman who speaks 
with the child’s voice, and as such needs to respond to the authority and judgment 
of her therapist.
Williamson expresses her doubts concerning the therapeutic “act of telling 
things” a number of times, most clearly, perhaps, in the penultimate part of the book, 
titled “Fragments of an Analysis.” Although the extent to which the methods em-
ployed by her therapists rely on Freudian conception of psychoanalysis is not clearly 
determined, they depend on verbal expression and require that the hierarchy be-
tween the doctor and the patient be maintained. “In spite of many satisfying mo-
ments of comfort and the fact that good therapy probably saved my life”—writes 
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toward a reconceptualisation 
of methodology
Even though the examples quoted above support the intuitive need to revise available theories of shame, I do not aim to propose any 
alternative forms of individual therapy. Instead, since I am interested 
in shame as a cultural phenomenon, rather than discussing an appar-
ently neutral concept of a (de)shamed “self,” my argument focuses spe-
cifically on the phenomenon of the (de)shaming of women in the cul-
ture of the West. Concentrating upon strategies of transcending shame 
(which, when translated into the language of popular psychology, con-
notes “fighting it,” or “self-healing”), I am primarily interested in the de-
marginalisation of possible parallel (subversive) paradigms of reading 
of cultural texts, which, albeit potentially therapeutic in individual 
cases, applies, above all, to a wide cultural context. With such a goal 
in mind, in order to explore the relationship between Woman 
and shame I examine ways in which the findings of shame psycholo-
gists have been read and interpreted by a group of influential theorists 
critiquing the principles underlying the metanarrative orders that orga-
nise Western societies. 
In fact, for over a decade now, a number of feminist, postcolonial, 
and queer theorists have been involved with the debate addressing 
the theory of shame as related to their own fields of study. This, in turn, 
has produced a plethora of cultural and literary interpretations re-
Williamson—“sometimes I found myself . . .  resenting the conversation” (176). What 
she subsequently details are, seemingly, the moments of resistance against the au-
thority of her therapists. She notices repeatedly that these specialists—regardless 
of their gender—work within the constraints of a limited and limiting patriarchal 
discourse, that they often reiterate overly simplified formulas, and disregard their 
patient’s intelligence and insight. “Talk about ‘the child within’ drove me wild with 
fury”—Williamson declares—“as though history were a series of transparent layers 
to be peeled off one by one” (176). What the narrator senses at times is that she 
knows more, knows better, as a feminist, a scholar, and a chronicler of her own past. 
However, she finds herself “playing dumb” (177), and saying nothing. “Why?”—she 
asks—“It doesn’t make sense” (177). 
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volving around shame or adopting it as a central concept.3 For instance, 
such feminist critics as Simone de beauvoir or Sandra Lee bartky em-
phasise the paralysing effects of shame and write about shaming 
as a cultural mechanism of control, implemented and institutionalised 
in order to keep women passive. In turn, queer theorists, including Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick and Sally r. Munt, focus on the transgressive na-
ture of the affect. The parallel existence of these two, apparently con-
trary, perspectives indicates the paradoxical nature of shame. The above 
notwithstanding, however, both must be taken into account in order 
to elucidate the dynamics underlying the two processes of my interest: 
cultural shaming, and feminist de-shaming of Woman.
And thus, rather than simply due to the fact that the source of my 
inspiration was the work of a Canadian woman poet, it is mainly via 
feminist and queer studies that the affect central to this book becomes 
linked to my third area of interest. The rhetoric of shame, interestingly, 
seems to harmonise with the language employed by scholars in these 
fields to address the ever-elusive concept of Canadianness. yet, while 
queer theorists emphasise the indefiniteness and unfixedness of Cana-
dian national identity, feminist researchers assert that women and Ca-
nadians speak from the same position of the margins. The feminiza-
tion of Canada, however, precedes the feminist critique of Woman 
as the Other: for example, in the 19th-century adventure stories set 
in the Canadian North, the hostile landscape was often addressed 
by means of the topos of the female body—one which needs first to be 
tamed and then taken in possession. 
Granted, it is in thus gendered Canadian scenery that Lorna Cro-
zier’s poems are inscribed. In fact, Crozier’s works—including her most 
recent Small Beneath the Sky: A Prairie Memoir (2009) and Small Me-
 3 These publications include Joseph Adamson’s Melville, Shame and the Evil Eye: 
A Psychoanalytic Reading (1997), Scenes of Shame. Psychoanalysis, Shame, 
and Writing (1999), edited by Joseph Adamson and Hilary Clark, J. brooks bouson’s 
Quiet As It’s Kept. Shame, Trauma, and Race in the Novels of Toni Morrison (2000), 
and Ewan Fernie’s Shame in Shakespeare (2002). The more recent works linking 
shame studies with feminist, and gay and lesbian studies, respectively, are J. brooks 
bouson’s Embodied Shame. Uncovering Female Shame in Contemporary Women’s 
Writing (2009) and Gay Shame by David Halperin and Valerie Traub (2010). 
As I was preparing this book for publication, the following works were announced 
as forthcoming: Timothy bewes’s The Event of Postcolonial Shame (2011), Neil See-
man’s and patrick Luciani’s XXL: Obesity and the Limits of Shame (2011) and Amy 
Erdman Farrell’s Fat Shame: Stigma and the Fat Body in American Culture (2011).
d
e-sh
a
m
ed
chanics (2011)—have most often been classified as “prairie writing.” 
yet, even though the seven poems I have chosen as illustrations of my 
theoretical considerations make no direct references to Canada 
as a place, they often focus on the female body as markedly “deterrito-
rialised.” by means of the same “topographical” rhetoric, which often 
looms large in poetic descriptions of the space of Canada, Crozier em-
phasises the body’s transformative properties in order to question pa-
triarchal definitions of Woman and effectively points to such a theo-
retical space where the theories of shame, gender, queerness and 
Canadianness meet and intersect. 
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1.3. an ascending spiral:
methodology and organisation 
of the argument
Attaining thus defined goals, however, requires a rather rigid argu-mentative frame, fashioned, so to say, upon the principle of the “as-
cending spiral.” rather than dismiss the findings of androcentric shame 
psychology, I revise the assumptions of this discipline by recontextual-
ising it within frames of contemporary feminist and queer studies. 
The consistency of a thus proposed theory would rely upon the “gen-
dered” version of the methodological foundations of shame psychology, 
yet its applications would go beyond individual therapy. Such a theory 
aspires to offer tools first to recognise and then to interpretively coun-
teract shaming discourses inscribed within cultural texts of the West. 
The methodological position I develop translates into the following 
composition of the book: in chapter two, “Towards a Theory of Wom-
an’s Shame,” I first present an overview of selected works by the most 
influential shame psychologists in order to both introduce concepts 
I employ further in my work, and—more importantly—to indicate 
the areas these thinkers have left uncharted due to the paucity of their 
references to women or gender. It is, in fact, my intention to try and fill 
in these gaps with the use of feminist and queer theories.
Secondly, I characterise the generalised cultural construct dubbed 
“Woman” and then proceed to define Woman’s shame in light of femi-
nist cultural studies. The definition of Woman which I adopt is histori-
cally rooted in the now canonical theory proposed by Simone de beau-
voir, the first feminist author to evidence a close relationship between 
Woman and shame. Western culture, in beauvoir’s interpretation, 
tends to identify Woman with her body, and to attach multiple, often 
self-contradictory and objectionable meanings to the Woman/body 
construct. The Woman’s body is visible; it both makes her and is her; 
it is a conspicuous object that others examine and evaluate. In beau-
voir’s terms, becoming Woman resembles being taught how to play 
a role in a cultural performance—a role which requires no lines and no 
movement, but demands that the trainee go on stage with the acute 
realisation that an audience is there, invisible, yet watchful and judg-
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mental. In order to guide Woman off the thus construed stage, 
in the final sections of the second chapter I offer an insight into shame’s 
transformative and transgressive potential. In light of queer theory 
and the highly ambiguous concept of Canadianness, it becomes pos-
sible to demonstrate that shame may provide the stimulus opening up 
possibilities of various redefinitions of Woman’s subjectivity. 
To illustrate the applicability of the theoretical perspective worked 
out in chapter two, I proceed to the third, interpretive chapter, “Lorna 
Crozier’s Feminist Strategies: Four Studies in Transcending Woman’s 
Shame.” It comprises four subchapters illustrating particular ways of de-
shaming Woman. In the first subchapter, entitled “Transgressing Trans-
gression. Subverting the Authority of the biblical Creation Myth (‘Orig-
inal Sin’ and ‘What I Gave you, Truly’),” I demonstrate how the ideas 
presented in the theoretical chapters relate to the paradigmatic experi-
ence of Woman’s shame. The subject of my investigation is the biblical 
Eve and the Original Shame she brought upon humankind. The anal-
yses of Crozier’s poems allow me to trace both feminist and queer strat-
egies which prove efficient as discursive tools facilitating acts of “going 
beyond shame”: in this case, the shame attributed to Eve, one of the pro-
totypical models of femininity in Western culture.
The broad perspective of foundational metanarratives of Judeo-
Christianity provides a backdrop against which the analyses included 
in the second subchapter, “Shrinking the Shrink. Subverting the Au-
thority of the ‘Classical’ Theories of Sex and Gender (The Penis Poems),” 
gain particular focus. In this section, I propose a reading of Crozier’s 
“poem for Sigmund” and “Tales for Virgins,” which belong to a poetic 
cycle of twelve verses under the common title of The Penis Poems. 
“poem for Sigmund” is a feminist response to the Freudian concept 
of “penis envy” and to the cultural sublimation of the male sexual 
organ. Employing the rhetoric of feminist re-visions of Freud’s theo-
ries, I aim to demonstrate central characteristics of Crozier’s ironic 
strategy, and to show how she succeeds in de-shaming Woman’s ap-
parent “lack.” This, subsequently, leads to the debarring of the “oxy-
moronic” nature of cultural myths narrating (and thus regulating) vir-
ginity and its loss, as well as conditioning the shame inscribed in both. 
The overall effect of such a strategy is the undermining of the “institu-
tionalised truths” about femininity, legitimised by virtue of their root-
edness of androcentric psychoanalytic discourses in patriarchal meta-
narratives of the West.
The third subchapter, “Gazing at the Gaze. Subverting the ‘Ocular 
regime’ (‘Alice’ and ‘Sometimes My body Leaves Me’),” focuses upon 
two representations of the Woman’s body. The bodies in both poems 
would commonly be referred to as “normal”: there is nothing excep-
tional about them. And yet, it is in these bodies that shame emerges 
“naturally” due to the objectifying, shaming look the heroines 
of the poems adopt as their own. My goal is to examine possible 
counter-looks, ones that transgress the “self-other” duality. 
The ensuing, fourth subchapter, titled “Subjectifying the Subject. 
Subverting the Western beauty Myth (‘The Fat Lady’s Dance’),” criti-
cally addresses meanings attributed to the female body marked as fat. 
Since contemporary Western culture has rendered the fat body partic-
ularly visible, in light of the debate on the troubled relationship be-
tween shame and visibility it becomes clear why it is the body of a fat 
woman that would be burdened with an exceptionally negative 
weight. Crozier’s poem, however, consistently unburdens the Fat 
Lady—not of fat, but of shame-inducing meanings. The interpretive 
chapter ends with a short résumé entitled “Kissing and Telling.” 
The analysis of Crozier’s de-shaming strategies, carried out within 
the frame of the theory worked out in the theoretical sections of this 
book, leads to its final chapter. recapitulating findings derived from 
analyses, the “Conclusions” simultaneously confirm the applicability 
of the proposed theoretical apparatus to the study of issues relating 
to Woman’s shame and indicate possible paths towards further revision 
of the existing state of knowledge, as well as—consequently—toward 
the abandonment of detrimental cultural practices. It is thus without 
any claims to exhaustiveness or universality that the present book as-
pires to make a foray into a territory of transgression: working from 
“within” the dominant patriarchal paradigm, the argument presented 
here leads towards a space in which shame’s defining power would 
no longer affect either the shape of Woman’s self, or that of her body.

TW
TW
Ochapter
toward a theory 
of woman’s shame
In order to attain goals described 
above, it makes sense to begin with 
a critical overview of theoretical 
stances which scholars have thus far 
adopted with respect to the shame 
affect, and to indicate the “blind 
spots” that need filling if a theoretical 
foundation for effective strategies 
of transcending Woman’s shame  
is to be proposed. The present chapter 
serves this purpose, simultaneously 
mapping present-day knowledge 
of the subject and defining central 
concepts of the methodological 
framework of this book. (ZS)
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2.1. blind spots:
psychology of shame 
and the question of gender
 n The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based
 Syndromes, Gershen Kaufman remarks on both gender and culture 
as factors relevant to analyses of the shame affect. “Shame exerts 
a powerful shaping influence over the development of gender-specific 
behaviour,” he states, “and that patterning is equally culture-specific” 
(93). In American culture in particular, 
men have traditionally been shamed for expressing distress affect (crying), 
fear affect, and shame affect. Men have also been shamed for expressing 
their need for affirmation, for touching/holding, and for identification, 
to feel merged with another. In contrast, women in this culture traditionally 
have been shamed for expressing anger affect and excitement affect, for as-
serting power, and for expressing their need to differentiate from significant 
others—to define themselves as distinctly different and separate while 
placing their own desires ahead of others’ desires. (93)
Kaufman’s observations clearly imply that both men and women 
have been shamed for exhibiting behaviours stereotypically ascribed 
to the other gender. Whereas showing such emotions as distress or fear, 
as well as seeking close contact and protection, have traditionally been 
inscribed in the cultural construct of “femininity,” expressing anger 
or desire for autonomy and independence, related strictly to the power 
of authority and control, have long been considered markedly mascu-
line. “proper” femininity, shamed for any attempts to differentiate it-
self from “significant others,” should be associated with a physicality 
(expressed, for instance, in the urge to touch and hold, and to be 
touched and held) that is fluid: Woman “merges with another.” Mascu-
linity, conversely, is understood in terms of differentiation and separa-
tion: Man, defining himself clearly and distinctly, protects his clear-cut 
sense of the self. Furthermore, in Kaufman’s view, it also appears un-
deniable that within Western culture both men and women who 
do not fit in the respective accepted categories of either masculinity 
or femininity, have often been subject to shaming (suffice it to mention 
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the stereotyping of gay men as passively effeminate, or of feminists 
as equal to lesbians, and as butch and hence unattractive). However, 
what I find particularly interesting in Kaufman’s laconic remarks is 
the suggestion that men are typically shamed for “expressing shame,” 
which, in light of his own observations, may suggest that shame is 
a markedly feminine experience. blushing, averting one’s eyes, and, 
most importantly, succumbing to the power of someone else’s gaze, are 
all desirable—and supposedly attractive—features of femininity. 
Kaufman’s study, however, seems to be only a case in point. 
The scholar explains that within the sphere of psychology, the growing 
interest in shame (originating in Heinz Kohut’s Self-psychology and de-
veloping into shame psychology “proper” in the second half of the 20th 
century) is a result of “the recent acceleration of addictive, abusive 
and eating disorders” (4), in which the feeling of shame plays a central 
role. Along with Kaufman, the most acclaimed shame psychologists, 
such as Donald L. Nathanson or Léon Wurmser, base their definitions 
of shame upon the description of the affect system conceived by Silvan 
Tomkins. Wonderstruck by the fact that his new-born child knows how 
to cry—crying being a complex set of behaviours—Tomkins postulates 
the existence of a number of innate patterns of expression, or “the group 
of ‘hard-wired,’ pre-programmed, genetically transmitted mechanisms 
that exist in each of us and are responsible for the earliest form of emo-
tional life” (Nathanson 58). The scholar distinguishes nine affects, 
among which some are positive (interest/excitement, enjoyment/joy 
and surprise/startle) and others negative (distress/anguish, fear/terror, 
shame/humiliation, dismell, disgust and finally anger/rage).1 Interest-
ingly, what distinguishes shame from other affects is that
[it] appears to be triggered neither by variations in the shape and intensity 
of nonspecific internal neural events  . . .  nor by the detection of specific nox-
ious chemicals, as in the case of the attenuators dismell and disgust. Shame-
humiliation is an inborn script, an attenuator system that can be called into 
operation whenever there is an impediment to the expression of either pos-
itive affect. It depends on the remarkable ability of highly organized, ad-
vanced life forms to assemble the data of perception into patterns 
and to compare those patterns to whatever has been stored as memory. 
In certain situations, as, for instance, when a pattern mismatch is detected 
while we are in the midst of interest or enjoyment, the affect shame-humil-
 1 All the affects are described as pairs, the first element of which is the mildest ver-
sion of an affect, the second its most extreme version.
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iation attempts to reduce the affect that had held sway a moment before. 
(Nathanson 135)
Shame, then, is “an auxiliary to the positive affects, rather than 
a true innate affect” (Nathanson 138). Whenever there is interference 
in the experience of joy/excitement, shame appears, and “the more ex-
cited the organism, the more shame is triggered when the impediment 
is sensed” (139). In other words, 
[o]nly something or someone that has interested you can produce a flush 
of shame. Someone looks at you with interest and you begin to be interested, 
only to realize she’s looking at someone else. Or, as Tomkins notes, “One 
started to smile but found one was smiling at a stranger.” (qtd. in probyn ix–x) 
In Elspeth probyn’s reading of the relation between shame and love, 
the fact that “shame highlights different levels of interest” translates 
into its reaching “to the heart of who we think we are” (x). It is the ex-
perience of being ripped of the interest and enjoyment you once felt, 
and the subsequent “sheer disappointment of loss” that “attacks your 
sense of self” (xii). 
The close relationship between shame and identity is also postu-
lated in Kaufman’s The Psychology of Shame. paraphrasing Tomkins, 
Kaufman defines an individual as an “information-duplicating or-
ganism.” Consequently, he sees 
the self [as] organized around scenes it later reproduces, and identity [as] or-
ganized around scripts.2 Identity is the highest order class of scripts. All 
scripts first evolve from scenes, but then scripts increasingly produce or de-
termine scenes. Multiple and competing identity scripts coexist with the self 
in either a fragmented, patched-together, or integrated manner. (101)
The scenes of shame are, therefore, internalised, and then internally 
reproduced; re-enacted and relived, they replicate the original shame-
based scenes. In contrast to the defending scripts—aimed at avoiding 
further deprecatory experiences—the negative identity scripts are di-
rected inwards; they are “turned against the self” (Kaufman 102). 
In other words, instead of preserving the border between the self 
and the outside world, the identity scripts blur this very threshold 
by means of questioning the self. The internalisation of shame scenes 
 2 The scripts constitute, in Tomkins’s words, the “individual’s rule for predicting, in-
terpreting, responding to, and controlling” affective scenes (qtd. in probyn 83–84).
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leads to the creation of multiple negative identity scripts, such as self-
blame, comparison-making and self-contempt, which in turn develop 
into the disowning of self, splitting of self and, finally, into shame-
based identity. 
However, it is not only in the process of identity formation that 
shame acts as a central force: it is as important in the development 
of psychopathology. This new understanding of shame, based on the af-
fect and script theories, induces, therefore, the reformulation of psycho-
pathology. Among the syndromes which need to be analysed from 
the perspective of shame, Kaufman lists compulsive syndromes (phys-
ical and sexual abuse, addictive disorders and eating disorders), schizoid, 
paranoid and depressive syndromes, phobic syndromes, sexual dys-
function syndromes, splitting syndromes (borderline, narcissistic, 
and multiple personality disorders), as well as sociopathic and psycho-
pathic syndromes. Interestingly, even though many of these disorders 
have been analyzed with reference to the concept of gender (notably, 
eating disorders, depression, as well as certain phobias which have been 
connected specifically to femininity), shame psychologists often tend 
to disregard gender differences, or, in line with the idea that shame 
is innate and genetically determined, focus only on the biological differ-
ences between the sexes. Such considerations are of little help in at-
tempting to connect the theoretical notions of “shame” and “Woman” 
as they tend to inscribe both concepts into the realm of the (biologically 
determined) body. 
Accordingly, in the chapter titled “Size and Shape” of his Shame 
and Pride: Affect, Sex and the Birth of the Self, Nathanson states that 
“in the world of shame and pride size comes to be a metaphor of tre-
mendous importance” (167). building his ideas on the fact that 
a shamed person feels lesser, or diminished, Nathanson connects large-
ness with pride and smallness with shame: “[what] we experience 
as small children carries with us throughout life—big means pride, 
and small means shame” (164). According to Nathanson, the apparent 
craving for the gratifying greatness of the body makes itself manifest 
through bodybuilding, men’s concerns about the size of their penis, 
and the surgical augmentation of women’s breasts. Importantly, 
the chapter emphasises the significance of bodily appearance in the ex-
periences of both pride and shame. What it entirely misses, however, 
is the differentiation between men’s and women’s relationship to large-
ness and pride. Specifically, it disregards the fact that Woman—under-
39
d
e-sh
a
m
ed
stood here as a product of Western culture—is not supposed to be 
large, nor is she expected to be proud. 
However, the most striking ideas binding women and shame to-
gether are presented by Nathanson in a short section of the chapter 
“Shame, pride and Sex,” simply titled “Women.” Nathanson starts with 
the bold statement that “[to] grow up female is to learn that you will 
be embarrassed at moments when nobody knows why you are un-
comfortable” (295). In other words, “women are discomforted in areas 
about which men know little,” as “[for] many girls, the vagina calls at-
tention to itself by leaking some sort of discharge.” The psychologist 
explains further that 
[s]tained underpants call to mind the shame of urinary dyscontrol and all 
the frailty of early childhood; the fear that one has contracted some deadly 
disease may follow in rapid succession. As Gail paster has commented, 
women often think of themselves as “leaky vessels” that spill whatever liq-
uids are entrusted to them. Menstrual blood, male ejaculatory fluids, even 
the secretions accompanying the sexual arousal, place women at risk of ex-
posure and shame. With the leakage of fluid also comes odor—thus a woman 
is subject to both self-dismell and self-disgust merely because she is female. 
These affects, of course, keep company with shame. (296; my italics) 
Nathanson thus binds femaleness with the lack of self-control 
and indispensable presence of self-dismell, self-disgust and, conse-
quently, shame. What he earlier referred to as mysterious, secret, 
and unknown to anybody, suddenly becomes the site of the hazardous 
exposure of the natural female effluvium. Notably, Nathanson clearly 
misinterprets paster’s point: in fact, she suggests that presenting wom-
en’s bodies as (either secretly or revealingly) “leaking” is a strategy ori-
ented toward shaming these bodies. In her The Body Embarrassed: 
Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England, paster 
claims that such a strategy has a long history. The renaissance dis-
course, she observes,
inscribes women as leaky vessels by isolating one element of the female 
body’s material expressiveness—its production of fluids—as excessive, hence 
either disturbing or shameful. It also characteristically links this liquid ex-
pressiveness to excessive verbal fluency. In both formations, the issue 
is women’s bodily self-control or, more precisely, the representation of a par-
ticular kind of uncontrol as a function of gender. . . .  representations of the fe-
male body as a leaking vessel display that body as beyond the control 
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of the female subject , and thus as threatening the acquisitive goals 
of the family and its maintenance of status and power. (25)
It is the apparent conspicuity of women’s incontinence that Na-
thanson finds threatening and shameful. Like little Karen from Hans 
Christian Andersen’s “red Shoes,” whose story I discuss in the inter-
pretive chapter, Woman has no control over the shameful transgres-
sions in which her body loses itself. by means of closely binding the fe-
male body with shame, Nathanson, in fact, secures the position of this 
body in the old patriarchal rhetoric of female monstrosity, and there-
fore presents it as torn between two extremes: it is both disgusting 
and alluring, unambiguous in its blatant physiology and enigmatic. 
Correspondingly, further on in the same chapter, the scholar returns 
to the issue of women’s breast-pride and asserts that
[f]emale dress is a dialectic between hidden and shown. but it is not from 
women that breasts are hidden, for all of this affect is generated in terms 
of male fascination. There is no better way to guarantee interest than to hide 
something—that girls cover their breasts and giggle among themselves 
helps set boys on fire. However a girl may feel about her size and physical 
power relative to the boys who interest her, she has power over them simply 
because she has breasts that will remain hidden from them as long as she 
wishes. . . .  Even now, when women appear at the beach in bathing cos-
tumes that expose all but a symbolic area of breast surface, the female breast 
is treated as if it were invisible.  . . .  Think then about woman who has 
by some fluke of nature been denied the development of mature breasts. 
She will experience some degree of shame relative to other women, some 
lessening of her power over men, and significant interference with her 
ability to admire herself. (296–297; my italics)
The quotation implies that female breasts are there to sexually 
arouse/subject a male audience, and that in order to perform this func-
tion they must remain hidden. Woman who happens not to be en-
dowed with large breasts not only has no power over Man, but also 
experiences shame. Indeed, the size of the body, menstruation and 
the insufficient “development of mature breasts” are likely to trigger 
Woman’s shame. However, the relationship between body size, men-
struation, breasts and Woman’s shame is not—as Nathanson implies— 
obvious or natural. In paster’s words, “[the] idea of a body oppressed 
by the weight, volume or poor quality of its own liquid contents  . . . 
has obvious ideological import for the metaphor of the body politic 
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and the material means of its reproduction” (78). Woman’s shame 
is thus not merely a result of one’s bodily dissatisfaction, but a pow-
erful means of repression. 
Another work on shame which is both grounded on essentialist un-
derstanding of Man’s and Woman’s identity and openly anti-feminist, 
is an anthology, one of the series titled Focus on Men, devoted entirely 
to the phenomenon of men’s shame. Men Healing Shame, edited 
by roy u. Schenk and John Everingham, combines twenty articles 
written by men who “desire to speak in male voice, with the male 
mode of feeling” (Everingham 3). The assumption of the collection 
is that “something is quite different about the way men and women 
experience, process, and seek to avoid shame” (4). yet, according to 
Everingham, the only clear difference is that “women tend to be 
ashamed of their bodies, whereas . . .  men are more ashamed of [their] 
feelings” (4). Indeed, rather than focusing on differences, the authors 
note multiple similarities between Man’s and Woman’s shame. For in-
stance, in his article titled “Shame in Men’s Lives,” Schenk claims that 
“men seem  . . .  locked in self-destructive gender roles” (15) and notes 
that the “shame used to enforce gender role expectations” (16) is shared 
by Man and Woman:
Through a wide spectrum of shaming actions, attitudes, words, and expres-
sions, we make our disapproval very clear to growing children when they de-
viate from gender role expectations. The word “tramp” exemplifies this 
shaming process. In one sense, the word means the same thing whether it is 
applied to male or to a female: it means a person who deviates from the ex-
pected gender role. For a man, it involves failing to be an achiever; 
for a woman, it means failing to maintain moral superiority. The roles are dif-
ferent for men and women, but the shaming message is the same. (16)
Whereas it is impossible to measure the intensity of shame experi-
enced by women and men when they are called “tramps,” it is inter-
esting that the word only gains sexual connotations when used with 
reference to Woman. Words such as “tramp” or “whore” are sometimes 
understood as markers of Woman’s identity: once fallen, she can never 
regain her chastity. Such words are also used on a great variety of oc-
casions to denote a number of behaviours,3 rather than to castigate 
 3 For example, apart from meaning “prostitute” and “a promiscuous girl,” the word 
“tramp” may also be used with reference to “a girl who goes with many different 
men, getting or attempting to get ‘what she wants’ out of him and then leaving”; 
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a particular behaviour. The word “tramp” meaning “somebody who 
is poor,” appears to be more limited in its semantics, and is neither de-
finitive nor descriptive of the person’s character. The “shaming message” 
behind the word “tramp,” consequently, appears to be quite different 
for Man and for Woman.
However, Schenk’s “male voice” takes the most misogynist tone 
in his claim that “feminists have tended to explain every difference be-
tween men and women as an expression of supposed female inferi-
ority, [and] they have therefore promoted women as victims” (17). 
by means of such promotion, they have incited man’s shame. Contrary 
to feminist claims, women, according to Schenk, “are seen as the au-
thorities on morality” (17) and their moral authority “extends to æs-
thetics, nurturing, relationships, attitudes, motives, spirituality, feelings 
and values” (17). Here Schenk seems to disregard the patriarchal his-
tory of Western culture and misinterprets the basic tenets of the femi-
nist movement whose aim, in the most general terms, has been to un-
mask Woman (one of the masks being that of a moral authority) and, 
by means of contesting women’s secondary status, to change their po-
sition in Western culture. It seems, hence, that rather than contributing 
to a discussion on the relationship between gender and shame, Men 
Healing Shame reproduces gender stereotypes. yet, when one takes 
into consideration the emotional and often offensive tone of some 
of the articles, the collection may also be seen as the mark of a shift 
in gender-related power structures, which, as Schenk indirectly admits, 
is due to the effectiveness of feminist de-shaming strategies.
Even though in the field of shame psychology no publications are 
devoted entirely to the nature of Woman’s shame, there are a number 
of texts from this domain which I have found helpful in my attempt 
to determine its characteristics. The four works that I discuss here link 
shame to body size, body image, and bodily exposure. In Shame: 
The Exposed Self, for example, Michæl Lewis cites the biblical Creation 
Myth and, specifically, the biblical version of the origin of shame. 
“a sexually promiscuous but unattractive or downright nasty girl or woman, not hot 
enough to be a bimbo  . . . ”; or “a girl with none or lower class values” (World Wide 
Web <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=tramp> (04.02.2011). 
The word “whore,” on the other hand can, surprisingly, “be turned around to be a term 
of affection, since ‘whore’ comes from an old root meaning ‘to like’ . . . ” (World Wide 
Web <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=whore&page=4> (04.02.
2011)). It can, therefore, be used among friends in a complimentary way (“you look 
like a total ho,” meaning, “you look hot”).
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In Lewis’s words, “the Old Testament story of Adam and Eve’s cre-
ation, their freedom to obey or disobey God’s injunction, their disobe-
dience, judgment by God, and punishment signify the importance 
of shame” (85). In the biblical story, curiosity (interest) leads to dis-
obedience and knowledge, which in turn results in the realisation 
of one’s shameful exposure in the eyes of God. One has to know (rules 
and one’s behaviour in regard to these rules, as well as oneself ) in order 
to feel shame. The story of creation is also a starting point for Lewis’s 
analysis of the importance of gender differences in relation to shame: 
it is the woman who is held responsible for the first sacrilege. 
Therefore, in the chapter titled “The Socialization of Shame: From 
parent to Child,” Lewis writes about mothers’ resorting to humiliation, 
disgust and contempt in the process of bringing up girls: 
The socialization literature indicates that mothers tend to be more punitive 
toward their daughters than their sons, but that they use more physical 
punishment with their sons. I think that this data on mothers’ punitive be-
havior reflects their use of disgust/contempt more with their daughters than 
their sons. If mothers punish daughters more than sons, but employ phys-
ical punishment less frequently for girls than for boys, mothers must use 
other forms of punishment, including more shame, on daughters than 
on sons. The special relationship that seems to bond mothers and daughters 
may have as one of its components the use and transmission of shame 
for behavioral modification. Moreover, the lack of similarity in the shame 
experience between mother and son, as a reflection of the difference be-
tween males and females, may find its origin in maternal differential use 
of disgust/contempt. (113)
In the section titled “Individual Differences and Shame Fights be-
tween Couples,” Lewis points to further differences between men’s 
and women’s relation to shame and claims that Woman is more likely 
to experience shame than Man, while Man is more prone to experi-
ence guilt.4 Whilst Man’s guilt develops into anger, Woman’s shame 
often transforms into depression. Importantly, as Lewis asserts, women 
are particularly prone to feel ashamed of their appearance; in the most 
extreme cases, the appearance-based shame evolves into eating disor-
 4 In Silvan Tomkins’s terms, guilt is about “what one did,” whereas shame is more 
about “what one is.” In other words, “ . . .  guilt can be understood as feeling disap-
pointed in oneself for violating an important internal value or code of behavior. 
Shame over a failure also feels like a disappointment in self. but here no value has 
been violated” (Tomkins qtd. in Kaufman and raphael 41).
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ders. In Lewis’s words, “physical appearance can be the source 
of a stigma [and] for females, the stigma of being overweight is a very 
powerful social marker” (195). The second most shame-provoking situ-
ation for Woman is a failure in interpersonal relationships. Importantly, 
“females’ moral sense  . . . is influenced more by their relationship 
to others and how others might feel and react than it is to internal 
standards and rules” (179). Lewis further claims that “women’s moral 
standards are consistent with the types of situations which, for them, 
are likely to elicit more shame” (179). 
yet, the author does not restrict his observations to the “ætiology” 
of shame alone. He also suggests a variety of ways of healing shame, 
one of which is confession. Contrary to Foucault’s understanding 
of confession as an act taking place within a power relationship (a po-
sition I adopt in the interpretive part of this work), Lewis construes 
confession as a ritual of bonding between the confessor and the con-
fessant:
In a sense, confession is like laughter. The degree to which people confess their 
transgressions to others is the degree to which they join in with the others 
in observing themselves. This allows the self to move from the self, that is, 
from the source of shame, to the other. This, in turn, allows the self as the “con-
fessee” to look upon the self as the object rather than the subject.  . . .  by ad-
mitting to a past error, the person is able to move from the site of the ob-
served to the site of the observer. (132)
In Lewis’s terms, therefore, the act of confession enables the speak-
ing subject to swap positions with the confessor and join him/her 
in the compassionate look directed at the depersonalised object 
of shame. Such a view, though optimistic, ignores the concept of Woman 
as an object that is fixedly looked at.
“Looked-at-ness,” and its relation to shame, is emphasised in Léon 
Wurmser’s “Shame: The Veiled Companion of Narcissism.” Namely, 
the author concentrates on the importance of being looked at and—
more interestingly—of looking at others, as triggers of shame. The fear 
of being seen, as well as the fear to see—both manifest in the act 
of averting one’s eyes and looking down, or away—are inextricably re-
lated to the mechanism of the affect. As Wurmser suggests, it is often 
through the memory of the shaming gaze of another person that one 
comes to realise the “devouring” power of the look. The scholar relates 
the words of his woman patient: 
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I saw how my parents were killed by the shock of seeing me because I looked 
so dead. I saw things being disorganized all over the world because of me. 
I dreamed I was eating the eyes of the world. I was eating the eyes of Christ, 
blinding him by my eating and drinking. My eating created the darkness. (79)
The dread of being looked at may realise itself in orality: devouring 
looks of others translates into a “gorging binge” (81). Consequently, 
the urge to counteract the devouring looks of another person may find 
its expression in bulimia, or symbolic vomiting of the hateful stares. 
Whether or not the fear of looking/being looked at leads to eating dis-
orders, it does “create darkness,” or lead to the metaphorical death—
the “icy withdrawal” (78)—i.e., passivity, isolation and silence:
The condign punishment for exhibitionism  . . . , one then meted out by the su-
perego, is: to freeze up, to become an inanimate object, like a statue or a pic-
ture, a puppet without life, to become rigid and expressionless. The com-
mensurate punishment for scopophilia . . .  is: to be blinded, unable to perceive, 
to deny, and to be blocked in taking in what is happening and to turn into 
the horror, into the monster itself, to identify with what has been looked at 
illicitly.  . . .  Such punishment is anticipated and preventively employed 
against oneself by the defence of shame as the reaction-formation: “I myself 
am the first to block all my attention and communication; I show myself 
but as frozen, wooden, stiff mask in order not to suffer the fate of freezing, 
dehumanizing shame anxiety.” (82)
As shame blocks joy/interest, a person exposed to the recurring ex-
perience of shame becomes indifferent and disinterested. by getting 
rid of any interest in others, one avoids the risk of being shamed again; 
by becoming blind to other people’s looks, and hence saving them 
from being looked at, one escapes the fate of merging and disappearing 
into others’ eyes. Absenting oneself is the only way to “protect the 
world and self from the magical powers of perception and expression” 
(80). Such a withdrawal, however, deforms one’s personality. by means 
of closing one’s eyes to the information about who one is that come 
from others, one, by extension, ceases to exist. At the same time, 
as the scornful look is internalised and directed inwards, one becomes
split in half: on the one side the spirit of self observation—pale, watching, 
cold, contemptuous—and on the other side the empty spectacle of [one’s] 
actions—feelingless, unreal, a meaningless role. And the self-observation it-
self is watched, in endless perspective of watcher being watched—the well-
known endless sequence of shame about shame. (80)
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The experience of being looked-at appears to be an important com-
ponent of Woman’s shame, as she has traditionally been identified 
with her “looks.” Correspondingly, benjamin Kilborne, a “psychologist 
of appearance,” devotes one chapter of his work Disappearing Persons: 
Shame and Appearance to the already mentioned connection between 
size and shame. The chapter, titled “The Contempt of the Queen’s 
Dwarf: On psychic Size,” focuses upon the size symbolism in such lit-
erary works as Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland or Jonathan Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels. In these analyses, Kilborne incorporates case studies 
of his own patients. Although the author does not distinguish between 
men’s and women’s approach to the concept of size—and, disappoint-
ingly, throughout the whole book hastens from one clinical/literary ex-
ample to another paying little attention to the gender of the patients/
characters—some of the hypotheses he introduces seem useful 
in the process of determining the specific relationship between Woman, 
appearance and shame. For instance, instead of assuming, like Na-
thanson, that in the context of identity discourses “big” invariably 
denotes “shameless,” and “small” is synonymous with “shameful,” 
Kilborne postulates, in the first place, that “ size is an internal or shared 
experience of relative size, dependent upon standards of judgment and 
comparison” (10). Instead of talking about “physical size,” therefore, 
Kilborne prefers to use the term “psychic size” when tracking the rela-
tionship between size and shame. As he replaces the notion of “objec-
tive measurements” with one of subjective “body image,” the author 
recognises that “[being] large can be perceived both as an asset and 
a basic flaw. Similarly, being small can be a symbol of endearment  . . . 
and a symbol of insignificance.  . . .  [The] primary reality is psychic re-
ality” (12–13). Furthermore, in a short section titled “Size Symbolism 
and Fantasized Measurement,” Kilborne states: “[what] matters is not 
who is objectively taller or smaller, but rather whose size is experi-
enced to be the standard by which the other is measured” (17). Evi-
dently, the standard against which Woman is measured is very non-
standard, because it is an elusive ideal of perfect beauty/thinness. As 
Woman is (or feels forced to be) constantly in the course of physical 
transformation, her body image is “ever-fluctuating” (18), which may 
induce, as Kilborne claims, pathological shame: “[just] as healthy nar-
cissism can be associated with a stability in what [the author has] 
termed psychic size, so pathological narcissism (and pathological 
shame) may be related to an instability in psychic size” (Kilborne 21). 
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I assume, therefore, that Woman’s shame remains in a close relation-
ship with her body image.
A number of ideas proposed by Nancy Lindisfarne in her “Gender, 
Shame, and Culture: An Anthropological perspective” will also re-
emerge at a later point in this work. For example, even though the au-
thor refers to Arabo-Islamic culture and writing, her brief considerations 
about how “parts or aspects of human beings   . . .  can be objectified, 
owned, and alienated, sold, or exchanged” (249), and how this is related 
to the experience of shame, prove relevant to analyses of consumerist 
Western societies. What I find particularly interesting in Lindisfarne’s 
reading is the idea that the antithetical notions of shame and honour 
are closely linked to the female body, and that this body—or its gen-
dered attributes, for example, a virgin’s hymen—“can be used to define 
and evaluate all dimensions of [her] personhood” (249). The author’s 
discussion revolves around a pair of concepts—“virginity” and “vi-
rility”—and their affiliation to the notions of honour and shame 
for women and men, respectively. She writes that
[r]hetorically, the virgin’s unbroken hymen is an attribute which stands for 
a unitary individual, and, at that moment when chastity is proven, it de-
fines that individual’s gender as entirely and unambiguously female. Hy-
menal penetration also creates an unambiguously gendered and honourable 
man: it is the means by which a man makes known his virility to himself 
and others. Finally, hymenal penetration effects a radical transformation: 
the womb thus acted upon is transformed and can be made to realize its fer-
tile potential and, by extension, that of the man. (257)
Correspondingly, the female body—when viewed as a cultural com-
modity—is to be controlled not so much for the sake of safeguarding 
its own “reputation” (the term which often replaces the dignified no-
tion of “honour” when femininity is being discussed), but in order to as-
sure the honour of Man.5 In light of the assumption that an unbroken 
hymen creates the identity of a reputable woman, it seems understand-
able that the surgical repair of the hymen (hymenoplasty) has been 
rapidly growing in popularity also in Western cultures. However, 
as “virginity” of Woman translates into “virility” of Man, some 
of the more common reasons for the surgical reconstruction of the hy-
 5 In fact, in the case of Woman, the notions of virginity, reputation, and shame ap-
pear to be strangely connected as, in Ewan Fernie’s words, the “basis of female 
shame is unchastity or a reputation for unchastity” (84; my italics).
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men are “to surprise your partner,” or to present “a gift to your hus-
band.”6 Appropriately, one of the internet slogans advertising “revir-
gination” reads: “you wouldn’t want your boyfriend/future husband 
to feel ashamed because your hymen no longer existed.”7 
Theories proposed in the four texts introduced above—Lewis’s 
Shame: The Exposed Self, Wurmser’s “Shame: The Veiled Companion 
of Narcissism,” Kilborne’s Disappearing Persons: Shame and Appear-
ance and Lindisfarne’s “Gender, Shame, and Culture: An Anthropological 
perspective”—correspond to ideas I propose in the theoretical section 
of this book. Even though in interpretive parts of my study I focus both 
on the transgressive potential inscribed in shame itself, and on the expe-
rience of going beyond shame (or de-shaming), I begin my deliberations 
by discussing shame’s benumbing properties. What interests me pri-
marily is the relationship between shame and femininity defined 
as a cultural construct which requires Woman’s passivity. The notion 
of “Woman’s shame” emerges in my work as an interpretive tool, ap-
plicable for the purpose of elucidation of both discursive and non-dis-
cursive relations between Woman and Western culture. Originating 
in the shaming gaze—which objectifies Woman’s body and concur-
rently teaches her what Woman is—Woman’s shame is internalised 
and accepted as a necessary component of Woman’s identity. This, 
in turn, as suggested by many of the shame psychologists whose work 
I have addressed in this chapter, may lead to one’s dissociation into 
a censorious observer and his censored victim. Since such a shamed 
Woman is preoccupied with reviewing and restricting her own behav-
iour, feminist theory appears to be, either directly or indirectly, 
a counter-response to the paradigm of Woman’s shame. More impor-
tantly, feminist theory becomes a necessary complement to the ex-
isting instrumentation of contemporary shame psychology, since 
the psychological argument, divorced from the distinctive, gendered 
perspective, will not suffice if one endeavours to first understand 
and then explain the significance of shame in the culture of the West. 
 6 “restore Virginity with plastic Surgery. Details about Hymenoplasty or Hymen 
repair procedure.” World Wide Web <www.mynippon.com> (27.01.2011).
 7 “revirgination.” World Wide Web <www.revirgination.net> (27.01.2011).
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2.2. shame-less voices:
woman’s shame
in light of feminist studies
I protested that I was not a suitable third voice, since I was born 
a woman and remain a biological and gender-identified woman.
Joan Nestle “Genders on My Mind” (3)
Joan Nestle’s protest asserts that Woman necessarily lacks subversive-ness implied in the theoretical notion of thirdness: limited by both—
her (apparently cultural) femininity, and her (apparently biological) fe-
maleness—she essentially speaks in the voice of the second sex. The 
concept of Woman, relying upon notions of biological and cultural lim-
itation, resuscitates the central postulates of Simone de beauvoir, ad-
opted and further developed by such feminist thinkers as Susan bordo 
or Sonia Kruks. In beauvoir’s terms—Woman denotes a dubiously the-
oretical space where cultural inhibitions defining femininity mingle 
with biological constraints unique to the female body. The body, 
in turn, “is the instrument of [women’s] grasp upon the world, the out-
line of [their] projects” (beauvoir 34) and, therefore, “to become 
a woman is to find oneself in a world in which possibilities close down 
rather than open up, in which the field of free action narrows even . . . 
to the point of disappearing” (Kruks 47). 
beauvoir’s concept of Woman as the Other—marginalised, es-
tranged, and silenced—corresponds to the image of a shamed person 
who is no longer himself or herself. The above parallelism’s obviousness 
notwithstanding, it is surprising how seldom has the subject of shame 
been dealt with by feminist theorists. While a multitude of works ad-
dress issues indirectly connected to Woman’s shame (particularly texts 
deconstructing Woman’s relationship with her body, or addressing her 
appearance), only few of existing analyses refer directly to shame. 
In the ensuing section, I contextualise my search for a viable theory 
of Woman’s shame by presenting a network of reference composed of 
what I believe are the most intellectually productive feminist analyses 
of the shame affect, encapsulating the most valid observations on the 
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interdependency between the concepts of “Woman” and “shame.” 
Such an overview simultaneously allows me to indicate theoretical 
foundations of the notion of “Woman’s shame” as I use it in subse-
quent chapters of this book, and thus properly—albeit without univer-
salist pretensions—define it for the purpose of my argument.
Expressed in The Second Sex, Simone de beauvoir’s idea of the un-
equivocality of the relationship between Woman and shame relies 
upon the observation that “[o]ne is not born, but  . . .  becomes, a woman” 
(295) through the shaming shock of adolescence, during which Woman 
surfaces on a teenage body and stigmatises it with inferiority, brands 
it with Otherness. The realisation that one has somehow (unwillingly) 
been teleported into a world in which one is the Other is unambigu-
ously characteristic of shame-experience: the feeling of shame is inex-
tricably blended with the feeling of loss. What is “lost” is precisely 
what one used to experience as a coherent “self.” The process of “Wom-
anisation”—in the course of which the “self” loses cohesion—involves
an awareness of one’s “permanent visibility,” learning continually to view 
oneself through the eyes of the generalized (male) inspecting gaze and, in so 
doing, taking up as one’s own project those “constraints of power” that fem-
ininity entails. (beauvoir qtd. in Kruks 58)
Woman’s shame is thus incited by a sudden realisation that her 
physicality is immoderately exposed. beauvoir presages this observa-
tion by pointing out that
[w]hen the breasts and the body hair are developing, a sentiment is born 
which sometimes becomes pride but which is originally shame; all of a sudden 
the child becomes modest, she will not expose herself naked even to her sis-
ters or her mother, she inspects herself with mingled astonishment and horror, 
and she views with anguish the enlargement of this firm and slightly painful 
core, appearing under each nipple, hitherto as inoffensive as the navel.  . . . 
under her sweater or blouse her breasts make their display, and this body 
which the girl has identified with herself she now apprehends as flesh. . . . 
The young girl feels that her body is getting away from her, it is no longer 
a straightforward expression of her individuality; it becomes foreign to her; 
and at the same time she becomes for others a thing: on the street men 
follow her with their eyes and comment on her anatomy. She would like 
to be invisible; it frightens her to become flesh and to show her flesh. (332–333)
Woman is prone to experience shame, since her body makes 
Woman. Whilst Man, in beauvoir’s phrasing, does the looking/judging/
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thinking, Woman merely appears; being Woman entails showing 
Woman, as she looms, swells, and peeps out from underneath her 
clothes. Subjected to the omnipresent phallic gaze, Woman’s body be-
comes the object of shame: terrifying, unwanted, and open not only 
to view, but also to sexual penetration.
While Jean-paul Sartre’s claim is that one can always return 
the shaming look and thus regain puissance, “beauvoir suggests that 
what distinguishes the situation of a woman from that of a man is pre-
cisely her inability to do so” (Kruks 63). Woman is as long as she 
is seen by Man, devoured by his invincible, shaming gaze, immobilised 
and silenced.8 Although the “emphasis on the other suggests  . . .  that 
shame is  . . .  an externally regulated emotion” (Adamson and Clark 9), 
it is, in fact, internalised by Woman “through identification with 
the shamer” (Adamson and Clark 10). In consequence, she experi-
ences “the unreality of [her] own being,” as she is “defined by the iden-
tity of the other” (Wurmser 74).
A more recent feminist account of the relationship between Woman 
and shame comes from Sandra Lee bartky. One of the chapters of her 
Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppres-
sion, titled “Shame and Gender,” examines what bartky refers to 
as “women’s shame.” In order to define the affect, bartky searches into 
explications provided by Jean-paul Sartre, John Deigh and John rawl. 
In bartky’s perspective, women’s shame is 
not so much a particular feeling or emotion (though it involves specific feel-
ings and emotions) as a pervasive affective attunement to the social envi-
ronment,  . . .  women’s shame is more than merely an affect of subordination 
but, within the larger universe of patriarchal social relations, a profound 
mode of disclosure both of self and situation. (85) 
Shame both reduces and reveals; it “requires the recognition that 
I am, in some important sense, as I am seen to be” (86), as well as “in-
volves the distressed apprehension of oneself as a lesser creature” (87). 
Even though bartky associates shame with the act of being displayed/
inferiorised, women’s shame, as she defines it, goes beyond the mere 
concern with one’s body. It “is manifest in a pervasive sense of per-
sonal inadequacy that, like the shame of embodiment, is profoundly 
disempowering; both reveal the ‘generalized condition of dishonor’ 
 8 “[S]he must pretend to be an object, and a fascinating one, when she senses herself 
as an uncertain, dissociated being, well aware of her blemishes” (beauvoir 380).
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which is woman’s lot in sexist society” (85). Shame, therefore, in bart-
ky’s reading, marks the oppressed and “isolates the oppressed from 
one another and in this way works against the emergence of a sense 
of solidarity” (97).
In Blush: Faces of Shame, Elspeth probyn asks the question 
of whether shame feels different for women than for men (82). unlike 
beauvoir and bartky, probyn is interested not only in women being 
shamed, but also in women shaming others. In her analyses, she refer-
ences John braithwaite’s Crime, Shame, and Reintegration, in which 
study he puts forth the claim that “females will more often be the ob-
jects and instruments of . . .  shaming” (qtd. in probyn 90). In his view, 
probyn writes,
living in patriarchal society means that women go from one set of interde-
pendencies to another (from family to marriage). Within these structures 
women are socialized by reintegrative shaming and then become adept 
at using it to socialize others. boys, on the other hand, are given the freedom 
of “time out” from the family. They are also more likely to be the objects 
of stigmatization. boys, according to braithwaite, will more often be thrown 
out outright, whereas mothers will seek to reintegrate their sons into 
the family by shaming them into good behaviour. (90–91)
On a similar note, probyn quotes Wade balder who claims that 
“feminism has shamed men into silence in the political sphere” 
(qtd. in probyn 80), which is reminiscent of roy u. Shenk’s position 
on the matter. braithwaite and balder both suggest that women use 
shaming in order to gain control. However, whereas balder sees them 
as manipulative power mongers, braithwaite suggests that women’s ten-
dency to shame others is a result of a prolonged shaming to which they 
have been subjected themselves. Connectedly, probyn asserts that 
[i]t is undeniable that repeated exposure to scenes of shame reactivates 
and feeds the individual’s capacity to experience shame. It’s equally undeni-
able that a collective history of being shamed will affect the scripted re-
sponses to shame of individuals within the shamed group. (85) 
Shame is thus an experience which creates bonds between women, 
even though these bonds do not create the positive sense of solidarity 
of which bartky writes. What connects women in shame—a unique 
version of the affect which ullalina Lehtinen’s calls the underdog’s 
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shame9—is shared vulnerability to its effects: “for women there is 
seemingly no possibility of defying [the feeling]” (Lehtinen qtd. 
in probyn 85). I feel connected to other women, which is why “I feel 
another woman’s shame” (probyn 85) and “[am] ashamed that [I am] 
ashamed” (Lehtinen qtd. in probyn 85). In light of the above, shame 
appears to be contagious and “particularly attaching, it is gluey, 
with a revolving cycle of separation-attachment-disattachment . . .  . 
[S]hame’s energy can be shaped in loops and spirals, waxing and 
waning as it moves” (Munt 24). 
Clearly, in her analysis probyn refers to a number of common, ste-
reotypical representations of Woman: as emotional rather than reason-
able (“mired in the body’s feeling and [contrasted with] men as mas-
ters of reason” (81), as morally superior to Man, and as “more socially 
integrated” (90) than men. In particular, the identification of Woman 
as emotional has traditionally bound her to shame, since “[w]ithin 
Western traditions of psychology and psychoanalysis a healthy person 
is one that knows how to manage and contain ‘their’ emotions within 
the individual self. The masculine bounded self has become ubiqui-
tously aspirational, its reverse is found in the feminine . . . ” (Munt 13). 
The “masculine bounded self” resides in the masculine bounded body—
classical, monumental, closed to the world. Its reverse—the feminine 
self that is unrestrainable—resides in the body that is unclosed 
and therefore prone to both experience and evoke shame. 
The shame-based disruption of Woman’s sense of self is often expe-
rienced as inner splits. both the conception of shame as transformative, 
and the idea that a shamed Woman not so much breaks down as she 
breaks up, can be linked to the fact that the experience of shame is re-
markably traumatic. A predictable reaction to being “pinned down” 
by someone’s authoritative gaze is the need to escape from the shaming 
look:
The primary motivational instruction of shame is the impulse to get out 
of the interpersonal realm, usually by hiding. Ashamed people frequently 
wish to get up and run out of the room, which they sometimes do. At other 
times, they simply look down, avoid eye contact, and lower their shoulders, 
seeming to shrink in size. (Janice Lindsay-Hartz qtd. in pattison 75)
 9 Lehtinen differentiates between “the aristocrat’s shame” and “the underdog’s 
shame.” She uses the concept of an aristocrat to describe a privileged person, “who 
[has] not been shamed by their gender, class or race  . . . ” underdog shame character-
ises a person who is “socially subordinate” (qtd. in probyn 85).
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When, however, it is your eyes that shame you, the escape is never 
easy. resultantly, a common effect of self-shaming is the inner split 
into the shaming and the shamed, or the “alienation of self from self” 
(Fernie 9). In Helen block Lewis’s words, 
here is a sense of being split between the “other” and the self, between af-
fect and cognition. This inhibits the functioning of the self. Self-functioning 
is usually smooth, “silent,” unnoticed and unproblematic; one is unaware 
of one’s self most of the time. In shame, however, it is disrupted so that 
the self becomes “noisy” and the sole focus of attention. There is an acute 
sense of dividedness or doubleness as the self evaluates itself. (qtd. in pat-
tison 73)
Similarly, Mary Daly refers to Woman “divided  . . .  par excellence” 
(1973: 48) and links the psychological notion of “divided consciousness” 
with the concept of Woman’s oppression. In Daly’s perspective, the op-
pressed—these “contradictory, divided beings”—“do not fully grasp 
the paralyzing fact that the oppressor, having invaded the victims’ 
psyches, now exists within themselves. They are caught in a web 
of self-defeating behavior” (1973: 48). both bartky and Daly point 
to an enemy within, a hostile component of Woman’s self which care-
fully watches/judges her, with “male chauvinist eyes” (Daly 1973: 49):
What occurs is not just the splitting of a person into mind and body but 
the splitting of the self into a number of personae, some who witness 
and some who are witnessed, and  . . .  some internal witnesses are in fact in-
trojected representatives of agencies hostile to the self. Woman has lost 
control of the production of her own image, lost control of those whose pro-
duction of these images is neither innocent nor benevolent, but obedient 
to imperatives which are both capitalistic and phallocentric. In sum, women 
experience a twofold alienation in the production of our own persons: 
the beings we are to be are mere bodily beings; nor can we control the 
shape and nature these bodies are to take. (bartky 1990: 42)
The fact that thus defined shame originates in Woman’s “general-
ized condition of dishonor” (85) within Western culture, suggests that 
shaming might be an effective tool of disciplining other “dishonoured” 
groups oppressed by “sexist societies.” While the answer to Elizabeth 
V. Spelman’s question concerning Simone de beauvoir’s definition 
of a generic woman—“Just Who Does She Think ‘We’ Is?” (1988: 57)—
necessarily reveals that beauvoir’s woman is not only white and 
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middle-class, but also axiomatically heterosexual, other theorists, in-
cluding Elspeth probyn and Sally r. Munt, suggest that in Western so-
cieties certain experiences—such as cultural shaming—are shared by 
women and homosexuals (both gays and lesbians). These authors sug-
gest that we “move away from an exclusive focus on only one system 
of oppression—gender oppression—and . . .  begin thinking in terms of 
multiple, interlocking systems of oppression” (Calhoun 3). The starting 
point for the ensuing section is, therefore, the assumption that it is 
the marginalised position of gays and lesbians in the heteronormative 
Western culture that could have triggered the considerable interest 
in the shame affect (and hence also shame psychology) among theo-
rists in the fields of gay and lesbian, as well as queer studies. The main 
goal of the next section is to explore the concept of “queerness” 
as a means to further investigate the concept of shame and to seek 
to formulate a theory which could provide a foundation for strategies 
of transcending it.
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2.3. queering shame:
toward the empowerment
of the language of the margins
. . .  shame, lost in guilt’s shadow, has been unjustly ignored as the under-
lying cause of most modern and postmodern psychic misery and mal-
aise—poor shame, unfairly forgotten, unsexy, and dowdy, and utterly 
in need of a makeover. 
William Ian Miller, Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, 
Social Discomfort, and Violence (131)
Queering  . . .  empowers us to think what is often the unthinkable, to pro-
duce unthought-of pasts [presents and futures].
Thomas A. Dowson “Why Queer Archeology? An Introduction” (163)
n colloquial usage, the terms of “queer,” “shame” and “Canadianness” 
  seem to have uncomplicated designates. “Queer,” more frequently 
than not, denotes “gay and lesbian,” “shame” is a label attached 
to the unpleasant feeling ensuing a transgression, and “Canadianness” 
signifies nothing more than Canadian national identity, i.e., an identity 
shared by Canadian passport holders. Concurrently, in the fields of cul-
tural, literary, or queer studies, the three notions are often conceived 
of as transgressive: they loom rather large as concepts defying clear-cut 
definitions and have evidently commanded much critical attention. 
unsurprisingly, as both unfixed and unfixing, “queer,” “shame” 
and “Canadianness” share certain common rhetorical denominators. In-
dicating the points where these discourses meet and intersect seems 
a necessary step toward the explanation of the use of language typical 
of the descriptions of the Canadian landscape for the purpose of ex-
ploring “queer marginalisation” in order to eventually work out a theory 
in light of which the rhetoric determining the reality of a shamed self 
could be revised.
It therefore seems in order to open the present section with the ob-
servation that the transformative potential of the shame experience 
has long been an important subject of analyses in the area of queer 
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studies. Originally, queer theorists’ interest in the shame affect had his-
torical roots: it sprang from the realisation that since the 19th century, 
when shame “became a code word for homosexuality and queerness” 
(Munt 86), the cultural shaming of queers has been continually exer-
cised. yet, bearing the assumptions of the present book in mind, more 
important than the historical rootedness of the theoretical involvement 
of the queer scholars with shame is the fact that queer readings of the af-
fect emphasise the subversiveness of both shame and queerness, 
and upon such grounds interpret these categories as parallel. 
In fact, rather than signifying a particular form of desire (e.g. homo-
sexual as opposed to heterosexual), “queer” is often theorised as an anti-
category which “represents the possibility of blurring and/or exploding 
categories” (Newman 132) and suggests that any desire is, basically, 
non-normative. “Queer”—“a site of permanent becoming” (Edelman 
qtd. in: Giffney 73)—is 
transgressive, rude-positive, non-accommodationist, risky. Queer is anti-as-
similationist, defiant, “in your face,” aggressive, unapologetic celebration 
of difference  . . .  The potential of queer seems to be that we do not come to-
gether around an assumption of sameness, but around the critique 
of “the normal.” . . .  What is brought to the fore by “queer” is how much stasis 
is required for the development and survival of identity—any identity. 
(Newman 132)
Correspondingly, in “Queer Sex Habits (Oh, no! I mean),” Kosofsky 
Sedgwick builds her understanding of “queer” upon the etymology 
of the term. The word “queer,” the scholar explains, “itself means ‘across’ 
and it derives from the Indo-European root twerkw, which also yields 
the German quer (“transverse”), Latin torquere (“to twist”), English 
athwart .”10 Like shame, therefore, queerness is “permeable, multifar-
ious [and transformative]” (Allan 144), and hence “queer” “can be un-
derstood more broadly as a project of defamiliarization, a sexed-up 
version of the russian Formalists’ conception of ostranenie” (Munt 23). 
To explain the interrelatedness between “queer” and “shame”, how-
ever, the thus-far introduced dimensions of the discussion on the affect 
central to this study—a discussion whose focus to this point has mostly 
been on a designedly limiting experience in which shame becomes 
a form of punishment based on inhibition and restraint—fail to suffice. 
 10 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Queer Sex Habits (Oh, no! I mean).” World Wide Web 
<http://www.qrd.org/qrd/media/journals/queer-e-v1.n1/article.3> (09. 08. 2004).
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The postulate of the parallelism between “shame” and “queer” necessi-
tates bringing the fact that shame is not simply about “what I did” 
to the forefront of attention. If, as I indicated in sections above, one re-
members that shame is simultaneously about “what I am,” the affect 
may be conceived of as a realisation of “an intimate relation of myself 
to myself. Through shame, I have discovered an aspect of my being” 
(Sartre 301–302; italics in the original). 
Such a discovery may motivate one to try to redefine oneself, 
or to bring oneself together again. This possibility of a new, desirable 
redefinition inspirits Sally r. Munt’s novel reading of shame as “a var-
iegated emotion with effects and practices that are not necessarily neg-
ative” (3). She sees the energy that shame produces as useful in two in-
terconnected contexts: in an abstract framework of re-identifications, 
and in a more practical context of tangible political changes. Shame, 
Munt explains, “can stimulate an energy that has a restorative, cre-
ative force, it can mobilise the self and communities into acts of defiant 
presence, in cycles of disattachment and reconnection” (216). Conse-
quently, 
[w]hen you no longer care that you are being shamed, particularly when 
horizontal bonds formed through communities of shame can be transmuted 
into collective desires to claim a political presence and a legitimate self, that 
new sense of identity can forge ahead and gain rights and protection. (4) 
Simultaneously, however, in light of the posthumanist conception 
of transformative subjectivity, Munt sees the experience of shame 
as opening up the possibility of a perhaps less palpable, yet none the less 
real, inner metamorphosis:
Shame puts us out of place, but the spaces of subjectivity are not wholly 
fixed or predetermined; shame’s loss carries uncertainty, but it also presages 
a desire for reconnection. It is this desire for re-attachment that has the pre-
carious potential for violence, or love. As we know from butler’s reading 
of Levinas on the face, the face is the vehicle for the self, an embodied meta-
phor for what it is to be human (2004). The face turned away—or in shame’s 
case both faces turned away (that of the shamer and the shamed)11—
 11 I understand that Munt sees the shamer turning his/her face away from 
the person s/he shamed out of disgust, and/or due to the contagious nature 
of shame (I turn my face away not to feel the shame experienced by someone else). 
At the same time, the act of shaming requires that one is looked at, and the “turning 
away” from shame can happen only after the shaming gaze has been cast.
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involves some loss of representability, that “loss of face” involves a risk 
of dehumanization. This is the volatility of shame, that it allows the subject 
to momentarily step outside linguistic determinability; it can then fall into 
abjection, or it can unfix itself and rise, in radical unpredictability. (103; 
italics in the original)
It is in view of the volatility—or a performative nature12—of both 
concepts that in her Touching Feeling. Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity, 
Kosofsky Sedgwick expressly correlates “queerness” and “shame.” 
In her reading, the principal characteristic of shame is that it “makes 
identity” (36): 
In fact, shame and identity remain in a very dynamic relation to one an-
other, at once deconstituting and foundational, because shame is both pecu-
liarly contagious and peculiarly individuating.  . . .  In the developmental pro-
cess, shame is now often considered the affect that most defines the space 
wherein a sense of self will develop . . .  . Which I take to mean, not at all that 
this place where identity is most securely attached to essences, but rather 
that is the place where the question of identity arises most originally 
and most relationally. (36–37; italics in the original)
When analyzed as “queer,” shame undergoes a re-definition, and thus 
loses the status of a punishment: it becomes a force capable of trans-
forming identity (and not necessarily in a negative way). “Shame” 
and “queer” remain in an active relation with each other, owing 
to which they are “available for the work of metamorphosis, reframing, 
refiguration, [and] transfiguration  . . . ” (Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003: 63; 
my italics). 
Inextricably linked to the prefix trans is the third concept central 
to this study—as amorphous as “shame” and “queer,” generating 
as multiple readings and as constantly redefined—the concept of “Ca-
nadianness.” This connection is clearly testified to by the particular 
choice of the name for one of the most influential institutions fostering 
Canadian Studies: the TransCanada Institute, established by Smaro 
Kamboureli in 2007, and by the obviously non-accidental decision 
Kamboureli and roy Miki made in giving the important volume of es-
says they edited in the same year the meaningful title of Trans.Can.Lit: 
 12 “performativity  . . .  carries the double meaning of ‘dramatic’ and ‘non-referen-
tial.’  . . .  performative [therefore] carries the authority of two quite different dis-
courses, that of theater on the one hand, and of speech act theory and deconstruc-
tion on the other” (Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003: 7).
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Resituating the Study of Canadian Literature. These intuitions are con-
firmed by the introductory text published on the Institute’s website: 
The “Trans” in TransCanada  . . .  echoes the various processes—historical, polit-
ical, national, economic, global—that impact on Canadian literature as an in-
stitution that has gone through various stages of development: from being ig-
nored as a colonial product, and thus seen as inferior to the british and 
American literary traditions, to being reified as a national, read “white,” liter-
ature, from encompassing, under the ægis of multiculturalism, diasporic au-
thors, to becoming indigenized and reaching international acclaim to being 
studied in the context of the Humanities. 13 
The prefix “trans-” opening up space to analyze “Canadianness” 
in terms of “transformation” invites “transgression” as a revisionist, 
“re-situating,” strategy. Though the already signaled affinity between 
the notions of “Canada” and “Woman” will be discussed in detail 
in the interpretive chapter of this book, at this point it is important 
to emphasise the queer potential inscribed in the “gray, protoplasmic 
fuzz outside [the American] borders” (Atwood 1996: 171)—“the snow-
bound Canada suffering from the borderline non-definability” (Sza-
tanik 2006: 59). The infamous Canadian identity crisis stems from 
the fact that “ there has always been a plurality of cultures competing 
for national attention  ” which is why “instead of a universal Canadian 
identity, the universal is now seen as a contested site of power  . . . ” 
(Sherbert 2–3). Whereas such authors as Margaret Atwood or Kath-
erine Monk have claimed that it is “emptiness—or negative space—
[that] becomes a defining principle in the Canadian psyche, Canadian 
art and Canadian film” (Monk 89), others argue that the theoretical 
concept of Canadianness cannot be comprehended through simple di-
chotomies (self-other, absence-presence, negative-positive)—it is trans-
gressive as it goes across, in “no direction home.”14 
The intersection of the discourses of “shame,” “queer” and “Canadi-
anness” becomes obvious when one considers the language common 
to, shared and interchanged among the three. An illustrative example, 
which allows one to employ the postulated connection to literary 
studies on transgressive shame and, at the same time, offers a conve-
 13 World Wide Web <http://www.transcanadas.ca/institute.html> (07.02.2011). 
 14 “TransCanada, Literature. No Direction Home” is an essay by Stephen Slemon in-
cluded in the collection titled Trans.Can.Lit: Resituating the Study of Canadian Lit-
erature, edited by Smaro Kamboureli and roy Miki.
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nient link with the interpretive part of this study, is offered by Terry 
Goldie. In his comment on Voltaire’s shaming statement that Canada 
is but “a few acres of snow [quelques arpents de neige],” Goldie asserts 
that “snow can be very important. Especially when it’s pink” (Goldie 
2–3). Snow, in itself, is transformative: in Goldie’s study it represents 
the queer potential of Canadian fiction and the de-shaming potential 
of the queer rhetoric, and thus it becomes comprehensible why Can. Lit., 
Canadian cinema, as well as the Canadian society, have often be re-
ferred to, or celebrated, as queer.15 Like queer theorists interested 
in the shame affect, present-day critics of Canadian national identity 
also focus on a process, rather than a state, on an unfixing and reframing 
of, rather than a determining of, identity. 
 15 For example, in In a Queer Country: Gay and Lesbian Studies in the Canadian 
Context (2001) edited by Terry Goldie, peter Dickinson’s Screening Gender, Framing 
Genre: Canadian Literature into Film (2006), or in Canadian Cultural Poesis: Essays 
on Canadian Culture (2005), edited by Garry Sherbert, Annie Gérin and Sheila petty.
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2.4. subversion\transgression\language:
a feminist theory of woman’s shame
Even though the majority of texts discussed so far focus on shame as experienced in the body, the affect must not be discussed solely 
as a bodily phenomenon. Instead,
[w]e need to think through shame’s passage from the physiological level 
to the sphere in which it becomes political . . .  .  Shame is a powerful instance 
of embodiment, but it is also called into being by, and then inflicts, histor-
ical and political circumstance . . .  .  Shame gets named and positioned within 
concrete political and social spheres. The questions remain: What is the point 
of shame? What can it do and not do? (probyn 79) 
Where shame becomes an issue, the bodily bleeds into the discur-
sive, as much as the discourse affects the body. Even though such 
a claim may well prove applicable to a variety of cultures of the world, 
the “political and social sphere” of my interest is that of Western cul-
ture alone. As for “what it can do,” Woman’s shame—alongside such 
a culturally productive concept as the beauty Myth, defined by Naomi 
Wolf—can keep the existing power relations intact,16 since “shame 
might be a type of feedback loop that continually connects the indi-
vidual and her environment” (probyn 83). 
This observation seems to conveniently bridge my reflections con-
cerning the uncharted areas of the psychological studies of shame with 
the limitations of contemporary cultural studies adopting shame 
as their object. Shame psychology, undoubtedly, rests upon consistent 
methodological foundations of clinical psychology, yet fails to account 
for the uniqueness of the cultural conditioning of Woman’s psyche. 
At the same time, contemporary culture studies addressing the problem 
of shame, albeit highly conscious of gender and its discursive entangle-
ments, seem to lack a cohesive methodological frame grounded 
in shame-oriented psychology. Therefore, revising both disciplinary ap-
proaches in their mutual light, I propose a theory defining Woman’s 
shame as a pathological state originating in what Woman is taught 
 16 After all, to quote Léon Wurmser, the shamed woman is “metaphorically dead” (65).
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about herself (through the lasting, shaming gaze, which conditions so-
cialisation she undergoes), and what she consequently adopts as her self. 
I also assume—echoing beauvoir—that Woman’s awareness of her self 
is closely linked to her awareness of her body. Hence, when I refer to 
Woman’s shame, I do not have in mind the common sensation that is a 
result of a single infraction, or a natural response to a sudden disruption 
of joy/interest as postulated by Tomkins. Instead, I understand Wom-
an’s shame as a lasting state instilled in Woman, one which disrupts 
and (mis)shapes her sense of subjectivity. 
Thus, building my gendered theory of Woman’s shame upon 
the methodological grounds of shame psychology, I postulate that 
the link between “physiological” and the “social” faces of shame 
is that of the metanarrative; it is language with its culturally mean-
ingful rhetoric that creates realities and undoes them. For this reason, 
it is in the existential acts of reading and writing that transgressive 
strategies of subversion, empowering Woman by disempowering 
shaming discourses, may manifest themselves. It is around the concept 
of transgression and the almost “tactile” rhetoric of blurred borders 
it entails, that various strategies of transcending Woman’s shame re-
volve. The ensuing part, dedicated to Lorna Crozier’s poetry, shows 
these dynamics in action.
THRE
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lorna crozier’s feminist strategies:
four studies in transcending 
woman’s shame
E
If severe feelings of shame  
compel us to hide and conceal  
inner reality from others  
and from ourselves, it is often counte-
red in the writer by the creative ideal,  
a defiant and even ruthless decision  
not to turn away or to lie, a coura- 
geous and almost shameless will  
to see and to know that which inter- 
nal and external sanctions conspire  
to keep us from looking at  
and exploring.
Joseph Adamson and Hilary Clark “In-
troduction: Shame, Affect, Writing” (29)
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Feminism has always been trangressive. Whether one considers fem-inism as a label for the movement associated with activism, resis-
tance, and empowerment of women or, more specifically, whether one 
thinks of it in terms of feminist theory—whose key-words involve 
a significant number of re-s (re-visioning, re-reading, re-writing)—
it seems beyond question that since its inception feminism has aimed 
to challenge the basic tenets of Western culture. Acts of defiance, rei-
fying the challenge, have regularly triggered shaming as a patriarchal 
countermeasure, and this seems to be a rule valid till this day. And just 
as Punch magazine in the 19th century would recurrently ridicule 
the Suffrage Movement, also the present-day common stereotypes 
of a feminist are perpetuated to perform a similar, shaming function. 
As a result, in casual usage, “feminine” and “feminist” are commonly 
assumed to form a binary opposition: unsurprisingly then “a feminist” 
continues to be construed as masculine, lesbian, ugly, aggressive, un-
kind, or even monstrous—and almost always grotesque. In order to be 
normal, Woman needs to be feminine—which is why many women 
are wary of the other f-word. The shaming strategy, if not foolproof, 
is undoubtedly effective. 
And yet, in the world of academia it is common knowledge that 
the concept of “feminism” denotes a multitude of meanings. Divided 
into waves, disintegrated through the use of hyphens and prefixes, this 
umbrella term encompasses a plethora of diverse standpoints 
and voices. For instance, to some feminists it would be “feminist” 
to challenge negative stereotyping and un-demonise feminism 
by means of entering the mainstream culture of TV shows in high 
heels and with an equally high awareness of the “enmeshed relation-
ship of femininity to a feminine appearance” (Holland 41). Others, 
however, would critique such choices as indicating adherence to, 
and reiterating the patriarchal models of femininity: they would claim 
that in order for feminism to be subversive, it has to remain on the mar-
gins and avoid mingling with the centre. More profound, critical dis-
crepancies within feminism sensu largo have been triggered when such 
factors as race or sexual orientation surface in discussions about wom-
en’s inferiorisation. In view of the essential non-homogeneity of fem-
inism as an intellectual and social formation, it is important that 
the concept of “feminist strategies” in interpretations of Lorna Cro-
zier’s poetry, which I propose to employ in the next chapter, be dis-
ambiguated. 
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My primary investment in this study is in the space of feminist cul-
tural and literary studies. Although I do occasionally refer to feminist 
works rooted in psychoanalysis,1 I mainly draw inspiration from femi-
nist research offering critical insights into narratives and metanarra-
tives of Western culture and, specifically, its literary manifestations. 
Correspondingly, the strategies of transcending Woman’s shame that 
I trace in Crozier’s poems epitomise the “subversion of cultural assump-
tions,” which “is an event that takes place . . .  in the reading of [a] text” 
(bordo 1995: 292). Therefore, centrally, the transgressive acts that I dis-
cuss below involve subverting metanarratives, retelling cultural myths, 
and questioning patriarchal authorities. These strategies have long 
been employed by feminist writers and critics, although usually 
without any clear references to shame or de-shaming.2
According to Joanne H. Wright, “rejuvenating [the myths] of the lost 
matriarchy” (127) was central to radical feminists of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Elaine Showalter elaborates, “Over the centuries, we find that women 
have turned to mythology and religion for clues to the feminist epic 
life, reaching back to the Amazons, Diana of Ephesus, Cassandra, pe-
nelope, Minerva, or Isis. They have sometimes sought in history a Fem-
inist Messiah, a saint or savior  . . . ” (Showalter 15). unsurprisingly, 
the scope of artistic and academic positions aimed at the revision of an-
drocentric narratives expanded fast, giving rise to a plethora of femi-
nist texts subverting patriarchal authoritarianism beyond the founda-
tional metanarratives of Western culture. Among these, some texts 
level their criticism at discourses of “institutionalised androcentrism,” 
including the (traditionally masculine) authority of academia.3 
 1 For instance, stances associated with the so-called French feminism.
 2 Myths and fairy tales, for example, have been revised and rewritten by such dis-
tinguished authors as Anne Sexton, Angela Carter or Margaret Atwood. Anne 
Sexton (1971) retold a number of the brothers Grimm’s fairy tales, often with 
the use of colloquial language and references to the 20th-century Western culture, 
in order to reveal these aspects of the tales—e.g., sexuality—which were invisible 
in their traditional versions. Angela Carter (1979), in a more radical way, reshaped 
such tales as “Little red riding Hood,” “Little Snow White” and “puss-in-boots.” 
In probably the most famous of her re-tellings—“The Company of Wolves”—
the protagonist of “Little red riding Hood,” reckless in her naiveté, is transformed 
into a self-confident, strong character, and the act of eating her up by the wolf be-
comes a sexual act in which she actively participates. In Atwood’s The Penelopiad 
(2005), it is penelope who tells the story of her, rather than Odysseus’s, life. 
The strategy of giving voice to the silenced was also famously employed by Jean 
rhys in her Wide Sargasso Sea (1966).
 3 See, for example, a collection titled The Madwoman in the Academy: 43 Women 
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The following section opens a series of interpretations of subversive 
poetic acts of literature which, apart from instantiating feminist defi-
ance against oppressive discourses, demonstrate a unique consistency 
in the use of rhetoric de-shaming Woman. Such de-shaming rhetoric 
functions both as a metanarrative cure and as a strategy of empower-
ment, allowing me to propose a congruous theory of Woman’s shame 
born as a result of convergence of shame psychology (now gender-
wise revised), feminism and queer studies, its distinctiveness looming 
large against the background of Canadianness and its particular rhet-
oric.
The point of departure for the argument central to this section 
is the analysis of two poems addressing what has traditionally been re-
garded as the highest authority: God/the father. The myth retold 
is “the dominant creation myth in the Western tradition,” whose “ren-
dition of gender relations continues to hold sway over  . . .  modern con-
ceptions” of gender roles (Wright 8). The object of transgression is thus 
the concept of transgression itself, the central notion underlying coer-
cive shaming of Woman.
Boldly Take on the Ivory Tower (2003), edited by Deborah Keahey and Deborah 
Schnitzer, or Carol Shick’s The University as Text: Women and the University Con-
text (1994).
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3.1. transgressing transgression.
subverting the authority 
of the biblical creation myth
The concept of transgression, as construed within the dominant meta-narrative of Judeo-Christianity, is an exponent of the more general 
conceptualisation of the mechanisms of power, central to the symbolic 
system, constructing—and organising—the order of the Western world. 
More specifically, however, despite its seemingly neutral etymology, 
the term in question seems to have been functioning predominantly 
as a rather unequivocal value judgment: for centuries, it has solely re-
ferred to acts of defiance with respect to accepted norms, which, 
in the Christian narratives, translates into the God-given Law. As such, 
transgression becomes a term shedding light upon the modus operandi 
of the Judeo-Christian normativity: that which is transgressive is both 
sinful and evil because it questions the “unquestionable” order, 
and thus imperils the stability of the structures of power. 
The menace of transgression, therefore, needs to be counteracted. 
In the Judeo-Christian, patriarchal, phallogocentric tradition, the term 
itself has become laden with negative connotations and thus also 
a part of a larger “failsafe mechanism,” invoking “pre-emptive mea-
sures” of shame and anxiety. This subchapter seeks to demonstrate 
how these measures are overcome on the basis of an interpretation 
of two poems by Lorna Crozier: “Original Sin” and “What I Gave you 
Truly,” which, offering a poetic re-reading of the traditional (canonical) 
exegesis of the Judeo-Christian myth of Origin, epitomise the trans-
gression. As such, they invite an interpretation rooted in the revi-
sionary discourse of contemporary feminist and queer studies, which 
provides the methodological framework for the ensuing, tripartite, ar-
gument. 
(“original sin
” and “what 
i gave you tr
uly”)
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“what is it that you have done?”4 
a (theo)retical introduction
It is common knowledge that the biblical narrative of the Original Sin and the Fall of Adam and Eve is, cardinally, the story of an arche-
typal transgression—the first people break the one law devised for them 
by God and eat from the Tree of Knowledge. Within the Garden of Eden, 
transgressions are not to be tolerated: such acts question God’s 
order—the archetypal Law-of-the-Father—which is hierarchical, pa-
triarchal, heteronormative, and, significantly, established by and in lan- 
guage. In fact, in the stories of creation presented in both Genesis 
and the Gospel according to John, it is language that is a “precondi-
tion of identity” (Gilmore 165).
Within such logocentric theology—formed by the “acts of dividing 
and knowing through opposition” (Gilmore 165)—Woman is created 
as other than Man. It is, in fact, the “man’s lack, his insufficiency unto 
himself revealed by his need for a helpmeet [that] generates the necessity 
for woman” (Gilmore 167). Eve, therefore—in Leigh Gilmore’s words—
is to be unavoidably associated with both the lack and the wound: 
“When the name/thing ‘helpmeet’ is discovered to be lacking, God per-
forms the first surgery and extracts a rib from the man to serve as a foun-
dation for a rather peculiar birthing fable that links woman with wound” 
(167). Through this act of violence, God creates the Wo-Man who stands 
in a “metonymic relation to the man” and is secondary to him, “morally 
weaker  . . .  and . . .  thus prey to the forces of corruption” (Gilmore 170). 
As such, she cannot use the power of language but, conversely, falls 
victim to it: 
The first three chapters [of Genesis] establish naming as the significant 
and signifying action and make clear Eve’s place in this order. She names 
nothing, creates nothing. perhaps in this narrative we could say that Eve 
was the first to experience the relationship between signifier and signified 
as arbitrary. Her transgression (which should primarily be understood 
as the desire for knowledge, the desire to know what God knows), which re-
sults in the exile from the garden, initiates only a more formal exile than 
the one she already lives. Her exclusion from language carries tremendous 
consequences, and this first revolution of the dispossessed (she does not 
own her name, hence, her self) concludes God’s experiment in the garden. 
 4 Gen. 3:13
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When God first speaks directly to the woman, it is as a judge, and the first 
trial is initiated: “What is it that you have done?” (Gen. 3:13). (Gilmore 170)
Importantly, the first sentence that Eve directs to God in response 
to his question is, in fact, an act of confession—“The serpent beguiled 
me, and I did eat” (Gen. 3:13)—which is traditionally understood to be 
“an injunction to render into language what is often culturally un- 
speakable” (bernstein 17)—or shameful. Its purpose is to transcend 
the (shameful) experience through redemption granted by an authority. 
The presence of the authority—God being its ultimate representation—
is, therefore, necessary in this discursive ritual. As such—in Michel Fou-
cault’s words—confession “unfolds within a power relationship” (61).5 
A confessant bares himself/herself in front of the confessor who is, 
at the same time, the sole bearer/barer of the truth, and “enjoys inter-
pretive privilege” (bernstein 17). The experience of verbalising the un-
speakable unburdens the confessant of shame only if it is “authorised” 
by the confessor.
The position of Eve as a “confessee” is particularly problematic, 
as she is not only construed as secondary and marginalised, but is also 
“silenced in the construction of [the] story of transgression” (bern-
stein 23). In bernstein’s reading, in fact, confession only reinforces 
power relations and, consequently, the only “subject that confession af-
firms is implicitly gendered masculine and heterosexualized male” (21).6 
It is, therefore, Man whom the act of “telling things” empowers, 
and it is Man who—in the binary world of patriarchy—is assigned 
to the dominant position of the confessor. 
 5 In Michel Foucault’s phrasing: “The confession is a ritual of discourse in which 
the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also the ritual that un-
folds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence 
(or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the au-
thority that requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes 
in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth 
is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order 
to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently 
of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who ar-
ticulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, 
liberates him, and promises him salvation” (61–62).
 6 bernstein supports her reading of confession by referring to Sigmund Freud’s 
theory. In Freud’s terms, catharsis is granted by the very fact of “telling things” 
which “discharges tension so that excitation gains an outlet” (22–23).
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The patriarchal character of the biblical order is further manifest 
in the fact that even though both Adam and Eve are disciplined by God, 
it is Eve who is believed to carry the blame for their loss of innocence. 
It is Eve, too, whose body is a locus of punishment devised by God. 
The fifth chapter of Genesis, therefore, in Gilmore’s reading, is the story 
of another creation: one of the female body as “the site of labor and 
pain” (170–171).7 Clearly, the new reality of an exile forces Woman 
to further subordination: “God . . .  predicts the future of heterosexuality 
with the constituents of desire and childbearing and prescribes the fe-
male role in it” (Gilmore 171). 
Importantly, even before the actual punishment is pronounced 
by God, the disobedience of Adam and Eve results in the sinners’ 
sudden awareness of their nakedness: “Then the eyes of both were 
opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig 
leaves together and made themselves aprons” (Gen. 3:7). In a more 
down-to-earth interpretation by richard Klein,
[a]fter the Fall, scales fell from their eyes and they perceived that they were 
not nude, but naked as peeled shrimp. The pious Christian ideal of beauty 
starts there, in the humiliation of the flesh. It bespeaks a hatred of every 
fleshy thing that prevents the soul from instantly achieving its spiritual des-
tiny. Flesh was no longer the blessed stuff in which the gods became present 
among humans. The beauty of its forms was censored by Judeo-Christian 
taboos surrounding graven images, and its seductions were demonized 
by Christian morals. The landscape of the human body was no longer 
deemed to enact the mysteries of creation, proposing to the eye of the daz-
zled spectator an incomparable vision of tension and ease, force and yielding, 
strength and softness. (28)
Even though the term Klein uses is “humiliation,” it is clear that 
Adam and Eve’s realisation of their nakedness is concurrent with 
the mind-altering experience of shame. In Sally r. Munt’s phrasing, 
“[s]hame is fundamental to the originary myth of Judeo-Christian soci-
eties, as Adam and Eve were shamefully expelled from Eden to dis-
cover their fallen humanity, in the world” (80). In fact, the Original Sin 
can be read not only as a transgression on God’s law, but also 
as a shame-induced transgression into a new corporeality. Such a sudden 
 7 God tells Eve: “I will greatly multiply your grief and your suffering in pregnancy 
and the pangs of childbearing; with spasms and distress you shall bring forth chil-
dren; yet your desire and craving shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over 
you” (Gen. 3:16).
shift is experienced as an immediate, unexpected transfer from a fa-
miliar, stable reality to a slippery maze, where
[this] unexpectedness is more than suddenness in time; it is also the aston-
ishment at seeing different parts of ourselves, conscious and unconscious, 
acknowledged and unacknowledged, suddenly coming together, and coming 
together with aspects of the world we have not recognized. patterns 
of events (inner and outer) of which we are not conscious come unexpect-
edly into relation with those of which we are aware. (Lynd 34)
The world they are shamed into takes Adam and Eve by an un-
pleasant surprise: merged in confusion and incongruity, they wish 
to hide from the new reality. The disappearance/invisibility they long 
for is, however, unattainable, as in this “divisive, shame-ridden con-
sciousness” (Fernie 32) they fell into, Adam and Eve are not only sep-
arate, but they become “his naked body and her naked body” 
(Jacoby 19), the conspicuous objects of desire, and manifestations 
of difference. In other words, in the biblical Creation Myth, shame 
is presented as a negative experience, a prelude to mortality and a fore-
taste of future pain. 
One of the feminist strategies of transcending shame, as suggested 
earlier, is re-telling the foundational patriarchal narratives. In her col-
lection titled Apocrypha of Light , Lorna Crozier re-visions numerous 
biblical stories, including the Creation Myth. Her poem titled “Original 
Sin” queers up and perverts the biblical account of the Sin and the Fall, 
by means of introducing a third character into the story of the first 
couple. 
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“of adam’s first wife, lilith, it is told.”8 
transgressions in/of “original sin”
The traces of Lilith have been markedly wiped away. Erased from the biblical translations, Lilith found her place in the rabbinic mi-
drash, and was created in the course of the interpretation of the fol-
lowing biblical verse: “ . . .  male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27).9 
In the midrashic reading, the original human was a hermaphrodite com-
posed of Adam and Lilith. Such interpretation corresponds to the pre-
Christian myth of the origin of the human nature, introduced by Aris-
tophanes in plato’s Symposium. The Adam/Lilith whole can be read, 
therefore, as the representative of the “third sex”: “[the] single com- 
bination, comprising both male and female” (plato 33). However, 
for the reason that “this posture made locomotion difficult, and conver-
sation awkward” God “divided the androgyne and gave each half a new 
rear” (Graves and pathai 69). 
The partition generated the story of Lilith as the archetype of the Evil 
Woman: separated from Adam, she did not try to return to the state 
of the original oneness, but—on the contrary—she refused to make due 
love to him, which left Adam longing for a new wife. Lilith, in turn, 
banished to the red Sea and relegated to the textual realm of Jewish 
folklore and fantasy, was described as the queen of demons and the pro-
totypical “whore.” Moreover, her rebelliousness formed the grounds 
for the differentiation between the motherly Eve and the murderous Li-
lith (for instance, while Eve would have procreative sex with Adam 
and gave birth to his children, Lilith would drink blood of human in-
fants). 
In Dante Gabriel rossetti’s reading of the myth of Lilith, she is 
the one who—having taken the shape of the snake—seduces Eve, thus 
bringing about the Fall. The present interpretations of the figure of the 
first woman, however, often reveal her feminist potential.10 Manifestly, 
Lilith invites readings, in which she is construed as the first rebel 
 8 Dante Gabriel rossetti, “Lilith.” World Wide Web <http://lilitu.com/lilith/lilpoem.
html> (01.02.2010).
 9 The earliest form of the legend of Lilith comes from the anonymous midrashic work 
titled The Alphabet of Ben Sira, written between 7th and 11th century. The oldest refer-
ence to Lilith, however, appears in the Ancient-Sumerian story of Gilgamesh.
 10 See: Which Lilith? Feminist Writers Re-Create the World’s First Woman, edited 
by Enid Dame, Lilly rivlin, and Henny Wenkart (1998) or Siegmund Hurwitz’s Li-
lith: The First Eve: Historical and Psychological Aspects of the Dark Feminine (1992).
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against the patriarchal power, the first victim of this power, and the 
first “feminist” threat. 
In Crozier’s “Original Sin,” Lilith—the third, the queer—disturbs 
the (structured, binary, heterosexual) reality of the Garden. The poem 
redefines the nature of the Original Sin and, at the same time, locates 
the origins of the humankind in Aristophanes’s myth. Concurrently, 
the poem creates Eve anew—freeing her from the burden of sin 
and shame—and allows Lilith (who in the bible signifies only absence) 
to tell her own story. 
“Original Sin” is composed of two parts—“The First Woman” 
and “The Fall of Eve.” The first part—narrated by Lilith—portrays 
the genesis of the human race derived from Aristophanes’s speech. 
In Crozier’s Lilith’s story, however, the original person is not a her-
maphrodite, but a perfect female form:
We were mothers giving birth
to each other, or we were sisters,
our home the night’s vast womb.
We orbited inside its silky
black cocoon.  . . . 
I felt her grow beside me, her spirit curve
against my bones like cream inside a spoon.
We were one creature then,
four-legged, perhaps a fawn
whose hooves had not grown hard,
a calf so strange we would be kept
inside a jar. (20)
Lilith’s description of the four-legged, queer creature bears a striking 
resemblance to Aristophanes’s portrayal of the original human 
as “a complete whole, spherical, with back and ribs forming a circle 
[who] had four hands, four legs, and two faces, identical in every way, 
on a circular neck” (plato 33). Aristophanes’s ingenious woman—anal-
ogous to Lilith/Eve whole—was perfectly complete, self-sufficient and 
“remarkable for [her] strength and vigour” (33). both in this pre-Chris-
tian myth and in the biblical one, it is the first humans’ shameless am-
bition that brings about gods’/God’s punishment. Having “tried 
to make a way up to heaven, to attack the gods” (33), Aristophanes’s 
original humans were cut into severed halves and thus rendered pow-
erless. From then on, “each half [has gone] round looking for its other 
half,” longing to “restore [themselves] to [their] true human form” (35). 
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This is why, as Aristophanes suggests, people are naturally inclined to 
love. Daughters of the earth,11 Lilith and Eve are driven by their 
earthly desire to “[wind] around each other” again (Crozier “Original 
Sin” 21). 
Although perfectly complete as one, in the Garden of Eden, Lilith 
and Eve are destined to be disunited: inevitably, they will be split into 
the first and the second wife of Adam. In Crozier’s poem God is 
the master of numbers and labels; since there is no name for the “double 
brightness” (21), Lilith and Eve have to be separated, which is why Li-
lith is marked:
My hand reached out
and to prove I was the first 
the angels tied it with a strong red string
the origin of scarlet as a curse. (21)
Through this signifying act, which connotes not only condemnation 
but also transformation, Lilith becomes other-than-Eve, although she 
“[clings] to the womb / with [her] nails and teeth” (21). Lilith is signed 
first, and then sins: her refusal to leave the state of harmony and jouis-
sance is punished (“[She], not Eve, brought pain into the birthing room” 
(21). The Original Sin, in other words, is Lilith’s refusal to be separated 
from Eve. In the next stanza, Lilith confesses that she sinned again:
. . .  I wouldn’t lie placid
as a hooked and fatty fish under Adam,
my wings pinned back. For punishment
God banished me and turned my sister into bone,
honed away everything she’d been
when we lay together among stars. (21)
The second woman is, therefore, punished for the lapse of the first 
one (which institutes the hereditary nature of the Original Sin), and is 
turned into Adam’s rib, so that she could be forever at his side. 
Transformed into Adam’s complement, Eve loses the memory 
of the past, but walks to the edge of the Garden, led by the uncon-
scious desire of “poetry and silence” (22). It is in the liminal space, be-
 11 “The reason for having three sexes . . .was this: the male was originally the off-
spring of the sun, the female of the earth, and the one which was half-and-half was 
the offspring of the moon  . . .  .” (plato 33).
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tween the Garden and the Wasteland which Lilith inhabits, that Lilith 
and Eve briefly find each other. During the encounter described 
in the second part of the poem it is Eve’s body that remembers 
the feeling—or feels the memory—of the perfectly sensual union with 
the other woman:
beside the hawthorn hedge, the forbidden
tart on my tongue, I said Lilith
though I didn’t remember
what it meant, then I said Beloved
and something like a breath lifted
the hair on the back of my neck. (22; italics in the original)
Like in the biblical story of the Fall, in Crozier’s poem it is also 
the taste of the forbidden that leads to the knowledge of the body 
as erotic and sexual (while God, enraged “[roars] through the leaves” 
(22)). And like in the biblical myth, such knowledge marks Eve’s Fall 
from amnesic innocence to the painful awareness of the lost unity:
My own arms rose and I know
the way you know your own sorrow
on this earth, once I was that dear,
that close to her,
once I too could fly. (23)
Through the introduction of Lilith to the Garden of Eden, Crozier 
queers the biblical Creation Myth, which, as I will shortly demonstrate, 
is in itself the strategy of de-shaming Eve. At the same time, Crozier 
de-shames the queer, by means of referring to the Ancient Greek text. 
According to Aristophanes, “the name of  . . .  desire and pursuit of com-
pleteness is Eros, or love” (plato 37). Such love does not distinguish 
between “good desire” and “evil desire”: the pursuit of wholeness— 
irrespective of whether one may originally have been the child 
of the sun, the earth, or the moon—is both natural and good. The myth 
presents the genesis of homosexuality in a way which renders its char-
acter natural or, indeed, defines homosexuality as superior to hetero-
sexuality:
[Women] who are part of an original woman pay very little attention 
to men. Their interest is found in women; lesbians are found in this class. 
And those who are part of a male pursue what is male. As boys, because 
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they are slices of the male, they are fond of men, and enjoy going to bed 
with men and embracing them. These are the best of the boys and young 
men, since they are by nature the most manly. Some people call them im-
moral—quite wrongly. It is not immorality, but boldness, courage and man-
liness, since they take pleasure in what is like themselves. (plato 36)
In Aristophanes’s myth, homosexuality (male homosexuality in par-
ticular) is, therefore, construed as “normal,” or, in fact, elevated. 
It seems, however, that the aim of Crozier’s poem is not to sublimate 
homosexuality, but rather to oppose the binary logic of the Garden, 
founded upon the hierarchical distinction between Man and Woman. 
The poem contests (patriarchal) dualisations by means of inserting 
the third element in between the proper two. Owing to the “queerifi-
cation” of the biblical myth, “shame” loses the magnitude of a life sen-
tence, and acquires the trangressive/ transformative potential. 
To conclude, “Original Sin” queers the biblical Creation Myth in a va-
riety of ways. Firstly, it draws upon the pre-Christian past, and thus 
undermines the biblical truths—particularly those concerning the na-
ture of Woman and the heteronormativity of the Garden of Eden. Sec-
ondly, the poem contrasts meaningful creation with the pre-symbolic 
state of the perfect unity. previous to the first act of divine significa-
tion—the “transfusion of the living body into language” (Oliver xvi)—
Lilith and Eve find themselves in the semiotic space of the body.12 In this 
pre-linguistic state, Eve and Lilith are, accordingly, 
. . .  mothers giving birth 
to each other, or . . .  sisters,
[their] home the night’s vast womb. (21)
At the same time, Crozier’s portrait of this “maternal” pair is evi-
dently eroticised. For instance, in the last stanza of “The First Woman” 
Lilith complains that Eve has forgotten
[their] one smell
As [they] wound around each other,
[Eve’s] fingers in [Lilith’s] mouth, [Lilith’s] hand
Holding [Eve’s] heartbeat. (21)
 12 It was Julia Kristeva who, in her Revolution in Poetic Language, famously distin-
guished between the symbolic and the semiotic elements present in the process 
of signification—the former referring to all that which is “proper,” “grammatical,” 
“structured,” “meaningful,” “masculine,” and the latter to “bodily drives,” “tones,” 
“rhythms,” “the pre-meaningful,” “the maternal” and “the subversive” (22–106).
Crozier’s portrayal of the pre-linguistic, homoerotic womb is partic-
ularly congruous with the vision of motherhood presented in Kriste-
va’s “Motherhood According to Giovanni bellini,” which links mater-
nity with homoerotic desire:
by giving birth, a woman enters into contact with her mother; she becomes, 
she is her own mother; they are the same continuity differentiating itself. 
She thus actualizes the homosexual facet of motherhood, through which 
a woman is simultaneously closer to her instinctual memory, more open 
to her own psychosis, and consequently, more negatory of the social, sym-
bolic bond. (303)
Such a homosexual bond between two women is, however, only 
temporary: for Woman, the image of the mother is, necessarily, “para-
dise lost” (Kristeva 1997a: 304). The story of Lilith and Eve, however, 
finishes at the point of Eve’s awakening, and therefore, the conse-
quences of the subversion of God’s law remain unclear. rather, as “nar-
ratives of transgression present descriptions of domination that might 
be starting points for questioning the rhetoric and structure of power” 
(bernstein 32), this subversion remains there as a promise of a change. 
The poem, in other words, uncloses the concepts of transgression 
and shame against the way in which they structure the Judeo-Chris-
tian discourses. 
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“moments and margins.”13 
transgressiveness of eve’s confession
The power of lies derives, paradoxically, 
from the centrality of truth-telling  . . .  
John Kucich, The power of Lies: 
Transgression in Victorian Fiction (3 )
“What I Gave you Truly” is a poetic monologue of the biblical Eve, who announces a new truth about the Original Sin. The poem is 
Eve’s confession: no longer a figure in someone else’s story, she narrates 
her own testimony. However, since Eve’s relation with language is du-
bious, her blasphemous relation of what happened in the Garden of 
Eden is even more so. Consequently, the question if, and under which 
conditions, a confession can become the narrative territory of compen-
sation and shame-less freedom for Crozier’s Eve inevitably arises.
In “What I Gave you Truly” time is sorted into “before” and “after,” 
and space is divided by the “bramble bush” into two (opposite) sides: 
in-side and out-side. The Garden—conventionally orderly, organised 
and regulated—is a private territory, a center which is harmonious 
and æsthetically enjoyable for its Master/Gardener, and from which 
Eve—imperfect and immoral14—is excluded. She is banished to margins 
and, as such, she speaks
. . .  from the other side
of the bramble bush, the side where nothing
grows but wheels and cogs and the loneliness
of exile on this earth. (39)
Moreover, Eve is deprived of her own voice and uses one that she bor-
rows from “thorns,” “wire,” “crow” and “rain,” although before she was
A softness longed for
at the end of the day, its vesper song,
mothering the weary. (39)
 13 Susan David bernstein, Confessional Subjects: Relations of Gender and Power in 
Victorian Literature and Culture (38).
 14 In fact, the words “integrity” and “morality” are etymologically linked. The root 
of “integrity” (Latin Integritas) implicates not only “wholeness” but also “honour,” 
“honesty” and “virtue.” 
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 Apparently, through the Fall—this divisive event—Eve lost her 
mother tongue and her motherly/virginal qualities as such, and became 
a model temptress, punished and condemned to exile and loneliness. 
Although she recognises the sweetness of “before” and the bitterness 
of “after,” the feelings of shame, guilt and responsibility for the Fall are 
absent from her speech: what she says she “gave man / without a lie 
and truly  ” (39), is merely an apple: “Gravenstein, Spartan, Golden De-
licious” (39). The act of offering the fruit to Adam and enticing him to 
“Eat this” triggers the conversion into a new reality which, however, 
contrary to the biblical account, appears to be faultless and shame-
less: 
Eat this, I say, and your eyes open
as mine did then, all things innocent, unused,
my new man naked before me.
remember that.
I give you the apple and you see 
your lover for the first time, this wonder
repeated in the flesh. (39)
The new reality that Eve transports Adam to is evidently sexualised; 
indeed, the tasting from the Tree of Knowledge can be interpreted 
as the first sexual act, or the first realisation of sexual desire.15 That is 
why, according to Stephen pattison, it is “[since] the incident of Adam 
and Eve in the Garden of Eden [that] sexuality and the body have 
been seen as particularly sensitive sites of shame  . . .” (267). The lyrical I 
of Crozier’s poem, however, is not the authoritarian seer : the unex-
pected nakedness she witnesses is unworldly and incorrupt. Eve’s con-
fession, in other words, locates shame “somewhere else”—shame is in-
stituted upon her instead of being naturally rooted in Eve’s apparent 
lewdness. Ewan Fernie observes that in the Judeo-Christian discourse 
the “basis of female shame is unchastity or a reputation for unchastity” 
(84). In the feminist discourse, conversely, Eve is neither promiscuous 
nor ashamed. Her confession appears to be, therefore, a form of resis-
tance against the dominant story which creates the definition 
of Woman. The purpose of Eve’s speech is, seemingly, to give a blas-
phemous testimony of what happened in the Garden of Eden (“without 
 15 In Hebrew the word “know”—yada—is a euphemism for sexual intercourse. 
Likewise, in psychoanalytical terms, “the desire to know is [always] constructed 
from sexual desire and curiosity” (brooks p. 5).
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a lie and truly”), the testimony which “[contends] to challenge the sov-
ereignty of male (that is, objective, distant, abstract) . . .  discourse” (ber-
nstein 31). Eve voices what is “culturally unspeakable”: her innocence. 
However, since it is Man who is the designated confessor (i.e. both a lis-
tener and a potential redeemer), the question arises whether such a pro-
nouncement makes sense. 
For numerous feminist writers—such as Sarah Kofman, Mary Daly 
and Sandra Lee bartky—confession is an act in which Woman is “forced 
to replicate [her] disenfranchised social status” (bernstein 36). Em-
powering Man solely and requiring the redemption by patriarchal au-
thority, confession cannot serve as a means of resistance against the pa-
triarchal power. Eve’s blasphemous confession, therefore, can be read 
as the narrative of transgression which is meaningful only in the sense 
that it is a “transformative activity” (34) and “a mode of going through 
the change” (Felman and Laub 15).16 
The subversive and transformative nature of Eve’s confession re-
veals itself in the lyrical I’s contesting of the notions of truth and ob-
jectivity. Crozier’s Eve urges the confessor to “remember that”—to 
recognise a story which is different from the traditional “this.” Such 
an idea evidently questions the concept of memory as the faithful in-
scription of objective facts. Every memory—and every confession— 
is necessarily imperfect, as it is necessarily incomplete. Such incom-
pleteness, in bernstein’s view, “allows space for divergent accounts, 
for competing perspectives” (37). At the same time, in confession 
“emerge varying vested interests in defining the transgressor, the trans-
gressed, and the transgressive” (37). Confession, therefore, is an indefi-
nite discursive territory of action and change, where linear truths are 
fractured by “moments and margins” (38). 
The interchange and indefiniteness are evidently detectable in Cro-
zier’s poem; on the one hand, Eve belongs to the reality which is neatly 
arranged into “before” and “after,” in-side and out-side, action and re-
action, cause and effect. Apparently, she confesses the truth which sub-
verts the dominant biblical account of the Original Sin. Apparently, 
 16 Felman and Laub distinguish between “confession” and “testimony” and define 
the former as mute, silent, secret and reductive. Testimony, on the other hand, is—
in Felman and Laub’s phrasing—active, open and unconscious. For the sake of co-
herence—and for the reason that I do not use Felman and Laub’s theory as an inter-
pretative tool—I do not make the distinction between “confession” and “testimony,” 
and continue to use the former term.
she claims herself innocent, is a transgressor, a defendant and a subject 
of defence. On the other hand, however, another testimony slips in be-
tween the lines of Eve’s monologue. Eve tells the story of the past, Man, 
and the apple, and, at the same time, she tells the story of the present, 
“you” and the apple:
I give you the apple and you see
your lover for the first time  . . .
Eat this, chew more sweetness before the bitter seeds,
the hard star at the core. I am speaking
in the voice of crow, the voice of rain. Stark naked
I am out here in the large and lovely dark,
the taste of you, the taste of apple in my mouth. (39; italics in the original)
In Eve’s confession, “remember that” contends against “Eat this”; 
the justice-seeking victim matches a tantalising seductress who nib-
bles “you” while her speech opens itself, invites and entices, over 
and over again like a siren song. The truth Eve tells is elusive and amor-
phous, as Eve is inscribed into the continuous process of seducing 
and falling, opening and being misunderstood, and it is another truth 
she tells. Eve’s monologue cunningly engages “you” in the game, 
in which “you” discover “you” are being seduced, and what seduces 
“you” is not the truth “you” finally learn from the real Eve, but the an-
cestral and textual Eat this. “What I Gave you Truly,” as suggested 
earlier, questions the very concept of the “truth,” instead of replacing 
one “fact” with another. Thus, in Crozier’s poem, Eve becomes a “lin-
guistic” subject that is ambivalent (as, concurrently, she is the object 
of another story) and transformative. Her shame is transcended not 
through redemption granted by an authority, but through the sub-
version of the very concept of the authority, as well as the notions 
of truth, memory and identity. Eve’s monologue, therefore, becomes 
an “experimental site” within which Eve’s sin and shame turn open 
to transposition. 
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toward a feminist metanarrative
In her Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Mary Daly compares the well-known fairy tale “Snow White”—in which 
a beautiful princess seemingly dies having eaten a poisonous apple—
to the poisonous fruit itself. In Daly’s words, 
the child who is fed tales such as Snow White is not told that the tale itself is 
a poisonous apple, and the wicked Queen (her mother/teacher), having her-
self been drugged by the same deadly diet throughout her lifetime (death-
time), is unaware of her venomous part in the patriarchal plot. (1978: 44) 
To borrow Mary Daly’s analogy, the biblical Creation Myth can be 
interpreted as the forbidden fruit, consummation of which leads di-
rectly to the experience of shame. Myths—in Daly’s phrasing—are said 
to “open up depths of reality otherwise closed to us. [What] is not usu-
ally suggested [however, is] that they close off depths of reality which 
would otherwise be open to us” (44). While participation in patriarchal 
reality requires the constant repetition of “mythical models to reactu-
alize them continuously” (45), transforming this reality depends upon 
the metamorphosis of its mythic narratives. The purpose of my inter-
pretations was, accordingly, to point out the transformative qualities 
of Crozier’s poems, as it is my belief that Crozier “[a-mazes] tales that 
are phallic” (47) and by doing so advocates the redefinition of “shame” 
and “transgression” into open—and subversive—categories.
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3.2. shrinking the shrink.
subverting the authority 
of “classical” theories of sex
and gender
In a typical urban landscape, phallic shapes line up as far as the eye 
can see—light posts, church steeples, high-rises, chimneys, antennæ. 
All these phalluses reach and stretch up into the sky as humans walk 
around below toting their cigars, ice creams and huge camera lenses.
Manne Forssberg, Sex for Guys (9)
Just as a cigar is sometimes more than a cigar, sometimes the penis 
is more than just a penis, too.
Susan Bordo, The Male body: 
A New Look at Men in public and in private (94)
The shame of nakedness/sexuality that Adam and Eve discovered seems, so to speak, “topologic.” Significantly—as the biblical account 
illustrates—the body itself is divided into more and less shameful parts. 
The “most naked” parts of Adam and Eve’s shamed bodies are, evi-
dently, their sex organs, actually referred to as “shame-parts” in many 
languages (Jacoby 9): the biblical first people hastily cover them with 
fig leaves. Even though the act of concealment couples the sinners 
in the shaming eyes of God, contemporary Western culture sets what 
is covered apart. Genitalia are the most direct indicators of one’s sex, 
dichotomised into the categories of “maleness” and “femaleness” 
(which, similarly to “masculinity and femininity,” have been instituted 
as antithetical). Interestingly, however, “it was not until the Victorian 
period that females and males were viewed as opposites; prior to this, 
Western scientists and natural philosophers tended to assume that fe-
males were an inferior copy of males” (Scott-Dixon 16). Opposing 
the two concepts did not change the inferior position of Woman 
in Western culture: femaleness and, by extension, female genitals have 
been construed as different and secondary. 
(the penis po
ems)
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The superiority of the penis has been reflected in the (English) lan-
guage. In his The Lover’s Tongue: A Merry Romp Through the Language 
of Love and Sex, Mark Morton lists 1,300 words used over the centu-
ries to refer to the penis, which is contrasted with a radically smaller 
number of words describing the female reproductive organs. Strikingly, 
many of these penis words “[equate] the penis with something dan-
gerous—that is with something designed to puncture, cudgel, or ex-
plode” (Morton 99). Many common male first names—such as roger, 
Thomas, Dick, peter, Willie, Stanley, or Johnson—have also been used 
to denote the male member. The two formal words which are em-
ployed most frequently for this purpose, are penis and phallus. 
As Morton reveals, 
[t]he word phallus was adopted from Greek in 1613 [and] was not used 
to denote flesh-and-blood penises but only their symbolic representations, 
such as the erotic carvings carried during the festivals of Dionysius in an-
cient Greece. It was not until 1924 that phallus was used to denote a real life 
penis . . .  . As for the word penis, it was adopted from Latin in 1676, 
as a learned counterpart to another long-standing penis word. That other 
word was tail . . .  .  Fifty years after the adoption of penis, English also bor-
rowed the term membrum virile from Latin, literally meaning virile member. 
The virile part of this term derives from the Latin vir meaning man, which 
also developed into the word virtue thanks to the confused notion that 
being manly is synonymous with being virtuous. (104–105; italics in the orig-
inal)
Even though nowadays, at least within academic discourses, 
the original distinction between the phallus and the penis has been re-
instated, the positive meanings attached to the male organ spring, 
to a great extent, from confusing the phallus (“the creation of the cul-
tural imagination”) and its “anatomical double” (bordo 1999: 84). 
The phallus, in Susan bordo’s words, “is the penis that takes one’s 
breath away—not merely because of length or thickness . . .  but because 
of its majesty. Those who gaze upon it immediately feel themselves 
to be its subjects” (1999: 87). The greatness of the phallus/penis 
amalgam manifests itself, on a different level, in colloquial expressions: 
“In English, when you’re talking about a brave, strong man, you say, 
‘He’s got balls.’ In Swedish, you say, ‘He has a boner,’ when a guy dis-
tinguishes himself. In bolivia, the Laymi people say, ‘He has a fan-
tastic penis,’ to describe someone who has achieved something really 
major” (Forssberg 10). 
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As for the words pertaining to female genitals, they are surprisingly 
unspecific and usually “[do not] denote just the labia or the vulva 
or the vagina, but rather [gesture] vaguely to the whole anatomical en-
semble” or point to what is “down there” or “down in the valley” 
(Morton 131). Many of these words equate female sex organs with 
a wound, or a scar, suggesting that Woman is not only injured, 
but also—to return to the metaphor of the leaking vessel—embarrass-
ingly open (or opened by the powerful male organ). perhaps with 
the  exception of “Mary Jane” or “Lady Jane,” other common expres-
sions for female genitals are names of various animals. Even though 
they might be perceived as terms of endearment, they also denote 
the apparently animal, or lower, nature of a “pussy,” as contrasted with 
the human qualities of a “roger” or a “Johnson.” Moreover, whereas 
the penis has been construed as virtuous, the vagina has often been 
perceived as threatening and unknown, which is most clearly reflected 
in the idea of vagina dentata (“toothed vagina”), “a neurotic fantasy 
that was first identified by the psychoanalyst Otto rank in his 1924 
book The Trauma of Birth.” The scientist claimed that “many men fear 
the vagina. They feel inexorably drawn to it, like a siren of Greek my-
thology, and yet they leave the vagina depleted of their semen, as if 
a vampire or lamia has sucked out their vital essence” (Morton 141–142). 
The danger inscribed in the female sex organs is detectable in the word 
“snatch, which implies that Woman’s genitals will grab hold of a man 
and devour him.” The shameful nature of female private parts, 
on the other hand, can be traced in the word “pudendum” which “de-
rives from the Latin verb pudere meaning to cause shame” (Morton 132). 
The apparent inferiority of female genitals should be read in the con-
text of a more general inferiorisation of the construct “Woman.” 
Importantly, in the past centuries, “sex was not viewed simply as a 
matter of differentiation between men and women: through a corre-
sponding gender system, it became an elaborately constructed ratio-
nalization of the male subordination of women, maintained in part by 
the claim that women lacked the capacity to reason” (Currie and 
raoul 3–4). “Femaleness” and “femininity,” which correspond to the 
concepts of “sex” and “gender,” respectively, were traditionally per-
ceived as equally “natural” and mutually dependent. The idea that it is 
natural, or normal, for females to be feminine, resulted in naturalisa-
tion or normalisation of various, often contradictory, “feminine quali-
ties” (and, by extension, in stigmatisation of the unfeminine ones). For 
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example, the origin of the most famous of feminine disorders—hys-
teria—was believed to be physical: “Woman’s uterus (hystera) was 
prone to running amok through the body or shrivelling when women 
studied fields such as mathematics” (Scott-Dixon 21). Along the same 
line, 19th-century craniologists claimed that the smaller size of female 
brains reflected their limited intellectual capabilities. 
It was, therefore, crucial for feminist theory to separate biological 
sex from cultural gender, and hence de-naturalise the feminine woman. 
resultantly, many feminists of the second wave veered toward social 
constructivism, and the biological body has become a problematic 
term for feminist studies. Toward the end of the 20th century, although 
feminist theories still tended to discuss the body as metaphorical 
and abstract, more attention was paid to the bodily experiences.17 
In present-day texts, importantly, sex is rarely discussed as clearly di-
morphic:
. . .  like gender which varies over time, place and contexts, biological sex may 
be thought of as a spectrum rather than two firmly divided categories.  . . . 
Now we know that there is a lot of diversity even in something as appar-
ently simple as sexual development. Early in development, male and female 
foetuses look the same, and their reproductive organs diverge from the same 
common origin. In a small percentage of people, one or more elements of bi-
ological sex are ambiguous; people with these indeterminate biological 
markers are called intersex. (Scott-Dixon 16–17)
rather than use the term “intersex,” however, in her Trans/Forming 
Feminisms: Trans/Feminist Voices Speak Out , Krista Scott-Dixon em-
ploys the term “trans people,” which she does not limit to transsexual 
or transgender people, but uses it in a broad sense to denote the trans-
gression of the stereotypical confines of gender. 
Such feminist efforts to transgress sexual and gender dichotomies 
notwithstanding, the following section is built upon the assumption 
that common cultural differentiation between the two sexes, and the re-
sulting shame-less glorification of the phallus, presuppose the apparent 
shame-fullness of the female body. The section is composed of two 
parts, comprising, respectively, my interpretations of Lorna Crozier’s 
“poem for Sigmund” and “Tales for Virgins.” both belong to Crozier’s se-
ries of twelve verses entitled The Penis Poems, included in the collection 
Angels of Flesh, Angels of Silence. Together with The Sex Life of Vegeta-
 17 See: Linda birke, Feminism and the Biological Body (1999).
bles from the earlier collection The Garden Going On Without Us, 
The Penis Poems have been labelled particularly feminist (i.e., offensive 
and controversial). Crozier herself responds to the zealous reactions 
of her readers thus:
It isn’t a girl masturbating, or carrots ‘fucking the earth,’ or a tongue finding 
peas clitoral “as it slides up the pod,” that makes some people go berserk. 
It is women writers saying—hey, here’s another way of looking at things 
you thought were wrapped up, tied with string, stored in the basement. 
We’re going to open the packages and surprise you. We’re going to tell you 
some secrets and expose some lies. We’re going to peel some vegetables 
and show you what’s underneath the skin. (1990: 92)
In light of Crozier’s explanation, The Penis Poems can be read as ex-
amples of deliberate, feminist “peeling” and “exposing,” whose aim 
is to countermand woman’s shame. Whereas the feminist strategy 
of de-shaming that Crozier implements in her “biblical poems” might 
be referred to as one of remythologising—as Crozier creates new myths 
in place of the biblical ones, or replaces Christian truths with the pre-
Christian stories—The Penis Poems de-mythologise the (symbolic) 
phallus by means of profaning its biological “counterpart.” The strategy 
of de-idealising the penis that Crozier employs is one that prevents 
penis envy, since “[p]enis envy is always envy of an idealised penis” 
(Torok 92).
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“‘so proud!’  . . . ‘and so lordly!  . . .  like another being!’”18
on (de)mystification
There is no resemblance at all  . . . 
Resemblances are the shadows 
of differences.
Vladimir Nabokov, pale Fire 
(qtd. in Bruhm 138)
Where women are enigmatic,  
men are recognizable.
Naomi Segal, “Echo and Narcissus” (172)
 orna Crozier’s “poem for Sigmund” is dedicated to Sigmund Freud,
     a theorist so influential “not only in the field of psychoanalysis 
but in the wider culture, [that] many of his ideas are today treated 
as commonplace” (brooks C. xi). Since, in her short verse, Crozier 
refers specifically to the idea of penis envy, it is only in order that 
Freud’s instrumental essay entitled “Some psychical Consequences of 
the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” (1925) (in which the 
theorist defines femininity as an unfortunate consequence of envy) 
should loom large in the structure of the argument organising this part 
of my book. In my analysis, however, Freud’s concepts, supplemented 
by more of Donald L. Nathanson’s ideas concerning the “shame of fe-
maleness,” are interlaced with their feminist revisions, and thus 
Crozier’s poem, cited toward the end of this section, becomes a reflec-
tion of the feminist critique of the father of psychoanalysis. 
In a sense, Freud, like beauvoir, believes that one is not born, 
but becomes Woman. When the little girl in Freud’s essay first dis-
covers that she has nothing, she naturally develops a “masculinity 
complex”: “she has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants 
to have it” (22). The overwhelming envy transfers her straight into the 
space of the “substandard”: she lands in the middle of a bumpy road 
toward femininity. Thus, as is easy to infer from Freud’s theory, the 
essential lack is a prerequisite, defining trait for Woman: she develops 
around the no-thing, motivated solely by the urge to fill in the empti-
ness. Her search for the thing is compulsory and dissatisfying, as plea-
sure—in Freud’s terms—is exclusively penile. 
 18 D. H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover (qtd. in bordo 1999: 95).
92
lo
rn
a
 c
ro
zi
er
’s 
fe
m
in
is
t s
tr
at
eg
ie
s
The little girl transforms into the envious woman gradually. Freud’s 
essay indicates the following six stages of the development of the “mas-
culinity complex”: first, the boy sees male and female genitals and, 
on recognising the female’s horrifying absence, experiences the fear 
of castration. Then, the girl sees male and female genitals, and, as she 
feels inferior and envious, she rejects sexual pleasure, finds herself 
stuck in the Oedipus/Electra complex, and becomes, finally, the (bad) 
woman. Importantly, Woman starts materialising as a result of a boy’s 
gaze: “… it is the boy who looks and is horrified first, and that is the 
little girl who merely doubles and confirms by reduplication what he 
supposed to have seen. Or not seen” (Irigaray 78). The gaze, therefore, 
that construes Woman as “nothing to see” (Irigaray 76) is necessarily 
phallic. Although Freud’s essay implies that a naïve little girl merely 
compares male and female genitals, and views the penis—naturally—
as the object of her envy, she is, in fact, “already an adept (albeit un-
conscious) reader of complex cultural signs” (Smart 163), able to recog-
nise the inferior position of Woman. yet, in Luce Irigaray’s view, 
Freud’s psychoanalysis actually renders the “naïve little girl” utterly 
impossible:
. . .  female sexuality can be graphed along the axes of visibility of (so-called) 
masculine sexuality. For such a demonstration to hold up, the little girl must 
immediately become a little boy. In other words THErE NEVEr IS (Or WILL 
bE) A LITTLE GIrL. All that remains is to assign her sexual function to this 
“little boy” with no penis, or at least no penis of any recognisable value.  
Inevitably, the trial of “castration” must be undergone. This “little boy,” who 
was, in all innocence and ignorance of sexual difference, phallic , notices 
how ridiculous “his” sex organ looks. “He” sees the disadvantage for which 
“he” is anatomically destined: “he” has only a tiny little sex organ, no sex 
organ at all, really, an almost invisible sex organ. The almost imperceptible 
clitoris. The humiliation of being so badly equipped, of cutting such a poor 
figure, in comparison with the penis, with the sex organ, can only lead 
to a desire to “have something like it too,” and Freud claims that this de-
sire will form the basis for “normal womanhood.”19 (77; italics and capitals 
in the original)
 19 In Three Essays of Sexuality Freud states that “The assumption that all human be-
ings have the same (male) form of genital is the first of many remarkable and mo-
mentous sexual theories of children.  . . .  We might lay it down that the sexuality 
of little girls is of a wholly masculine character” (qtd. in Oliver 200).
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The gaze that shames the female genitalia into “nothing” is—to re-
peat it once more—one of “the boy who looks and is horrified first” 
(Irigaray 78). The little girl, “forsaken and abandoned in her lack, de-
fault, absence, envy, etc.,  ...  enters into the castration complex 
in the same way as a boy, like a boy” (78). This little girl, consequently, 
desires to be like Man, as “the ‘fact of castration’ will leave her with 
only one option—the semblance, the mummery of femininity, which 
will always already have been to “act like” the value recognised by/for 
the male” (78). During the first three stages of her feminisation, hence, 
the girl adopts the phallic gaze and directs it onto herself. This gaze, 
in turn, castrates her—deprives her of some thing—and predetermines 
her not only to envy men, but also to inflict the fear of castration 
in men. 
The transformation of the little girl into an injured little boy pushes 
her into the next stage, where she denies herself any sexual pleasure. 
Devoid of the sexual organ, she recognises the fact that masturbation 
is a masculine exercise.20 The girl “turns violently against that pleasur-
able activity” (Freud 24), apparently led by
her narcissistic sense of humiliation which is bound up with penis-envy, 
a reminder that after all this is a point on which she cannot compete with 
boys and that it would therefore be best for her to give up the idea of doing 
so. Thus the little girl’s recognition of the anatomical distinction between 
the sexes forces her away from masculinity and masculine masturbation 
on to new lines which lead to the development of femininity. (Freud 24)
In order to transform into “a little woman,” hence, the girl has to ac-
knowledge the sullen inferiority of her genitalia. This realisation, in turn, 
transforms her smoothly into the victim of the Oedipus/Electra com-
plex: 
. . .  now the girl’s libido slips into a new position along the line—there is 
no other way of putting it—of the equation penis-child. She gives up her 
wish for a penis and puts in place of it a wish for a child: and with that pur-
pose in view she takes her father as a love-object. Her mother becomes 
the object of her jealousy. (Freud 24) 
 20 In Freud’s phrasing “the elimination of clitoral sexuality is a necessary precondi-
tion for the development of femininity” (24).
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Woman’s essential lack, therefore, translates primarily into her 
being an envious, a-sexual mother-to-be. Importantly, however, it also 
presupposes her moral deficiency: Woman is altogether bad. Freud 
confesses:
I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that 
for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is 
in men. Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent 
of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men. Character-traits which 
critics of every epoch have brought up against women—that they show less 
sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exi-
gencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgments by feel-
ings of affection or hostility—all these would be amply accounted for 
in the formation of their super-ego . . .  . (26)
Therefore, the penis—conspicuously present, forthright and handy—
is illustrative of the (positive) masculine values as such. The vagina, 
on the other hand, is to be viewed as “the wound to [Woman’s] narcis-
sism” (Freud 23), a source of contempt and the sphere of shameful ab-
sence. Femininity, “as the negative term in sexual difference, is con-
structed in relation to the phallus; and the thoroughly natural, 
essentialist penis lends itself to the representation of the phallus” 
(brennan 7). In other words, the biological penis is “elevated” 
to the symbolic phallus—a representation of (white, heterosexual) 
masculine authority and a pillar of the Western culture.
Significantly, Freud’s phallus/penis—(omni)present and straight—
realises its superior power only in heterosexual intercourse. The con-
cept of the powerful phallus and that of heterosexuality, integrate into 
manifestations of unmatched “normality”: 
Freud’s theory of heterosexuality made this orientation “normal” and not 
simply natural. This is an important distinction  . . .  because nature and the nat-
ural were not necessarily seen as moral, nor capable of self-reflection. Freud’s 
heterosexual was a moral, self-reflexive being who had achieved normality. 
The aim of bodily pleasure was normalised and it is clear that Freud did not 
imagine that the sole goal of heterosex—for men anyway—was anything 
other than pleasure. (Smart 172) 
“For men anyway,” the pleasure of heterosex arises from penetra-
tion. For Freud’s Woman, conversely, submittal to penetration is a sign 
of “mature femininity” (Smart 164). The normal Woman, in Freud’s 
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terms, succumbs, and “penetration [is] a crucial part of [the] process 
of subjection” (Smart 165). As such, both heterosexuality and its cen-
tral subjecting demonstration have been viewed by numerous feminist 
writers as “defining [elements] of oppression” (Smart 165). Such auto-
cratic establishment of heterosexuality as the system of “domination 
and subordination” (Smart 166) is another way to “deny [hetero-
sexual] women pleasure and bodily autonomy and empowerment” 
(Segal qtd. in Smart 175).
Curiously, Freud does not associate his lacking Woman with shame 
in any straightforward manner. In fact, shame is almost exclusively ab-
sent from Freud’s writings in general. According to Stephen pattison, 
however, much of what Freud states about guilt refers to the shame af-
fect. The absence of shame from Freud’s theories has been explained 
as a result of Freud’s being particularly shame-prone himself: “perhaps 
he was ashamed of being a Jew in anti-Semitic Vienna, or because 
he perceived himself to be ugly,  . . .  [he] made [himself] blind to shame 
in his clinical practice” (pattison 44). Still, the experience of femininity 
as he describes it is evidently shame-bound, as the feelings of inferi-
ority, mutilation, humiliation and contempt that he ascribes to femi-
ninity are the constituents of the shame affect. Freud’s woman, in fact, 
is normal just enough to recognise her abnormality and immerse her-
self—to borrow Donald L. Nathanson’s term—in the “shame of female-
ness.” The very fact that she has a vagina, hence, makes Woman both 
an uncontrollable “leaky vessel” and a non-phallus; her inferiority, 
therefore, seemingly secures both biological and symbolic dimensions.
Nathanson’s reading of Woman actually rephrases Freud, as it 
shows with a startling clarity how the female body is construc- 
ted as shame-bound. Even though—as Nathanson claims—shame 
is founded upon exposure, and display of genitals is, hypothetically, 
most shameful, the invisibility of female organs must not be read 
as advantageous. In order to support his claim, Nathanson construes 
the vagina which is not simply invisible, but disguised and deceptive. 
While the penis straightforwardly erects at times, the vagina secretly 
leaks and reeks, so that “Woman is subject to both self-dismell and self-
disgust [which], of course, keep company with shame” (296).21 Evi-
 21 Moreover, in the heteronormative world of Nathanson’s theory it is Woman who 
is held responsible for Man’s sexual arousal, which is visible and hence risky. Conse-
quently, Nathanson summons Woman to “learn how to handle the effect [she] makes 
on men lest that effect cause confusion, embarrassment and anger” (295).
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dently, in both Freud’s and Nathanson’s theories, Woman’s “nothing 
to be seen” is exposed, visible and analysed: as Nathanson decla- 
res, “there is no better way to guarantee interest than to hide some- 
thing” (296). Therefore, in the phallic/symbolic reality in which 
Woman finds herself, “this nothing to be seen” (Nathanson 296) onto 
which the phallic gaze is fixed, is nothing and must remain nothing:
The idea that a “nothing to be seen,” a something not subject to the rule 
of visibility or of specula(riza)tion, might yet have some reality, would in-
deed be intolerable to man. It would serve to threaten the theory and prac-
tice of the representation by which he aims to sublimate, or avoid the ban 
on, masturbation. Auto-eroticism has been permitted, authorised, encour-
aged insofar as it is deferred, exhibited in sublated ways. All this is endan-
gered (caught in the act, one might say) by a nothing–that is, a nothing 
the same, identical, identifiable. by a fault, a flaw, a lack, an absence, out-
side the system of representations and autorepresentations. Which are 
man’s. (Irigaray 78–79; italics in the original)
Hypothetical “symbols for the state of this ‘nothing to be seen’” (Iri-
garay 78) could threaten “the process of production, reproduction, mas-
tery, and profitability, of meaning, dominated by the phallus–that 
master signifier  . . .  .” (Irigaray 79; italics in the original). Most evi-
dently, therefore, critical analyses of Freud’s definition of genders 
and the creation of the female sexual symbols have been necessary as-
signments of the feminist movement. Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanaly-
sis and Feminism, notably, first “broke the link between biology . . . 
and power” (Smart 163), splitting the (symbolic) phallus from the (bio-
logical) penis. Following this tradition, Crozier restores the penis 
to a simple status of an organ, and describes it as functional, pleasur-
able, funny, sometimes ridiculous, but certainly not powerful. The lyr-
ical I of the poems takes the (de-idealised) penis in her hand, examines 
it, smells it and tastes it. Her examination—although tender—degrades 
the penis to a
. . .  funny thing
a brontosaurus with a long neck
and pea-sized brain, only room
for one thought and that’s
not extinction. (76)
The first part of the poem, therefore, introduces the penis as “peeled” 
of the phallus: there is nothing particularly threatening, authoritarian 
or admirable about the “funny thing.” Importantly, Crozier separates 
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the penis from its male “carrier”: the (lyrical) penis of the poem 
is driven by its own logic. The second (and last) part of the poem un-
veils the expectations of this simple “animal” and, simultaneously, re-
defines and blasphemously mocks the apparent sacredness tradition-
ally related to the phallus and to heterosexual desire:
No wonder I feel fond of it,
its simple trust of me
as my hands slide down your belly,
the way it jumps up
like a drawing in a child’s pop-up book,
expecting me 
to say “Hi!
Surprised to see you,”
expecting tenderness
from these envious woman’s hands. (76)
In line with feminist strategies discussed so far, “poem for Sigmund,” 
together with other verses in Crozier’s poetic series, redefines Freud’s 
notion of the phallus. undoubtedly, the feminist re-definition 
of the (sexual) norms, and the subversive surfacing of queer perspec-
tives, have acted as unparalleled anti-oppressants within the realm 
of the feminist theory. The Penis Poems “deflate the phallus discur-
sively,  . . .  deconstruct this mythic status of unitary, transhistorical het-
erosexuality and start to talk of heterosexualities  . . .  .” (Smart 166).22 
Interestingly, the gaze directed at the penis in Crozier’s series expresses 
not only the critique of phallogocentrism, but also (heterosexual) de-
sire. Crozier’s woman, however—unlike Freud’s—does not yield 
to the penetrating penis, but, on the contrary, has the power to tender 
pleasure. The concept of the powerful “male thrust”23 as the proper 
manifestation of heterosexual desire is, in “poem for Sigmund,” re-
placed with the “male trust” in Woman. Since the penis in the poem 
is de-idealised and non-phallic, it does not evoke any envy or trigger 
any “masculinity complex” in the lyrical her. As the penis is exposed, 
the phallus is phalling. In the non-phallic reality, consequently, there is 
no reason for the “shame of femaleness.”
 22 In a similar way, in The Male Body: A New Look at Men in Public and in Private 
(1999), following her 1995 Unbearable Weight devoted to the female body, Susan 
bordo casts a close look at the male body and opens it up for analysis.
 23 “Male Thrust” is the title of one of Crozier’s poem, a humorous response to An-
thony burgess’s statement that he “can take no pleasure from serious reading  . . . 
that lacks a strong male thrust” which serves as the epigraph to Crozier’s verse. 
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“never trust an animal that has tasted blood.”24 
lies, truths, the virgin
And what I wanted from you, Mother, 
was this: that in giving me life, you still 
remain alive.
Luce Irigaray, “And One Doesn’t Stir” 
(qtd. in Hirsch 137)
Sweet between my thighs,
you burrow there, the animal
I long for,
the animal I fear.
Lorna Crozier, “Ode” (93 )
The organ sounded and the children’s 
voices echoed so sweetly through 
the choir. The warm sunshine stream-
ed brightly in through the window, 
right up to the bench where [she] sat. 
Her heart was so overfilled with sun-
shine, with peace, and with joy, that it 
broke. Her soul flew with the sunshine 
to heaven, and no one there asked 
about the red shoes.25
Hans Christian Andersen, 
“The Red Shoes” (25)
In “Tales for Virgins”—a lengthy poem which, together with “Ode,” closes The Penis Poems cycle—the eponymous virgin is a central 
figure, while the penis’s role is secondary. However, unlike the organ 
inspected in “poem for Sigmund,” in “Tales for Virgins” the penis is 
a danger. Even though in the realm of (virgin) tales the penis can only 
be imaginary, it poses a very real threat: in the course of defloration, 
the penis kills a virgin. In the ensuing section I will focus on various 
readings of Woman’s virginity (commonly equated with the concepts 
of honour, virtue, and integrity), and of its shameful, albeit perceived 
as inevitable, loss.
In “Tales for Virgins,” the penis is a lethal weapon, inflicting pain 
and soaking in blood; it is what Marie bonaparte referred to as a “ban- 
ging rod” (86).26 The first stanza/tale emphasises this characteristic 
 24 This line comes from the last poem in Crozier’s The Penis Poems series, titled 
“Ode.” 
 25 Hans Christian Andersen, “The red Shoes.” World Wide Web <http.//hca.gilead.
org.il/red_shoes.html> (08. 09. 2003).
 26 In her Female Sexuality, in a chapter titled “Essential Feminine Masochism,” 
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by reference to two narratives, Sylvia plath’s The Bell Jar and Hans 
Christian Andersen’s “The red Shoes,” here interlinked:
. . .  Her first time,
she bleeds all over the bed,
soaks through the towels
she wears like a diaper,
fills up her shoes
(talk about red
dancing slippers),
then bleeds all over the taxi
that takes her to the hospital –
her mother 
out there somewhere,
waiting. (89)
Andersen’s tale (repeatedly hinted at in Crozier’s poem) elucidates 
plath’s narrative—and, by extension, “Tales for Virgins.” It structures 
the whole poem around the themes of immorality, shame, subse-
quent punishment and necessary repentance. Consequently, by reason 
of the narrative fusion, the red shoes become the symbol of shameful 
defloration. In Crozier’s tales, the story of little Karen who loses com-
mon sense in her passion for beautiful red shoes, and for this is con-
demned to dance an endless dance (humiliated and banished from 
the church, she may only end her agony by begging to have her feet 
chopped off) is both a lesson and a warning for virgins. Significantly, 
all modern “Tales for Virgins” related by Crozier, revolve around 
the same motif: the uncontrollable, dreary dance of the shoes filled 
with blood.
The sense of such a symbolic consistency becomes clear when one 
takes into account that, like in Andersen’s “The red Shoes,” in Crozier’s 
“Tales for Virgins” defloration incites the experience of shame. First of all, 
the loss of virginity gives vent to disgraceful, uncontrollable excess. 
In Crozier’s retelling of plath’s narrative, this excess is manifested in su-
perfluous, conspicuous leaking.27 Virginal blood overflows and stigma-
bonaparte states that Woman’s natural enjoyment of pain is reflected in language: 
“Is not the penis termed ‘rod,’ and is it not spoken of as ‘banging’? In any case, pop-
ular wisdom has it that women like ‘being beaten’” (86).
 27 In Andersen’s tale, on the other hand, it is the outrageous redness of the girl’s 
shoes that brings the other’s gaze and shame upon her. When little Karen goes 
to church in her wicked shoes “[everybody looks] at her feet, and the whole 
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tises Woman, leaving a flagrant, bloody path behind her. blood— 
although usually “not classified as body’s excreta” (paster 64)—becomes 
excremental (i.e., shameful and impure) when specifically female 
(i.e. menstrual, virginal or released at childbirth):
[Woman’s] bleeding signifies as a particularly charged instance of the fe-
male body’s predisposition to flow out, to leak. Menstruation comes to re-
semble other varieties of female incontinence—sexual, urinary, linguistic—
that served as powerful signs of woman’s inability to control the workings 
of her own body. It is not too much to argue that these historical signs 
of uncontrol bear implications for the ideology and politics of reproduction 
that we live with still. (paster 83)
Although the forms of female blood mentioned above have tradition-
ally been perceived as filthy, Woman’s blood as such, was often—as Gail 
Kern paster suggests—thought of as worse than Man’s. According 
to the humoral axioms, for instance, 
females were considered naturally plethoric.  . . .  Their bodies  . . .  were naturally 
less soluble, since by virtue of its colder temperature their blood tended to be 
slower moving, clammier, grosser.  . . .  It follows  . . .  that the finest female blood 
was less pure, less refined, less perfect than the finest male blood and  . . .  
the more inclined to corruption. (79) 
paster uses Mikhail bakhtin’s concept in order to theorise Woman’s 
body as grotesque: one which is “not a closed completed unit [but] 
is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits” (bakhtin qtd. 
in paster 14). Woman is viewed as “naturally grotesque—which 
is to say, open, permeable, effluent, leaky.” Man, on the other hand, 
is “naturally whole, closed, opaque, self-contained” (92). In “Tales 
for Virgins” the discomforting female incontinence translates into sexual 
uncontrollability. Not only is the first sexual act potentially embar-
rassing and life-threatening—the second tale relates the story of Duch-
of the way from the church door to the choir it [seems] to her as if the ancient fig-
ures on the monuments, in their stiff collars and long black robes, [have] their eyes 
fixed on her shoes” (Hans Christian Andersen, “The red Shoes.” World Wide Web 
<http.//hca.gilead.org.il/red_shoes.html> (08. 09. 2003). This first lavishness results 
in uncontrollable, murderous dance—the perfect representation of the shameful ex-
cess mentioned above. In other “Tales for Virgins,” similarly, loss of virginity means 
loss of control which results—as discussed further on—either in death, unwanted 
motherhood, or sexual promiscuity. 
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arme who “rammed [his penis] right through a woman / and killed her” 
(89)—but a girl who “goes all the way” either ends up “with babies / 
folding diapers in front of game shows” or “goes bad” (90). “Tales 
for Virgins,” therefore, give virgins three options: “remain a virgin / 
to save yourself” (91), or fall into (unwanted) motherhood, or (shameful) 
whoredom. “Going all the way,” in other words, is the sin that is al-
ways evident and never goes unpunished.
“Tales for Virgins”—“The red Shoes” included—are, significantly, 
stories of mothers and daughters. In Andersen’s tale, disastrous red 
shoes are offered to the little girl first by her mother and then by her 
foster mother28—and in both cases the fatal footwear becomes 
the cause of the respective mother figure’s demise. In symbolic corre-
spondence with the metaphorical red shoes, “Sylvia plath’s [heroine’s]” 
shameful leaking, similarly, causes symbolic death, sending her mother 
“out there somewhere” (Macpherson 59).29 The mother in Crozier’s 
poem is, therefore, both a contradictory and a tragic figure: she simul-
taneously designates the daughter’s destiny (the red shoes are heredi-
tary) and guards her purity; as Woman, “she sacrifices all to [her 
daughter] who [is the stand-in] for her absence” (Wilkie-Stibbs 87). 
The mother also remains silent; she does not share any experience with 
her daughter, although—at different moments in time—their experi-
ences are the same. The vague relationship between mother 
and daughter presented in the poem corresponds to beauvoir’s depic-
tion of this ambivalent bond. In beauvoir’s view, the mother “saddles 
her child with her own destiny” (309) and “greets [her daughter] with 
this ambiguous curse: ‘you shall be a woman’” (533). The lack of actual 
communication between the two—devised by the mother—aims, ac-
cording to the French feminist, at keeping the daughter innocent 
and inferior, as it is intolerable for the mother “to have her daughter 
boldly assert herself as an other, an independent person” (535; italics 
 28 The first pair of red shoes is made for Karen by “an old shoemaker’s wife” who 
simply does not have any other material. The girl first wears her shoes “on the day 
of her mother’s funeral,” the day she is also spotted and adopted by “an old lady.” 
The woman burns Karen’s red shoes (which she thinks of as “hideous”) but then—
unwillingly as she cannot see very well—buys the girl another pair of red shoes. 
The girl’s sinful fondness for her red shoes results, in turn, in her departure from 
the old woman and the woman’s consequent death.
 29 It has been argued that The Bell Jar may be read as “a daughter’s case of matro-
phobia, [and it is] Esther’s fear and hatred of her mother [that] entrap her within 
a misogynist version of motherhood that is potentially lethal” (Macpherson 59). 
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in the original). In Irigaray’s less judgemental terms, the lack of com-
munication is due to the fact that the mother, “perceived solely 
in the light of her relationship with her child . . . no longer has an access 
to her own female identity” (qtd. in Wilkie-Stibbs 87). The mother is, 
therefore, “[exiled to] motherhood” and remains in the state of “symbi-
otic paralysis” (87) with her daughter. The daughter, on the other hand, 
“must keep company with her mother to learn how to become 
a woman” (88), but in fact she “can not learn anything more than 
to become a mother” (Wilkie-Stibbs 88). 
The term “symbiotic paralysis”—descriptive of the constant ex-
change of silence established between mother and daughter as it is—
is not capacious enough to embrace another shame-full aspect 
of the mother-daughter relationship brought into light by Crozier’s 
poem: the connection between the mother and the abject. In Kriste-
va’s terms, in order to enter the Symbolic, one has to renounce jouis-
sance: the sensual and primary pleasure rooted in corporeal closeness 
of the mother. The mother’s body is thus removed—together with all 
that is improper, disgusting and repulsive (like, for instance, “a piece 
of filth, waste  . . .  dung,  . . .  defilement, sewage and muck” (1982: 12))—
into the liminal space in between nature and society, the margins 
of consciousness.30 The removal, however, is not entirely successful, 
as the abject forever threatens the “’I’ of the socialized, signifying, 
and speaking subject,” and manifests itself as “repugnance and disgust” 
(Wilkie-Stibbs 85; italics in the original). 
The abject belongs to peripheries and borders, primarily ones 
of the body, and, therefore, is “paradigmatically fluid: pus, menstrual 
blood, vomit, the decomposing corpse” (Jantzen 124). The bodily fluids 
that incite the feeling of abjection are necessarily polluting and 
 30 In Kristeva’s phrasing: “The abject confronts us  . . .  within our personal arche-
ology, with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even before 
existing outside of her, thanks to the autonomy of language.  . . .  The difficulty 
a mother has in acknowledging (or being acknowledged by) the symbolic realm  . . . 
is not such as to help the future subject leave the natural mansion. The child can 
serve its mother as token of her own authentication; there is, however, hardly any 
reason for her to serve as go-between for it to become autonomous and authentic 
in its turn. In such close combat, the symbolic light that a third party, eventually 
the father, can contribute helps the future subject, the more so if it happens to be 
endowed with a robust supply of drive energy, in pursuing a reluctant struggle 
against what, having been the mother, will turn into an abject. repelling, rejecting; 
repelling itself, rejecting itself. Ab-jecting” (1982: 13). 
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fall, schematically, into two types: excremental and menstrual. Neither tears 
nor sperm, for instance, although they belong to borders of the body, have 
any polluting value. Excrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, dis-
ease, corpse, etc.) stand for the danger to identity that comes from without: 
the ego threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by its outside, life by 
death. Menstrual blood, on the contrary, stands for the danger issuing from 
within the identity (social or sexual); it threatens the relationship between 
the sexes within a social aggregate and, through internalisation, the identity 
of each sex in the face of sexual difference. (Kristeva 1982: 81)
Kristeva associates both types of polluting objects with “the ma-
ternal and/or the feminine” (1982: 71).31 Whereas, in Kristeva’s words, 
the connection between menstrual blood and femininity “goes without 
saying” (1982: 71), the relationship between the maternal/feminine 
and excrement might seem less transparent. The scholar provides two 
arguments to support her point: first, that “the anal penis is also 
the phallus with which infantile imagination provides the feminine 
sex,” and second, that “maternal authority is experienced first 
and above all . . .  as sphincteral training” (1982: 71). In other words, 
Kristeva’s mother “shapes [the child’s] body into territories having 
areas” (1982: 71), some of which are “proper-clean” and some “im-
proper-dirty.” The mother herself appears to be both “proper-clean” 
and “improper-dirty”: an agent of pollution and guardian of cleanliness. 
The contradictory nature of the mother figure that shapes Crozier’s 
poem deserves a closer scrutiny. In Andersen’s “The red Shoes” 
and plath’s The Bell Jar mother figures are simultaneously daughter 
figures’ supervisors and abject characters. In Andersen’s tale mother 
figures are old, and either make the red shoes and offer them to little 
Karen or forbid the girl to wear them. Consequently, mothers 
in “The red Shoes” represent menstrual blood, (constrained) sexuality 
and death. In plath’s narrative, on the other hand, Mrs Greenwood 
 31 Importantly, it has been argued by numerous feminist authors that there is no 
“natural” link between femininity and its apparent polluting nature, and that 
Kristeva stays within “the symbolic structure in which the mother is already seen 
as polluting” (Jantzen 126). Jantzen criticises Kristeva for linking “semen with . . . 
purifying tears, [and] menstrual blood . . .  with shit” (125). In Jantzen’s phrasing, 
“the reason menstrual blood can be threatening when semen is not is that the fe-
male—sexual and maternal—is already perceived as threatening and the male 
is not” (126; italics in the original).
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is both the proper “suburban wife-and-mother” (Macpherson 41) 
and a site of repulsive physicality.32
because of her highly oxymoronic nature, the mother in Crozier’s 
poem may also be viewed as the embodiment of the Virgin Mother: 
pure, religious, and elusive.33 The first sexual act—one of “killing 
the virgin”—is a lethal weapon in the daughter’s hands, aimed against 
the Holy Mother. Therefore, in Andersen’s tale, the act of putting 
on the red shoes not only ends the lives of the mother figures, but it 
also condemns Karen to exile from the Church: even when her feet are 
finally chopped off, the red shoes (with the little feet in them) hop 
at the church door blocking the way, so that she cannot get in. 
religion—as presented in the poem—is to relieve virginal anxiety. 
What it offers as salvation is eternal chastity, which is ridiculed by Cro-
zier in the third Virgin Tale:
Though protestant,
when I turned thirteen
I dreamed of becoming a nun
wed to Jesus
who never had a penis.
Or even his mother Mary
wouldn’t be so bad.
She only had to do it once
and in the ear. (89–90)
The stanza points at the unattainable continence of Christian icons: 
Jesus is Godly thus penis-less, while Mary—the Christian ideal of Good 
Woman—is impregnated spiritually by the Holy Ghost. In Mary Da-
ly’s words, “[so] spiritual was the whole affair that Mary remained 
a virgin  . . .  before, during and after the birth” (1978: 83). In consequence, 
Mary is “officially [set apart] from all other women as utterly unique, 
an impossible ‘model’” (1973: 82), leaving them “essentially identified 
 32 In Reflecting on The Bell Jar, pat Macpherson indicates the following fragment of 
the novel in which Esther’s mother is directly associated with “sphincteral training,” 
and thus, in the light of Kristeva’s theory, with excrement itself: “My mother was 
the worst. She never scolded me, but kept begging me, with a sorrowful face, to tell 
her what she had done wrong. She said she was sure the doctors thought she had 
done something wrong because they asked her a lot of questions about my toilet 
training, and I had been perfectly trained at a very early age and given her no 
trouble whatsoever” (plath qtd. in Macpherson 60).
 33 The girls who “end up with babies” are not referred to as “mothers.”
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with [shameful] Eve” (1973: 81): Mary “had to do it once,” but only 
for the most immaculate and substantiated of reasons: she was chosen 
by God to give birth to Jesus, the saviour of humankind. As Daly sug-
gests, designation of Mary as (an entirely improbable) standard 
of Good Woman serves the purpose of shaming Woman into the all-
inclusive category of moral looseness.34 
The lyrical I of Crozier’s poem is, accordingly, scared/shamed into 
aching for eternal virginity. At the same time, she wishes to be relieved 
from her condition in a way which “connects directly to romantic nar-
ratives” (Giddens 241). romantic fiction is, in the words of Jane M. 
ussher, “perhaps the most pervasive and avidly read form of literature 
aimed at women [which] throws  . . .  women head first into a pit of pas-
sion and longing for the phallic hero who will make her a complete 
woman” (43). Indeed, the girl presented in the poem studies the fables 
which display to her the world of restraints, from which she can be 
freed solely through romantic love:
. . .  we waited for the boy
we couldn’t say no to, 
though he might hang in the morning,
though we might walk
across our mothers’ spotless floors
in bloody shoes. (91)
In romantic fiction, to which the stanza alludes, Woman is passive: 
she waits to be seduced. Overwhelming romantic affect makes her 
helpless: she simply cannot say no. In fact, “within the codes of ro-
mance, she can have [sex: this death-dealing, matricidal venture] only 
 34 bonnie MacLachlan, in her Virginity Revisited: Configurations of the Unpossessed 
Body, looks for the origin of the cult of the Virgin Mary in a mistranslation: “It is 
not without some degree of irony that the foundation of the veneration of Mary as 
Virgin Mother derives from the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew almah as par-
thenos, ‘virgin.’ The text in question is the prophecy found in Isaiah 7.14, that an 
almah would conceive and bear a son and call his name Immanuel. The Greek par-
thenos rendered by the Septuagint does not cover the entire range of meanings of 
the Hebrew word; almah (‘young woman’) could refer equally to young widows, 
concubines, or prostitutes. Although the range of meanings for parthenos was more 
restricted, it was still a term with much more elasticity than the English ‘virgin.’ 
Parthenos was a term applied usually to an unmarried young woman, but on occa-
sion it could denote a young mother . . . ” (6–7).
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if she is seduced  . . .  and that must happen only when she has received 
his promise of love” (ussher 44).
“Waiting to be overpowered”—popularised by romantic narratives—
connects directly to the idea of Woman’s masochism, advocated, 
among others, by Sigmund Freud and his followers, such as Helen 
Deutsch and Mary bonaparte. Freudian woman cannot have sex; 
she only can have it done to her: naturally passive, she is—in bonapar-
te’s interpretation—an enlarged version of the ovum, whose mission 
is to “await the . . .  active, mobile spermatozoon, to come and penetrate 
it [/her]” (bonaparte 78). penetration, in turn, “may entail destruction: 
death as much as life” (78). It is by wounding her that Man both im-
pregnates and deflowers Woman, and it is wounding that, in Freudian 
understanding, constitutes female sexuality as such: Woman, after all, 
has a passive-masochistic bleeding “wound” where penis/phallus 
ought to be. She, therefore, does not take pleasure: satisfaction “must 
be inflicted upon her” (bartky 1990: 53). 
Interestingly, Woman is so passive and transparent that even 
in Freudian accounts on the nature of her innate masochism Woman’s 
subjectivity is erased; she serves, as Nick Mansfield argues, only 
“to produce male subjectivity” (72):
This is a direct replication of the way the masochistic subject encounters 
his own subjectivity in the form of an hallucinated double, by way of cre-
ating and manipulating the subjectivity of the feminine other, in role-play, 
the dominatrix. The truth of the masochistic subject is discovered by con-
structing, controlling and annihilating a female subject. Only by owning 
femininity in this way can masochism reveal itself . . . .  In . . .  Freudian texts, 
femininity was merely the point of exchange in the commerce between 
male subjectivities. (72)
Mansfield’s concept of Woman’s masochism/passivity seems to lend 
itself very well to the interpretation of the figure of Virgin/Mother. 
Firstly, as Mary Daly argues in Gyn/Ecology, Mary—the Virgin 
Mother—can, and often has been, read as the paragon of passivity.35 
 35 Daly argues that “[i]t should not be imagined that Mary had any real role in this 
conception and birth. Although some Christians like to call the ‘virgin birth’ a para-
digm of parthenogenesis, it is not that. As Helen Diner points out, it is really the op-
posite of parthenogenesis, for in the myth of the Virgin birth, Mary does nothing, 
whereas in parthenogenesis the female accomplishes everything herself” (83). It is, 
however, possible to interpret Mary independently of her relations with male fig-
ures, which I explain later on in this section.
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Secondly, the biblical story of Mary’s impregnation might be viewed 
as one of the rape of the Goddess—“an almost universal theme in pa-
triarchal myth” (Daly 1978: 84):
The rape of the rarefied remains of the Goddess in the Christian myth 
is mind/spirit rape. In the charming story of “the Annunciation” the angel 
Gabriel appears to the terrified young girl, announcing that she has been 
chosen to become the mother of god. Her response to this sudden proposal 
from the godfather is . . .  nonresistance: ‘Let it be done unto me according 
to thy word.’ physical rape is not necessary when the mind/will/spirit has 
already been invaded. In refined religious rapism, the victim is impregnated 
with the Supreme Seminal Idea, who becomes the Word made flesh. (Daly 
1978: 85)
Mary, in other words, was raped “through the ear.” Like Mans-
field’s (masochistic) woman, Mary—the Virgin and the Mother—is 
reduced to a mere “point of exchange in the commerce between male 
subjectivities” (Mansfield 72). Her role, therefore, is “utterly minimal; 
yet she is ‘there’” (Daly 1978: 85). 
Apart from her proper and absolute chastity, the one aspect of the Vir- 
gin Mother that seems to particularly appeal to the lyrical I of Crozier’s 
poem is the figure’s freedom from the dilemmas that the lyrical I, 
“poised on the brink of moral excellence and moral decay” (Foskett 59), 
faces. provided she is “taken out of the [Christian] context” (Daly 
1973: 84), the Virgin Mary can be interpreted as a symbol of indepen-
dence and “female autonomy” (1973: 85) because “the woman who is 
defined as virgin is not defined exclusively by her relationships with 
men” (1973: 84)—she is “a woman (gyn) like a man (vir)” (Wall 12). 
“As an iconographic motif”—writes Kathleen Wall—“the image of Mary 
standing on a globe that rests upon a serpent has conveyed to the Chris-
tian world the unambiguous association of power—temporal and spir-
itual—with virginity” (5). The term virgin, consequently, denotes “not 
a physical state but a social one, a relational one, one that evokes 
the qualities of social autonomy and potency” (7). In the same vein, 
within Western culture, due to “the wide ranging belief that there is 
particular potency residing on the margins of the familiar,” virgins, po-
sitioned “on the margins between childhood and womanhood,” were 
often perceived as endowed with disruptive, or transgressive, power 
(Wall 7). Concurrently, in A Virgin Conceived: Mary and Classical Rep-
resentations of Virginity, Mary F. Foskett claims that: 
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Absolute virginity [represented by Mary] denotes a certain undeniable 
power that the virgin embodies. Hers is an extraordinary continence. 
As an adult, she stands independent of the culturally imposed roles of wife 
and mother. The absolute virgin, whose sexual status signals not so much 
emptiness or singleness of heart, but self-containment and singularity, 
is always powerful and sometimes dangerous. (63)
The figure of Mary—the absolute virgin who transcends Woman’s 
plight—is, importantly, as elusive and unreachable as Mary chosen 
by God, Mary impregnated by the Holy Spirit, and Mary the Mother 
of Christ. “Absolute,” clearly, appears to be an impracticable category. 
Marilyn Frye argues that power can only be associated with the virgin 
once you define her as “a free woman, one not betrothed, not married, 
not bound to, not possessed by any man. It meant a female who is 
sexually and hence socially her own person.” regrettably, “[i]n any 
universe of patriarchy there are no virgins in this sense. Even female 
children are possessed by their male kin and conceived of as potential 
wives. Hence virgins must be unspeakable, thinkable only as negotia-
tions, their existence impossible” (133). The virginal lyrical I of the poem 
is, therefore, “retained  . . .  by ignorance” and “signals physical, social 
and moral liminality” (Foskett 59). Such liminality, in turn, dooms 
the virgin to incongruity: 
[because] she is a sexually ripe but inexperienced female, her body is associ-
ated with varying degrees of health and sickness, increased sexual desire, 
emptiness and openness, holiness, monetary and reproductive worth, vul-
nerability and weakness. (Foskett 58)
Again, the virgin is mainly defined through her body that she is ex-
pected to both guard and offer; her destiny is (not) to yield to tempta-
tion, (not) to give herself to dangerous man, and (not) to suffer the con-
sequences. 
If approached from such an angle, Crozier’s poem unveils numerous 
connections between losing virginity and shame. Oftentimes it is actu-
ally shame that “[enables] the virgin to retain both her honour and her 
virginity” (Foskett 62). The loss of virginity is always conspicuous, 
irreversible and proliferates dreary aftermaths. The traditional
paternalistic ethics imperatively demand that the fiancée be given over 
to her husband in virginal condition; he wants to be sure she carries 
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no stranger’s seed; he wants single and exclusive ownership of this flesh he 
is making his own. (beauvoir 459)
That is why—according to beauvoir—“virginity took on a moral, re-
ligious and mystical value, and this value is still very generally recog-
nized today” (459). The “Virgin,” however, as I mentioned, is a narrow 
category: she is “unique, alone among women, alone among mothers, 
alone among humans . . . .” (Kristeva 1997b: 327). remaining a virgin—
“an expert of flying elbows / and crossed knees”—requires a never-
ending effort one finally “gets sick of” (Crozier 90): hence the dream of 
being “taken,” of unconsciously “giving in.” perversely, shame is in-
scribed into virginity, too. This is, after all, the penis/phallus that within 
the patriarchal culture is the “master signifier,” or a magic wand ca-
pable of transforming an incomplete woman into a complete one. The 
virgin, therefore, as a highly oxymoronic image, may easily be inter-
preted as undesirable and lacking.
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toward “shameless parts”
One of the meanings of the word “tale” is “falsehood”/“lie.” Indeed, it seems that the strategy of de-shaming Woman, proposed 
by Crozier in her two penis poems, is one of ridiculing the cultural 
truths referring both to the penis/phallus and to defloration. The reality 
fabricated by the “poem for Sigmund” and “Tales for Virgins” is often 
illogical and contradictory; at the same time, however, the prepos-
terous stories Crozier ridicules are often granted the rank of cultural 
laws which discipline, and shame, Woman.
Importantly, Crozier’s decision to write and publish The Penis Poems 
(originally, they were intended only to be read out in public) was 
an audacious one. As Mary di Michele writes in her “An Argument 
with Darkness,” Western literary tradition “enshrines the phallus . . .  . 
We have centuries of art, millennia of representations of female 
anatomy, defined by men. Male eyes have been our mirrors. Crozier  . . . 
[is] doing the important work of ‘returning the compliment.’”36 Even 
though Crozier “has fun with [it]” and considers the penis mostly 
as “an object of fun, amusement, tenderness, good luck and not simply 
as a dirty joke or an object for pornography,”37 her choice of subject did 
result in the book being received as controversial and provocative. 
As Warner Winter remarked, “it’s too bad that the ‘penis’ section 
means this interesting  . . .  book will make it into only those places 
where the librarians have courage.”38 Crozier’s series is, in other words, 
a feminist transgression incorporated.
 36 Mary Di Michele, “An Argument with Darkness.” World Wide Web <http://
www.booksincanada.com/article_view.asp?id=2039> (11.02.2011).
 37 review of Angels of Flesh, Angels of Silence by Warner Winter. World Wide Web 
<http://www.umanitoba.ca/cm/cmarchive/vol17no4/angels.html> (11.02.2011).
 38 review of Angels of Flesh, Angels of Silence by Warner Winter. World Wide Web 
<http://www.umanitoba.ca/cm/cmarchive/vol17no4/angels.html> (11.02.2011).
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subverting the “ocular regime”
. . .  because geography always relies on an observer, it will always be 
a subject-dependent fiction rather that an objective fact; in turn, 
by telling stories, fiction tries to provide a map for experience, subjec-
tivity and nation.
Gabriele Helms, Challenging Canada: 
Dialogism and Narrative Techniques in Canadian Novels (68)
They can only be real, in their own terms, by turning themselves 
into something they are “really” not. 
Margaret Atwood, Strange Things (qtd. in Hulan 16)
“up her can nada”
Earle Birney (qtd. in New 184)
Earle birney’s “up her can nada” is a “punning, witty [and] deliber-ately rude” map/poem that 
[uses] line and word to epitomize all the hostile, self-protective, sexist, 
and self-righteous attitudes that birney (or Canadian culture at large) attri-
butes to Ontario’s “upper Canada” past, figuratively present in Establish-
ment Anglo-protestant traditions. Constructing these attitudes as a map 
is itself part of birney’s critique, for the map of “upper Canada” articulates 
in speech and visual design the system of mapping by “upper Canada” that 
has given centrality and power to one particular set of values. (New 169; 
italics in the original)
What birney’s map/poem reveals is that the process of mapping, 
colonising, and taking a land in possession implies “sexual conquest” 
and “penetration (of continent, of body)” (New 114). The parallelism be-
tween the rhetoric of topography and that of the female body seems, 
in fact, to have become one of the notable sources of inspiration 
(“alice” and “sometimes my body leaves me”)
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for writers as well as researchers in the area of cultural studies. 
The analogy between the two seemingly divergent rhetorical con-
structs is particularly evident when texts addressing them touch upon 
issues of literal or metaphorical liminality. It is the liminal space—one 
which often becomes the locus of struggle between competing dis-
courses—that becomes a topos of making sense, of creating meanings. 
Metaphors of the body/space present in the discourses of Canadian-
ness provide particularly illustrative examples of liminality thus con-
ceived. 
The uniqueness of the rhetorical correspondence between the fe-
male body, place and Canadianness in Canadian letters becomes clear 
in the light of an observation by renée Hulan who, in her Northern 
Experience and the Myths of Canadian Culture, suggests that “ . . .  the en-
vironment, the climate, the place are all that people in Canada have 
in common,” which is why this “environment holds the transformative 
potential to condition and form a distinct [Canadian] identity” (10). 
In Hulan’s view, the particular imaginary rather than real space that 
Canadians have looked on as the locus of their national identity 
is the north—a perfect “setting for quest narratives and heroic tales 
of survival” (18). Since “[s]uch stories require their characters to attain 
qualities traditionally . . .  associated with masculine identity . . .  [a] na-
tional consciousness shaped by the north tends to encompass the same 
qualities of rugged, masculine identity” (19). Such “ragged individu-
alism,” in turn, requires “the passivity, silence, and frailty of someone 
other than the hero, usually women, the landscape” (19), or women 
as the landscape. In the same vein, Charlotte Sturgess points out the in-
teresting affinity between the discourses of national and gendered 
identity in the literary process of creating the concept of “Canada”:
The textual refiguring of spaces and boundaries, the emphasis on encodings 
and decodings, crystallize the anxieties of a culture still coming to terms 
with its “settler-invader” (brydon 1994, 25) status, one which articulates 
“Canadianness  . . .  through crossed constructions of competing narratives 
of nation and gender” (24). (141) 
If one accepts Andrew Tolson’s broad definition of gender as the “cul-
tural significance of sexuality, a historically and culturally specific sig-
nificance with political as well as social implications” (qtd. in Hulan 20), 
it becomes “possible to compare gender and other political and social 
discourses such as nationalism” (Hulan 21). 
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by way of clarification: notions of space and boundary, as well 
as their literary constructions (and deconstructions), appear to be cru-
cial components of the discourses of Canadian national identity: 
as topoi, they also become the loci in which “narratives of nation 
and gender” cross and meet. Even though the processes of seeking, 
creating and re-visioning of national and gender identities usually take 
place simultaneously and in parallel, in the Canadian context, as Stur-
gess and Hulan suggest, narratives originating in these processes inter-
sect, or even mix and mingle. One of the consequences of such concep-
tual meetings is a tendency manifest in Canadian literature to use 
the language of the body in order to write about space—and to per-
sonify Canada as Woman.
The mechanism sketched out above has, however, been present 
in Western literature and culture for a long time: unknown, unfamiliar 
spaces have often been (metaphorically) colonised with the use 
of the rhetoric of femininity. A fitting example is a feminised visualisa-
tion of otherness by Jan van Kessel. In his painting, America (1666), 
the artist encloses the apparently chaotic attributes of the New World 
within an orderly, classicist interior. Interestingly, central to the painting 
are the figures of exposed, innocent but also seductive Indian women. 
Even though they are accompanied by children and masculine figures, 
they seem to dominate the scene, informing the “chaos” with a promi-
nently feminine tinge. It is this chaos that van Kessel designates 
“America.” Tadeusz Sławek interprets the painting in the following way: 
The mid-17th-century work by Jan van Kessel, Jan breughel’s grandson 
and an eminent Flemish artist, [is—on the one hand—] an apotheosis 
of the nature of America, of its oddities and curiosities (the abundance of an-
imals varying in forms and shapes), of its fertility and richness (even though 
it must be noted that these natural riches—including the shellfish, mussels 
and oysters—are all related to the sea, which simultaneously distinguishes 
America from the agrarian-telluric Europe and emphasizes the element 
of the ocean separating one from the other). On the other hand, however, 
Kessel’s effort of representing America tends toward a distinctive and literal 
inscription of the continent within the world of well-known forms deter-
mining the current canon of European arts. Even though the habitacles, 
in which figures representing the various forms of the local civilization’s life 
open up to a broad, limitless vista, the figures of the Indians, caught in some-
what theatrical poses have been introduced to the neoclassicist-like interior 
in such a fashion as if the artist, apprehensive of the problems with repre-
senting America, decided to approximate it to the viewer by means of sculp-
turesque and architectural forms to which the eye of the European middle 
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class has become well-used. Thus runs the elaborate courtly masque entitled 
America, in which the unknown is presented by means of shifting us back 
in time (the figures in the habitacles could indeed be ancient sculptures; hence 
the thesis that America is closer to the “beginnings” of culture) and through 
the gesture of the inscription of the whole spectacle within the convention 
of a theatrical mise-en-scène (which allows for the “familiarization” or America 
or, furthermore, for its “duplication,” or its “imitation” effected in any place 
and time by means of well-known mechanisms of art, such as the court 
drama) . . .  America, which was supposed to be that which is unrepresentable 
and which acts subversively with respect to the world of Europe, now be-
comes the servant and preceptor of the wealthy middle class European, war-
ranting his clear conscience in his use of amassed riches. (472–473) 
Sławek’s reflection demonstrates how the (seemingly) unrepresent-
able space becomes marked, limited and described, and thus becomes 
subjected to exploration and exploitation. Familiarised and tame, 
America—like a woman, inscribed within the phallogocentric dis-
courses of gender roles—may be taken in possession, objectified and in-
feriorised. Evidently, the rhetoric of subjugation and inferiorisation ap-
plied in the colonial context parallels the rhetoric historically used with 
reference to femininity. Like America, femininity cannot be left “un-
contained”: without a definition superimposed upon what to the con-
queror’s eye may seem to be nothing but chaos, both America and fem-
ininity would remain nondescript entities disrupting preferred orders 
and dangerously tipping the balance of power. Located on the margins 
of the dominant, Eurocentric discourse, America appears to be a lim-
inal space which must be inscribed within a comprehensible system 
of reference and translated into a comprehensible language. Femininity, 
stereotypically perceived as unintelligible, nonspecified, irrational, 
as well as unsettlingly and seductively corporeal, is limited to frames 
of the Judeo-Christian imagery—and thus offers the European explorer 
a convenient set of parallel rhetorical devices, as if ready-made specifi-
cally for the purpose of the description/containment of the newly en-
countered liminal space. Like femininity in the past, also the New 
World calls for rhetorical action: to be comprehended/comprised within 
the central paradigms of interpretation and dominant world order, 
it needs to be marked, labelled and defined.39 
 39 yet, irrespective of whether the liminality is conceptual or geographical, the con-
queror seems to believe that he fully comprehends what is being communicated 
to him despite his inadequate command of the language. To Antonio de Ciudad 
real, who in his explorations encounters a group of natives and asks them 
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In general, however, the rhetoric of femininity—present in allegories 
of Mother Earth or Mother Nature since the times immemorial—is re-
alised within the phallogocentric discourse in traditional constructs 
of Woman as a mother, housewife, housekeeper and homemaker. 
At the same time, the idea of Woman also provides a foundation for na-
tional symbolics: Great britain, France and poland, among other coun-
tries, are frequently conceptualised as women in poetry, in painting 
and even in cartography. picturesque landscapes are often likened 
to the female body, and the female body, in turn, has often been praised 
for its “topographic” beauty. Inscribed in scenic representations—appar-
ently natural, irrational, and intuitive—Woman becomes one of the 
basic points of reference in descriptions of space which needs to be first 
domesticated, and then governed and managed. This is why, in Cana-
dian adventure stories, “the counterpart to [the] restless men is  . . . 
a beckoning and dangerous female north, made even more fearsome 
by the comparison to the civilized women who make cosy, inviting 
homes for wayward men” (Hulan 117).
The concept of domesticity premises the binary opposition between 
the outside and the inside: the unlimited, dangerous open space vs. 
the warmth and safety of home. Domestication indicates the idea 
of a complex inscription into an understandable order of the heimlich, 
as a result of which the domestic space and that which it contains blend 
into one. The house—“the smallest   . . .  spatial [unit] of acknowledged 
human dwelling” (best 182)—is hence often identified with femininity, 
both at the metaphorical and at the corporeal level, and therefore 
the textures of the feminine and the spatial traditionally blend in var-
ious discourses responsible for the present-day state of culture. Gaston 
bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, in which “the house is a woman” (best 
182) reduced to maternal womb, the metaphor of ultimate comfort 
and safety, seems to be only one of many important testimonies to sup-
port the claim. Men, conversely, “can never be ‘at home’ with mascu-
line identity; rather, they must constantly aspire to an identity based 
on an externalized sense of self by continuously proving themselves 
worthy” (Hulan 101). 
Sue best argues that any act of feminising space suggests—
on the one hand—that the space undergoes a transformation as a result 
of the name of the place in which they are, the response uic athan will not mean 
“I do not understand”: the explorer knows that the peninsula’s name is yucatan 
(rachwał 18). 
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of which it is rendered homely and private, and hence easy to control. 
On the other hand, however, the same gesture testifies to the ever-
present cultural anxiety evoked by the notion of femininity, which re-
sults in constant attempts to enclose the corporeal female within 
clearly specified borders (182–183). The notions of femininity and space 
are interconnected because, as best asserts, the female body is not 
merely a metaphor for space, but because, rhetorically, it is the female 
body which grants space some definite shape—and is necessary for 
space to function within discourse. Space, in other words, is (re)pro-
duced by the female body (186). 
As Charlotte Sturgess remarked in the passage quoted at the begin-
ning of the present chapter, the anxiety reflected in Canadian literature 
can be understood as a specific case of Angst experienced in confronta-
tion with liminality. To the Western mind, Canada—a vast country 
of a relatively small, yet constantly growing population—still appears 
to be a Terra Nova. This is why, like the whole of the New World 
at the time of European exploration and early colonisation, Canada 
seems to continue to be subjected to the mechanisms of rhetorical fem-
inisation. 
Thus, the affinity between femininity and Canadianness becomes 
explicable in the context of the proneness of the culture of the West 
to identify unexplored bodies of land with the female body. Accord-
ingly, as Canadian women authors—such as Margaret Atwood or Jancy 
James40—confirm, the rhetoric of the Canadian myth of wilderness 
has been tangibly feminised; likewise, the figurative renditions of Ca-
nadian landscape have traditionally been metaphorised with reference 
to female body. Importantly, however, the apparently simple ideolog-
ical and rhetorical parallelism becomes more complex in light 
of the unique discourse of Canadian national identity.
The feminisation of the concepts of Canada’s landscapes notwith-
standing, the country’s “bodily landscape” seems to retroactively shed 
light upon the rhetoric of femininity itself. As Sturgess writes, Canada 
has frequently been defined in terms of “a unified cultural space, 
whether that of a ‘mosaic’ or of a ‘multicultural’ ideal” (12). It seems, 
however, that a mosaic can never be truly “unified”: even if one imag-
ines its pieces as equivalent to one other, they never blend into a unity. 
Canadian landscape is not only perceived as wild, cold and hostile, 
 40 See: Margaret Atwood Survival (1972) and Jancy James’s “Canadian paradigms 
of postmodern Feminism” in Postmodernism and Feminism: Canadian Contexts (2005).
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but first of all as dismembered and fragmented. In this, the features 
of the traditional discourse of heimlich femininity, the rhetoric of which 
served the purpose of the domestication of liminal spaces of the newly 
explored lands, give in to the postmodern concepts of femininity, which 
today often serves the purpose of the description of contemporary 
Canada. 
In other words, the transformations of the Western concepts of fem-
ininity in the post-1980s world offer good reasons to claim that the prac-
tice of feminisation of the unheimlich spaces has remained in place, 
even though what once served domestication, today serves an alto-
gether different purpose. Linda Hutcheon seems to be right in her asser-
tions that today it is the discourses of Canadianness and feminism, 
rather than the traditionally conceived femininity, that coincide.41 Cor-
respondingly, similarly to Canadian theorists who subvert the concept 
of, or the need for, a coherent Canadian identity, Canadian feminist 
writers often “take over the roles of explorer/traveller/adventurer 
and reconstruct them.” In their texts, “[t]he image of landscape-in-mo-
tion replaces the image of land-as-static-territory-to-be-named-into-
compliance and so confined” (New 114),42 in order to emphasise 
the transgressiveness inscribed in the ideas of the body/space/identity. 
In the ensuing sections, of this chapter, consequently, I intend to ex-
amine the correlation between these concepts from two different stand-
points suggested above and corresponding to the processes of shaming 
 41 See: Hutcheon, Linda, Kathleen O’Grady, “Theorizing Feminism and postmoder-
nity. A Conversation with Linda Hutcheon by Kathleen O’Grady.” Trinity College, 
university of Cambridge, 1997. 12 Sept. 2008. World Wide Web <http://bailiwick.lib.
uiowa.edu/wstudies/hutcheon.html> (11.02.2011). 
 42 This strategy is perhaps most clearly visible in Aritha van Herk’s novels and her 
concept of geografictione—“the term [which] combines geography, fiction, 
and the ending ‘e,’ which, in many Indo-European languages marks the feminine 
form” (Helms 68). Geografictione springs from the conviction that “ . . .  [g]eography, 
mapping and fiction cannot be neutral/neuter, as the narrator realizes in her explo-
rations, all three discourses, as she knows them, have been written by men, while 
the perspectives of women have been silenced and marginalized” (Helms 68–69). 
Whereas in her novels (e.g., Places Far From Ellesmere), van Herk rewrites the mas-
culinist arctic narratives, she most clearly contests the concept of the north as the 
ultimate Canadian space in her short story entitled “Creating Willem berentsz; pi-
loting North.” The story of berentsz, who was “most definitely not Canadian” (van 
Herk 81), construes “the north [as] a configuration of narrative imagination, without 
nation, without destination, and without inherent motivation [and a] geography 
only traceable by an eye willing to abandon its prescribed latitude and longitude” 
(92). 
and de-shaming: the former focuses on the correlation between 
“Canada” and “Woman,” the latter connects the transgressive dis-
courses of Canadianness and feminism.
On the one hand, in the light of what has been stated so far, it is 
clear that both Canada and the female body to which the land has 
been likened have been undergoing a similar process of being “mapped” 
and “colonised,” i.e., objectified, possessed, and hence shamed. “Canada” 
and “Woman,” in other words, have both been relegated to the mar-
gins, and discussed in terms of their apparent otherness and negativity. 
In the section titled “A body (Not) of One’s Own and the problem 
of Otherness in Crozier’s ‘Alice’ and ‘Sometimes My body Leaves Me,’” 
therefore, I focus on the female body which is shamed into being 
homely rather than homey. In the following section, however, titled 
“returning the Gaze: Feminist revision of Looks Cast in ‘Alice,’” I ex-
plore the opportunities of de-shaming this body as suggested in Cro-
zier’s poem. The assumption that I adopt in my reading is that both 
“land” and “body “can . . .  function . . .  as [spaces] or [places] or [sites] 
of challenge to the accustomed borders of power.” both are “[icons] 
of stability and [mediums] of change. Fixity vies recurrently with flu-
idity, position with positionality, the place of social residence with 
the condition of being there” (New 6). Thus my interpretation points 
to the transgressive and transformative potential of the in-between-
ness that Alice embodies.
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a body (not) of one’s own 
and the problem of otherness
In Margaret Atwood’s words, “The Female body has many uses” (1994: 74). undoubtedly, the female body has been a locus in which 
a plethora of frequently contradictory cultural meanings would inter-
twine. In the patriarchal tradition, where it has often been construed 
as synonymous to the concept of Woman, the body has gained exces-
sive significance and thus, as beauvoir suggests, came to determine 
the limits of Woman’s potential in the culture of the West (34). Susan 
bordo observes that Woman and her body may be compared to Sia-
mese twins, “neither one with [the other] nor separable from [each 
other]” (1995: 2). In Western culture, in which, over millennia, ratio—
traditionally attributable to Man—has been valued higher than 
the body, the latter “is the negative term” (bordo 1995: 5). If Woman 
is primarily construed as a somatic being, she simultaneously becomes 
an embodiment of the one of the two elements of the binary opposi-
tion which the culture has been treating as less valuable, or even con-
trary to the one attributed positive values. In this vein, Susan bordo 
states that if Woman is the body, “then women are that negativity, 
whatever it may be: distraction from knowledge, seduction away from 
God, capitulation to sexual desire, violence or aggression, failure of will, 
even death” (1995: 5). 
It is striking, however, that the concepts of “negativity,” “otherness” 
and “foreignness” find traditional application not only in the process 
of the conceptualisation and, subsequently, discursivisation of femi-
ninity, but also in the analogous process of defining Canadianness. It is 
easy to observe that, like women, Canadians have on numerous occa-
sions been ascribed the so-called “negative identity”: since both 
women and Canadians define themselves through reference to domi-
nant groups (men and Americans respectively), they allegedly find it 
easier to decide what they are not rather than what they are. The par-
allelism stems from an analogous experience of marginalisation: “Just 
as women have traditionally been positioned on the fringes of male 
culture, so Canadians often feel as if they are watching the action (be 
it American or European) from the sidelines” (Hutcheon).43
 43 “Theorizing Feminism and postmodernity. A Conversation with Linda Hutcheon” 
by Kathleen O’Grady. World Wide Web <http://www.cddc.vt.edu/feminism/
Hutcheon.html> (24.01.2011).
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The problem of the disjunction between Self and the Other—where 
the Other adopts the shape of the female body—is addressed in two 
poems by Lorna Crozier, titled “Alice” and “Sometimes My body Leaves 
Me.” In the first verse of “Alice,” the lyrical I reveals that she “[knows] 
a woman / who can leave her body” (66). Freed from bodily constraints 
and exhilarated by the act, the woman rises in the air and “from 
the ceiling’s corner / [laughs] at her mound of flesh / sweating on sheets” 
(66). Evidently, the relationship between the woman and her body 
is founded upon the traditional dichotomy: body vs. mind. The woman/
subject—the immaterial “I,” traditionally identified with masculinity—
weightlessly rises above the physiological/feminine object: the dis-
graced and immobilised object of mockery and derision. The immaterial 
element becomes the “essence” or the “self,” whereas the body is re-
duced to a worthless container, a surface, or (as will become clearer 
in the poems discussed further) a metaphorical house which imprisons 
or frames the woman, and hence a house in which the woman cannot—
and does not wish to—make herself at home. The relationship between 
“the woman” and “her body” (the subject and the object) is clearly of hi-
erarchical nature: the contemptuous, scornful gaze falls upon the body 
from above. 
In the second verse of the poem, the lyrical subject emphasises that 
a woman who can leave her body nonetheless leaves an impression 
of normality since she does not manifest any features of madness (“her 
eyes do not twist / nor does saliva thread / her chin” (66))—thus sug-
gesting that in the physical appearance of the described woman there 
is nothing particularly repulsive. Therefore, one may conclude that 
the only determinant of abnormality (otherness and inferiority) 
in the poem is the negatively marked femininity alone. As Elizabeth 
Grosz observes, the biological body undergoes conceptualisation exclu-
sively as mediated by cultural images and truths (41) defining the body 
of Woman as overly visible, sexual, permeable and defective—as an in-
volucrum around nothingness (which concept, incidentally, makes 
an interesting parallel to the metaphor of Canada as a periphery sur-
rounding emptiness). In the light of such reading, the need of escape 
seems understandable. Even the lyrical I itself admits that it envies 
the woman her magical ability “to stride beyond this bone closet” (66)—
especially that the self takes over the body’s capacity to see 
and the ability to move. However, in the last verse of the poem 
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this unique skill is exposed as deceptive as it is dangerous: every time 
the woman leaves her body, she “stays away a little longer” (66).
Even though “Alice” and “Sometimes My body Leaves Me” come 
from two different collections of poems, it is interesting to look at them 
correlatively. The “dissociative” ability of coming separate from one’s 
body, which in “Alice” is a source of exhilaration and elation, becomes 
an unsettling element of everyday reality and an experience of the lyr-
ical I in the second poem. In the first verse, the lyrical subject reveals 
that sometimes her body “goes into another room / and locks the door. 
There / it bangs about / like an angry thief” (15) The woman does not 
know “what it feels, / if it feels anything” or “what sounds to make / 
to call it back” (15). Like a nameless animal—a simple, yet potentially 
hostile “it”—the body escapes its owner’s (re)cognition. yet, even if 
the sense of superiority toward “this thing”—which features so power-
fully in “Alice”—becomes manifest in the actions of the owner of the 
body in the second poem, it is inscribed in the colonising gaze levelled 
at the body. The incomprehensible entity becomes an object (of obser-
vation): the lyrical subject of the poem, unsuccessfully, attempts 
to translate its actions into a comprehensible language. At the same 
time, however, the woman abandoned by her body feels incapacitated 
and helpless. The questions she asks (“What does it do when it sits 
alone / without a book or anything / resembling love?” (15)) testify not 
only to the distance separating her from her body, but also to the great 
attention which the woman pays to her corporeality. yet, since her 
concern is thoroughly unrequited, the woman remains feeling disinte-
grated: incomplete and lonesome.
In both poems the woman, separated from her body, becomes met-
aphorically homeless: she is incapable of being the tower of strength 
for herself and remains in need of a body of her own. Despite the fact 
that in the patriarchal culture the images of the mother, wife and the mis-
tress of the house are inscribed into the space of the heimlich, the fe-
male body—not determined with reference to the mentioned social 
roles—is attributed features excluding the familiarity of the space 
of home. Woman’s body is therefore defined “as lacking not so much 
or simply the phallus but self-containment—not a cracked or porous 
vessel, like a leaking ship, but a formlessness that engulfs all form, a dis-
order that threatens all order  ...” (Grosz 203). As such, it is thus the con-
tradiction of home; it is both an enigma and a wilderness. In the con-
text of theories of the Canadian identity—the rhetoric of which 
frequently makes use of references to the landscape of Canada, 
described as the vast expanse of snow or a cold, dead emptiness—
the ideal of the home-like familiarity appears unattainable. “‘Away’ 
and ‘home’ are the destinations of [Canadian] writing” (rooke ix):
Canadian authors, as Constance rooke claims, write along the two 
parallel vectors of opposite senses.
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returning the gaze:
feminist revision of looks cast in “alice”
The relationships between my decision 
and my body are, in movement, magic 
ones.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
phenomenology of perception (108 )
While in one sense the body is the most 
abiding and inescapable presence in our 
lives, it is also essentially characterised 
by absence.
Drew Leder, The Absent body ( 1 )
Like “Woman,” “Canada is a concept at once coherent and dispersed” (Findley 174). In a great majority of canonical texts searching for, 
or narrating, a coherent Canadian identity, the noun “Canadian,” in fact, 
refers to a “canonical Canadian,” i.e., a white, male Anglophone. 
In other words, “Canadian minus any qualifiers evokes the entirety 
of the geopolitical space it refers to, but it also siphons off large seg-
ments of this space and its peoples into oblivion at worst, and circum-
scribed at best” (Kamboureli 2007: ix). Contrary to Constance rooke’s 
claim that Canadian authors write in two opposite directions (“away” 
and “home”)—both of which require that the home exist as a fixed 
point of reference—Smaro Kamboureli imagines Canadian literature 
as deviating from this clear-cut axis:
CanLit may be instrumentalized by and concerned with the Canadian state, 
but it also contests the stateness, and boldly points beyond it, to an else-
whereness that is not yet legible, that defamiliarizes the tropes that produce 
transparency and its accompanying contentment and complacency. An al-
ternative cognitive space, this elsewhereness demands epistemic breaks that 
require new tools to comprehend its materiality; it calls for an under-
standing of temporality and space that questions the assumption that 
knowledge is residual, always anterior to what has come before, the product 
of the same epistemological gestures that have cultivated the categories 
of “proper” subject and “other” in the first place. (Kamboureli 2007: x)
Correspondingly, in this section I focus on the concepts of trans-
gression, re-vision, multiplicity and, most importantly, de-shaming, 
which—in the theoretical chapter of this book—I linked to the notion 
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of Canada as a queer space. In my reading, it is the female body de-
picted in Crozier’s “Alice” that becomes both the queer, transgressive 
space and the token of elsewhereness.
In The Absent Body, Drew Leder speaks of the human body as both 
ecstatic and recessive. “The word [‘ecstatic’]”—writes Leder—“includes 
within it the root ek, meaning ‘out’ and stasis, meaning ‘to stand.’ 
The ecstatic is that which stands out. This admirably describes the oper-
ation of the lived body. The body always has a determinate stance—
it is that whereby we are located and defined. but the very nature 
of the body is to project outward from its place of standing” (22). To re-
cede “means to ‘go or fall back.’” The body is recessive as it “not only 
projects outward in experience but falls back into unexperienceable 
depths.  . . .  If, for example, I am fully engaged in listening to a concert, 
my closed eyes, my stilled legs, are enfolded in a background disap-
pearance. No longer perceiving or acting from such organs, they tem-
porarily withdraw from awareness” (53–54). Leder’s suggests that 
the “normal” healthy body is therefore experienced both in terms 
of absence and of presence. Such a state of presence, however, may be 
interrupted by pain, disease, or any encounter with Otherness: the in-
terruption, in turn, results in what Leder calls “dys-appearance” 
of the body. Importantly, “dys-appearance” does not merely connote 
“absence” or “disappearance” that “[characterise] ordinary functioning,” 
but is descriptive of a circumstance in which “the body appears as the-
matic focus, but precisely as in a dys state—dys is from the Greek 
prefix signifying ‘bad,’ ‘hard, or ‘ill’ as is found in English words such 
as ‘dysfunctional’” (84). Dys-appearance—which, like shame, assumes 
the form of a threatening body/me split—is a result of any bodily dys-
function, in the course of which “a specific organ, rather than serving 
the rest of the body, manifests an independent pattern” (88). Such 
an organ “suddenly goes its own way, failing to perform its required 
norm in proper co-ordination with others” (88). 
It seems, however, that in the case of Woman, it is not a specific re-
bellious organ that alienates itself from the coherent “whole,” but rather 
her whole body dys-appears: is experienced as shamefully disobedient. 
Leder connects Woman with dys-appereance on the basis of beau-
voir’s definition of Woman as the Other. In his reading, he pays atten-
tion to the fact that 
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[women] must maintain a constant awareness of how they appear to men 
in terms of physical attractiveness and other forms of acceptability. Women 
are thus expected to pay meticulous attention to their surface appearance, 
including hairstyle, make-up, dress, weight, figure, and skin tone. This ex-
hibits the principle of social dys-appearance; one incorporates an alien gaze, 
away, apart, asunder from one’s own which provokes explicit thematization 
of the body. (99) 
In the way one looks down at one’s paralysed limb and is “struck 
by the alien nature of the embodiment” (88), Woman (the body-sub-
ject) looks down upon the body-object and “can no longer take the body 
for granted” (89). Her body becomes alien to her “self,” and—as she “ex-
periences the painful body as merely an ‘it’”—she “becomes  . . .  ready 
to take whatever means are necessary to rid [herself] of it” (77). Signifi-
cantly, in the context of the feminine rituals of beauty that Leder writes 
about, “getting rid of the body” can no longer be read as a metaphor 
only. The numerous processes to which Woman subjects her body often 
aim at reducing its size (which, in the case of women suffering from an-
orexia nervosa may lead to—very literal—death).44 The female body 
as construed by Leder is, to a great extent, imaginary: in the process 
of becoming one, rather than one. In other words, it is marked by dys-
appearance because it appears rather than is, and it is appearance—
surface and mask—that makes Woman. 
Feminist theorists have often emphasised the super- and arti-ficial 
nature of femininity which, in their readings, is recurrently likened 
to a masquerade and/or a performance. Like Cinderella, Woman be-
comes feminine (i.e., the object of Man’s desire) once she is equipped 
with the required accessories of femininity, such as a dress (“all beset 
with jewels”), a pair of glass slippers (“the prettiest in the whole 
world”), and a whole “equipage to go to the ball with” (perrault).45 
Like her appearance, her behaviour also has to be regulated, or toned 
down: a feminine woman does not talk/eat/do much (Cinderella, ac-
cordingly, dances “so very gracefully” and shows her stepmother 
and stepsisters “a thousand civilities”). In line with the fairy tale pat-
tern, omnipresent in Western romantic narratives, Woman is promised 
 44 both the beauty Myth and the meanings attached to the female body are 
the focus of my interpretation of Crozier’s “The Fat Lady’s Dance” in the following 
subchapter.
 45 All the quotations from Charles perrault’s “Cinderella” used in this paragraph 
come from the World Wide Web <http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/perrault06.html> 
(16.02.2011).
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success as soon as her body metamorphoses into its perfect(ed) form—
therefore, when (magically transformed) Cinderella enters the ballroom 
“[t]here [is] immediately a profound silence  . . .  so entranced [is] ev-
eryone with the singular beauties of the unknown newcomer.” 
The young prince cannot eat a thing, “so intently [is] he busied in gazing 
on [the girl].” In perrault’s version of the tale, masquerade guarantees 
success as well as implies anonymity: in her new dress, Cinderella 
is unrecognizable to her stepmother and stepsisters. In fact, she 
no longer is Cinderella—or Cinderwench46—but becomes a feminine ta-
bula rasa for the prince to write on. The story’s promises, however—
first, that a metamorphosis of her appearance is mandatory, and second, 
that once the transformation is complete she will be happy “ever 
after”—appear to be contradictory, because Woman is urged to trans-
form her body permanently, to remain preoccupied with improvement 
and to wait for a transition. Identified with a changeable, permeable 
body in-the-process, she can only long for the profound silence 
of the entranced audience, but she can never have it. 
The fairy tale both emphasises the connection between Woman’s 
appearance and identity, and dramatises her role as an object to look 
at. prince’s gaze penetrates Cinderella and transforms her into an objet 
d’art.47 The girl does not return the gaze, but yields to it, lets herself be 
moulded by it. In John berger’s terms, Woman, in fact, is incapable 
of looking back, because, being “too close to herself” (Merritt 46), she 
looks at herself only:
Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked-at. This deter-
mines not only most relations between men and women but also the rela-
tion of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the 
surveyed female. Thus she turns herself into an object—and most particu-
larly an object of vision: a sight. (qtd. in Merritt 16–17)
 46 “When she had done her work, she used to go to the chimney corner, and sit down 
there in the cinders and ashes, which caused her to be called Cinderwench. Only the 
younger sister, who was not so rude and uncivil as the older one, called her Cinderella.”
 47 A similar process—in an even more pronounced way—is presented in the brothers 
Grimm’s “Little Snow White.” Seemingly poisoned to death by her envious stepmother, 
Snow White is placed in a glass coffin, so that everyone can still admire her perfect 
beauty. When a prince arrives, consequently, he does not express a wish to revive the 
girl but says instead: “Let me have it as a gift, for I cannot live without seeing Snow-
white. I will honour and prize her as my dearest possession” (“Little Snow-White” by 
the brothers Grimm in Margaret Taylor’s translation (1884) available online at: http://
classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/grimm/bl-grimm-snowwhite.htm).
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As Juliette Merritt proposes, berger’s claim is “incomplete, rather 
than incorrect” (17). undoubtedly, Woman “[internalizes] the male 
gaze, perpetually seeing [herself] through the eyes of the Other  . . .” (17). 
As evidenced in Crozier’s poem, she looks at her body judgingly, 
and the shame she experiences under her own scrupulous gaze is due 
both to the apprehension that she looks bad, and the resulting convic-
tion that she is bad. On the other hand, however, “this gaze is only one 
among many that women possess” (17). Even though in “Alice,” as I in-
dicated in the previous section, the body is dislocated and objectified 
by the lyrical I, consolation comes with a possibility of looking differ-
ently.
puzzlingly enough, the lyrical I faces the “woman / who can leave 
her body” and sees the woman’s “laughing face / mirrored in her eyes” 
(66). The woman’s eyes, therefore, reflect what, apparently, is not 
in front of them: the mirror reflection of the “woman / who can leave 
her body” is faced by another person. Interestingly, although they 
stand face to face, they transgress the confines of the traditional di-
chotomy the Self/the Other. Already the first verse of the poem 
(“I know a woman / who can leave her body”) suggests a (close) rela-
tionship between the woman and the lyrical I, which is then substan-
tiated in the successive mirror-intermingling and the lyrical I’s shame-
less recognition of the woman’s talent:
I have asked her
to teach me
to stride beyond this bone closet
but her act is instinctive
and beyond learning
or perhaps I am afraid
and don’t really want to know
this final deception (66)
There is, therefore, no shame in the relation between the lyrical I and 
the “woman / who can leave her body,” while, certainly, the gaze is 
present in it. In Merleau-ponty’s phrasing, one can actually “supple-
ment [one’s] embodiment through the Other” and see another’s body as 
a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing 
with the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise 
a system, so my body and the other person’s are one whole, two sides 
of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which 
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my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simulta-
neously. (qtd. in Leder 94) 
Leder ventures a statement that although Woman incorporates 
the (masculine, objectifying) look that she then forwards upon herself, 
she is likely to have the eye contact with others who treat her as a sub-
ject, “that is, [who experience] with [her] the world in which [she] 
dwells” (96). The lyrical I of the poem shares the imprisonment within 
the “body closet” with the “woman / who can leave her body,” as they 
both speak of the body in derogative terms, and the lyrical I finds 
the magical abilities of the woman tempting (and risky). In Leder’s 
words, it is precisely the experimental sharing that precludes shame:
Sartre’s example of a man looking through the keyhole illustrates that dys-
appearance can be initiated by ethical distance or condemnation. Sartre’s 
voyeur feels shame when discovered. The Other, it is assumed, would never 
do such a thing, would refuse to assume a similar posture and gaze. 
The voyeur becomes aware of his position by virtue of his disrupted cosub-
jectivity. If the onlooker turns out to be a friend equally interested in taking 
a peek, the voyeur’s self-consciousness would soon disappear. Their embodi-
ments would no longer be away, apart, asunder, but interwoven in a common 
project. (97)
It seems that the “common project” in which both the lyrical I 
and the woman are interwoven, is the ambition to get out of the body 
and away from the shame secured by it. The project, however—
as the lyrical I recognises—is a “final deception.” The body they both 
want to relinquish is, as stated earlier, a dys-appearing one and, ac-
cording to Leder, “the ultimate mode of dys-appearance” (141) 
is the body’s death: 
Though none of us has ever experienced our death, it ever seeds our body, 
waiting to blossom. It is foretold from within the episodes of pain, injury, 
and illness [and] by the body’s gradual changes.  . . .  The body in its aspect as 
that-which-must-die can constitute a threat to all of one’s goals. It can sever 
or transform all relations, bring our projects to a halt, threaten one’s very ex-
istence as an ‘I.’ This body thus emerges as an ego-alien force that demands 
thematization” (141). 
The ability of the woman to leave her body is alarming to the lyrical I, 
precisely for the reason that “each time . . .  [the woman] stays away a little 
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longer,” as the prolonged dys-appearing necessarily leads to the terminal 
disappearance. If the poem proposes any solutions to the body-bound 
shame, it is rather in the “loving eye” that one should look for them. 
In the words of shame psychologists, eye-to-eye contact with an-
other person constitutes the most intimate interpersonal relation pos-
sible. Necessarily, it is a shame-less one, as the experience of shame 
clearly precludes such interaction (a shamed object of the gaze immedi-
ately looks down or away). Whereas the shaming gaze in the poem is di-
rected onto the body, or into the eyes reflected in the mirror (which are 
nothing but the “constituted objects in the world” (Leder 14)), the only 
look which is devoid of shame is one which is shared. As proposed by 
such feminist theorists as Sonia Kruks, Marilyn Frye, Maria Lugones, 
Christine Sylvester, Sandra Lee bartky and Susan bordo, and discussed 
in the following paragraphs, the experience of the powerful, intimate and 
respectful gaze challenges the prerogative of the sha-ming one.48
The re-vision of the nature of looking is advocated in Sonia Kruks’s 
discussion of Lugones’s concept of world-travelling, Sylvester’s idea 
of panoptic empathy, as well as bartky’s conception of feeling-with 
another. The first concept—world-travelling—is a metaphor of entering 
another person’s world (and of a subsequent identification with the vis-
ited Other) through “loving perception.” Such identification requires 
the rejection of any “fixed conception of oneself,” as “instead of de-
fending boundaries, one must endeavour to be open to ambiguity 
and surprises, to accept being a fool and having oneself and one’s own 
world continually reconstructed” (Kruks 156):
Travelling to someone’s ‘world’ is a way of identifying with them, because 
by travelling to their world we can understand what it is to be them and what 
it is to be ourselves in their eyes. Only when we have travelled to each other’s 
worlds are we fully subjects to each other. (Lugones qtd. in Kruks 156) 
 48 Interestingly, Drew Leder claims that the “mutual incorporation,” as defined 
by Merleau-ponty, is also implicit in Jean-paul Sartre’s theory: “[Sartre] argues that 
the Other’s gaze leads me to experience my own body as object. but this presup-
poses that, to some degree, I can see myself as others do. Only because my vision al-
ways incorporates that of other people could they have this power of negation over 
me. I put myself in their place, assume their perspective, just as they do mine. Hence, 
mutual incorporation is the necessary precondition of even the alienated gaze that 
Sartre describes. This mutuality never fully disappears, not even in the most objecti-
fying encounter” (95).
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In Susan bordo’s reading, Lugones’s world-travelling is an example 
of the feminist advocation of postmodern multiplicity, which goes “be-
yond dualism not merely theoretically but also in intellectual practice.” 
She continues to claim that
. . .  becoming a world-travelling thinker cannot . . .  be accomplished by sight-
seeing, textual or cultural. Nor does it require extensive coverage of “foreign” 
territory. As Lugones describes it, it has fundamentally to do with the de-
sire and ability to explore reality “wearing the other’s shoes.” This means 
recognizing, wherever one goes, that the other’s perspective is fully realized, 
not a bit of exotic “difference” to be incorporated into one’s own world. 
The world-travelling thinker thus must be prepared, not only to “appreciate” 
the foreign, but also to recognize and nurture those places where worlds 
meet. (bordo 1995: 287; italics in the original)
recognition and appreciation of the “places where worlds meet” 
notwithstanding, Kruks is suspicious of Lugones’s concept as one that 
urges disembodiment and implies becoming the Other: “Our experi-
ence of attempting to enter the world of others is both more complex 
and less complete that Lugones assumes in describing the process 
of ‘identification.’ For we cannot shed our weighty identities as freely 
and playfully as she suggests.  . . .  [Were] full identification with others 
in their worlds even possible, it would not be desirable” (157). What 
Kruks proposes in place of the “full identification” is to—in the words 
of Christine Sylvester—“[rely] on empathy to enter into the spirit 
of difference and find in it an echo of oneself as other than the way 
one seems to be” (qtd. in Kruks 158). Empathy, as described by Syl-
vester, does not induce the merging of the Self and the Other, but a sep-
arate existence which nevertheless depends on “informing and drawing 
on each other” (qtd. in Kruks 159). A similar idea emerges from bart-
ky’s “Solidarity and Sympathy” in which she draws on Max Scheler’s 
concept of fellow-feeling: 
bartky suggests that Scheler’s phenomenology of feeling-with offers femi-
nists a helpful framework for addressing experiences of difference among 
women.  . . .  In attempting to feel-with those who suffer, we must not reduce 
them to passive victim status nor to mere objects of sympathy, or even pity. 
but neither can we actually experience their suffering ourselves. Instead, 
“genuinely” to feel-with another “presupposes that awareness of distance 
which is eliminated by identification”: to feel-with somebody is not 
the same as to feel what they actually feel. (Kruks 160)
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The three concepts—world-travelling, empathy and feeling-with—
endorse “a mobile subjectivity, rather than the parading of fixed iden-
tity positions, and thus, flexibility, a commitment to juggling, an em-
brace of ambiguity and irony” (Kruks 159). The multiplicity they 
advocate posits the space where feminism, postmodernism and queer-
ness meet. This space is de-shaming because it forms in between two 
looks shared by two subjects of the gaze. Leaving aside the body 
(“sweating on the sheets” (66)), the lyrical I and the “woman / who 
can leave her body” shamelessly travel into each other’s worlds. The 
body, however, problematically, remains there, for the two looks—
loving and arrogant—coexist in Crozier’s poem. The shame-less gaze 
does not annihilate the simultaneous shame-full gaze, but it introduces 
panoptic alternatives that transgress the hierarchy of looking deter-
mined by Sartre and beauvoir.
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toward an ex-centered vision
What is most exciting and creative about 
thresholds as passageways are the possi-
bilities that are produced by letting go 
of destinies and expectations, by learn-
ing to live with and through uncertainties.
Fairn herising “Interrupting Positions: 
Critical Thresholds 
and Queer Pro/Positions” (128)
Living at once inside and outside the frame- 
work, Hester is able to see the frame.
Carol Gilligan “Joining the Resistance: 
Psychology, Politics, Girls and Women” ( 17 )
Carol Gilligan’s motto above refers to the figure of Hester prynne, the heroine of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 1850 novel The Scarlet Letter. 
Hester, like biblical Eve, is guilty of transgressing God’s law—
as an adulteress in the puritan community of boston, she is shamed 
into punishment (or punished into shame). The scarlet letter “A” that 
she wears on her bosom is, like a blush, a conspicuous indicator of her 
shame. What the quotation emphasises, however, is that Hester’s mar-
ginal position—she occupies, literally and metaphorically, the space in-
between the town and the wilderness—provides her with the distance 
necessary to see things differently. 
The concept of marginality and in-betweenness corresponds 
to the notion of liminality which I referred to in the introductory part 
of this subchapter. In Jill G. Morawski’s phrasing, “[l]iminality is 
the threshold, the betwixt-and-between of established social states” 
and “a place not just for momentary inversion, or reversal, of mundane 
social reality, but also for its ultimate subversion, or replacement” (qtd. 
in riegel 13). Liminality, therefore, describes the paradox of being both 
here and there, and, simultaneously, neither here, nor there. On the one 
hand, the threshold is a location, on the other, it is a passageway “be-
tween and through locations” (herising 128). Such indeterminacy 
of place and space is important both for theorists of Canadian identity 
and for present-day feminist researchers. In theories of Canadianness, 
the potential of the margins is perhaps most clearly pronounced 
in Linda Hutcheon’s concept of the ex-centric:
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The centre no longer holds. And, from the decentred perspective, the mar-
ginal and what I will be calling the “ex-centric” (be it in class, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, or ethnicity) take on new significance in the light 
of the implied recognition that our culture is not really the homogenous 
monolith . . .  we might have assumed. (qtd. in Kamboureli 2009: 167) 
Concurrently, the belief that “the centre no longer holds” has been 
an important postulate of the feminist movement. Therefore, feminist 
theorists have often de-centred, or ex-centred, such seemingly unalter-
able concepts as Woman or the female body. As the argument of this 
chapter has demonstrated, Woman’s oppression and shame are 
related to a system of looking whereby relations of power are conducted 
within a subject/object dichotomy. In this “ocular regime,” power is tradi-
tionally believed to accrue to the subject side of this opposition, a position 
most frequently held by men who make women the object of their gaze. 
(Merritt 16)
Consequently, in this case, the feminist ex-centering means the re-
configuration of “women’s role within the visible field” (Merritt 16). 
Accordingly, although the female body presented in Crozier’s “Alice” 
is shamed into otherness, the poet imagines a possibility of de-shaming 
Woman by making her the subject of the look, the shame-less “world-
traveller,” and the transgressor. 
The concepts of fragmentariness, otherness, and incoherence, there-
fore, determine the loci in which the theories of gender and of Canadi-
anness intertwine. In light of the interpretations presented above, 
the identity of a woman and Canadian identity evade equivocal defini-
tions: the theoretical limits of the body of the woman and those of Ca-
nadianness are subject to continuous transformations, are ceaselessly 
transgressed and undergo recurrent revisions. The liminality of both 
these spaces triggers anxiety in Canadian artists, yet the periphery—
“the exciting and dangerous boundary where silence and sound meet” 
(Kroetsch 63)—sensitises one to the signs of otherness and warns one 
of the dangers lurking in the cohesive discourses of national identity 
and of femininity erected upon the fundamental concepts of being-at-
home with oneself, a de-shamed subject.
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3.4. subjectifying the subject.
subverting 
the western beauty myth
 
They had a model of Miss Hunter before them as they talked, made 
in a new transparent substance called flexi-wax, threaded through with 
plastic sinews and vein and bones: they played with it, pinching out flesh 
here, adding it there, working their way to perfection. They thought they 
might have to alter the position of the kidneys, so that they lay one above 
the other, not side by side. It was easy enough. The working parts 
of the body must be properly linked; their actual position was immaterial. 
Fay Weldon, The Life and Loves of a She Devil ( 233 )
In her Flesh Wounds. The Culture of Cosmetic Surgery, Virginia L. blum employs the metaphor of the female body as a landscape. She coins 
the term “body landscape” in order to address
the individual’s sense of where one’s body begins and ends, the hierarchy 
of the body parts, which parts one esteems or values or invests with more 
thought than others, the degree to which this body is perceived as trans-
formable or having been transformed.  . . .  [O]ne’s body landscape determines 
one’s own threshold for and reaction to different kinds of transformations 
(puberty, disfiguring injury, piercing one’s ears, aging, cosmetic surgery  . . . ). 
(42–43) 
Even though blum stresses that thus construed “body landscape” 
is one’s own—a personal and subjective perception of one’s body bor-
ders, it is interesting to observe that she writes of it in terms of a hierar-
chical evaluation, and sees it as a plane upon which transformations are 
to come about. As the body is always “culturally inscribed and histori-
cally located” (bordo 1995: 41), it is logical to speculate that the posi-
tioning of the threshold of which blum writes depends on political 
rather than private factors—and on one’s individual susceptibility 
to cultural messages. Moreover, although blum does not speak of the fe-
(“the fat lady’s dance”)
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male body specifically, in the light of what has been discussed thus far, 
it is difficult to think of the “body landscape” as gender-neutral. partic-
ularly, if one agrees that some of the bodily transformations of which 
the author parenthetically writes (aging, cosmetic surgery), even 
though they may affect any-body, bear particular importance to the fe-
male body: one subject to the workings of the beauty Myth. In fact, 
if one interprets the passage above from the perspective of gendered 
discourse, it can be inferred that it is masculine gaze that determines 
“an individual’s sense” of the body: a gaze which has traditionally ob-
jectified the (stereotypically female) “body landscape” from the out-
side—and invested more thought with some parts of it than with 
others. 
If one considers blum’s “body landscape” as a (version of) “body 
image,” the blurring of borderlines between an individual’s experience 
of the body and its cultural evaluations becomes manifest. For example, 
it is so common for women to be dissatisfied with their bodies, that 
a new term—“normative discontent”—had to be coined in order to em-
phasise that body dissatisfaction is, in fact, “normal” (Lafrance, Zivi-
an and Myers 228). In the same vein, dieting has been descri-
bed as a “normal” eating behaviour for Woman (Lafrance, Zivian 
and Myers 228). Moreover, it is worth noting that the body Image Dis-
tortion Syndrome—symptomatic for anorexia nervosa, but not limited 
to this disorder—was originally perceived as a “defect” in some “disor-
dered” women who were “unable to see [their bodies] ‘realistically’” 
(bordo 1995: 55). yet, as Susan bordo shows, 
[m]ost women in our culture  . . .  are “disordered” when it comes to issues 
of self-worth, self-entitlement, self-nourishment, and comfort with their 
own bodies; eating disorders, far from being “bizarre” and anomalous, 
are utterly continuous with a dominant element of the experience of being 
female in this culture. (1995: 57) 
Such designations as “normal” and “abnormal,” “natural” and “un-
natural,” as well as “personal” and “cultural,” appear nothing short 
of perplexing when one thinks of Woman’s relationship with her body: 
the confusion, however, seems to open up a space in which the body 
can be addressed in terms of its “de-shaming potential”: as a plastic, 
(un)bounded, albeit, for these reasons, also (in)tangible. Although body 
transformations, including plastic surgery, have been the subject 
of a wide variety of feminist analyses thus far, and sometimes, as blum 
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suggests, they have even been perceived as “liberating,” i.e. allowing 
Woman to take control of her life (61)—it seems in order to return 
to the debate and to revisit some of its major issues from the perspec-
tive of Woman’s shame. At this point, it is already clear that there is 
a direct link between Woman’s shame and her need to become other 
than she is. Like Cinderella, Woman is urged to metamorphose, yet 
. . .  the specific ideals that [she is] drawn to embody (ideals that vary histori-
cally, racially, and along class and other lines) are seen as arbitrary, without 
meaning; interpretation is neither required nor even appropriate. rather, all 
motivation and value come from the interest and allure—the “sexiness”—
of change and difference itself. blue contact lenses for a black woman  . . . 
make her “other” (“the other woman”). but that “other” is not a racial or cul-
tural “other”; she is sexy because of the piquancy, the novelty, the erotics 
of putting on a different self. Any different self would do, it is implied. 
(bordo 1995: 253; italics in the original)
Correspondingly, it is interesting to think of the connection be-
tween Woman’s body and subjectivity in the context of the ever-in-
creasing popularity of plastic surgery. Traditionally, the human face 
has been perceived as a window onto one’s identity. possibly, the most 
blatant practical example of such a perception is the phenomenon 
of an ID picture: a photograph of one’s face, whose presence is manda-
tory in one’s passport or a driver’s license, functions as the most imme-
diate, though often misleading, indication of who one is. Furthermore, 
face and character have been conceptually linked together in fixed ex-
pressions of many a language: the popular idiom “to lose face,” for in-
stance, connects the “façade” to such concepts as dignity, honour, 
and self-respect. Eventually, it is also on the face that emotions—such 
as anger, fear, joy, or shame—inscribe themselves most clearly: the face 
is, or, more precisely, it used to be a trustworthy indicator of one’s 
emotions. Used to, due to the consequences of the shame-induced 
transformative practices encouraged by contemporary culture.
In an American TV series Lie to Me (2009—), Dr. Cal Lightman, 
“ . . .  the world’s leading deception expert  . . .  can read feelings ranging 
from hidden resentment to sexual attraction to jealousy  . . .  by analyzing 
facial expressions and involuntary body language.” 49 Thanks to his un-
usual skill, liars are always exposed and rightly punished—the face, 
therefore, clearly points to “the truth.” In the episode 3 of the first se-
 49 World Wide Web <http://www.fox.com/lietome/about> (18.02.2011).
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ries, revolving around the death of a teenage girl, however, Lightman 
is originally misled into suspecting the girl’s mother—a federal judge—
of committing the crime, because he “notes the expression on the judge’s 
face doesn’t match the words she’s saying.”50 As it turns out, however, 
the woman has been using botox, and thus her inanimate face points 
to no truth. 
In the “culture of cosmetic surgery,” face can no longer be viewed 
as either unique or expressive, and “losing it” no longer connotes 
shame or disgrace. In M.G. Lord’s words, “[t]he postsurgical Dolly 
parton  . . .  looks like the postsurgical Ivana Trump looks like the post-
surgical Michæl Jackson looks like the postsurgical Joan rivers looks 
like  . . .  barbie   . . . ” (qtd. in blum 179). Thus, because of the popularity 
of the relatively safe procedures, such as lip augmentation and botox 
injections, many international celebrities have become visually similar. 
Furthermore, their “uniformised” faces continue to be replicated, since 
patients bring photographs of cultural icons to the surgeon’s office indi-
cating them as blueprints for their own respective metamorphoses: 
When you come closer to becoming a celebrity by having yourself surgically 
altered (imitating on the body what cameras and lightning do to the screen 
image), the identification becomes more complete; significantly this is 
an identification with a process (role playing) rather than with any partic-
ular person, thus necessarily putting any fixed sense of self at risk. (blum 
154; italics in the original)
Even though plastic surgery, as evidenced above, undoubtedly puts 
“any fixed sense of self at risk,” advertisements of plastic surgery, 
as well as such popular TV programs as Extreme Makeover (2002–
2007), often refer to the traditional, humanist notion of the true self. 
Almost all of the women transformed on the Extreme Makeover re-
ality show claim, for instance, that their main motivation to undergo 
the agony of the procedure is to reveal their true identity: they wish 
the world to see who they really are. paradoxically, it is when they 
look like someone else that they feel most at home with themselves. 
Woman as a construct and “beauty” as a category are inextricably 
linked in the culture of the West. “Feminists have had good reasons 
to distrust the discourse of beauty” (Wolff 144): for centuries, “beauty” 
 50 World Wide Web <http://www.fox.com/lietome/recaps/season-1/episode-03> 
(18.02.2011).
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has been believed to be one of few allegedly positive terms applicable 
to Woman and as such, it has played “an integral role in the construc-
tion of gender identity in a patriarchal system” (battella 3). In Naomi 
Wolf’s 1990 The Beauty Myth, therefore, beauty is described as “a form 
of currency in circulation among men” (20), whereas the beauty Myth 
itself is a tool of patriarchal oppression. The myth
was institutionalized  . . .  as a transformer between women and public life. 
It links women’s energy into the machine of power while altering the ma-
chine as little as possible to accommodate them; at the same time, like 
the transformer, it weakens women’s energy at its point of origin. It does 
that to ensure that the machine actually scans women’s input in a code 
that suits the power structure. (21)
The pursuit of beauty is “a normalizing discipline  . . .  perpetual, elu-
sive, and instructing the female body in a pedagogy of personal inade-
quacy and lack” (bordo 1995: 254). Its goal is to help maintain gender 
hierarchy, by means of keeping women dissatisfied with their bodies 
and, at the same time, teaching them that satisfaction-through-trans-
formation is within their reach. This, in turn, is to have them engaged 
in performing actions which are politically inconsequential. by way 
of example, the disconcertingly detailed description below is Sandra 
Lee bartky’s fantasy of Woman’s daily routine, ironically playing with 
an amalgamate of “beauty tips” offered abundantly by magazines 
for women:
I must cream my body with a thousand creams, each designed to act against 
a different deficiency, oil it, pumice it, powder it, shave it, pluck it, depilate 
it, deodorize it, ooze it into just the right foundation, reduce it overall 
through spartan dieting or else pump it up with silicon. I must try to res-
culpture it on the ideal through dozens of punishing exercises. If home mea-
sures fail, I must take it to the figure salon, or inevitably, for those who can 
afford it, the plastic surgeon. There is no ‘dead time’ in my day during which 
I do not stand under the imperative to improve myself: While waiting 
for a bus, I am to suck the muscles of my abdomen in and up to lend them 
‘tone;’ while talking on the telephone I am bidden to describe circles 
in the air with my feet to slim down my ankles. All these things must be 
done prior to the application of make-up, an art which aims, once again, 
to hide a myriad of deficiencies. (1990: 40)
In order to stress the power of the beauty myth, Wolf refers to it 
as “a gospel to a new religion” (86)—and presents Woman as its 
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zealous follower. Woman has to devote herself to the rites of beauty, 
which dedication is perceived both as her responsibility and a test 
to her character: beauty is not a given, it is what is earned through 
conscious effort and determination. paradoxically, however, as both 
Wolf and bartky make clear, Woman’s preoccupation with her appear-
ance—though apparently a proof of self-discipline and persistence—
does not really improve her status. In Western culture, “beautification” 
is an exclusively feminine exercise: as such, it is often viewed as trivial, 
as a symptom of vanity, or a harmless obsession. “If we are never 
happy with ourselves,” Susan bordo explains, “that is due to our fe-
male nature, not to be taken too seriously or made into a political 
question” (253). Consequently, 
[t]o succeed in the provision of a beautiful or sexy body gains a woman at-
tention and some admiration but little real respect and rarely any social 
power. A woman’s effort to master feminine bodily discipline will lack im-
portance just because she does it.” (bartky 2002: 73)
The “ugly” Woman, however, faces a yet more serious threat; ridi-
culed and shamed as unfeminine, she is commonly represented as mon-
strous, dangerous, offensive, and lazy. beautification, albeit unde-
serving of serious treatment, must be treated with all seriousness 
by Woman: the failure to observe the rites of “the gospel” results 
in consequences which in themselves are far from trivial. 
The focus of this section is on the fat female body—one that is 
a manifest proof of the non-adherence to the rites of beautification, 
and thus an object of coercive cultural shaming. Within present-day 
Western culture fat is perceived us ugly (and hence unfeminine), un-
healthy (and hence life-threatening), excessive (wasteful and polluting) 
and even indecent or vulgar. Fat is intemperate—fat bodies take up too 
much space, consume too much food, encompass too many meanings. 
In Lorna Crozier’s “The Fat Lady’s Dance,” however, the Fat Lady—tra-
ditionally relegated to sideshows—becomes a symbol of unbounded, 
feminist defiance.
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fat is in the fire, or: 
the shame-less dance of the fat lady
The ugly woman, by not conforming 
to the norms of beauty, is depicted 
as anomalous, rebellious, and transgres-
sive. Such a feminine type escapes con-
trol and challenges social order. Since  
she may cause the wild, unrestrained, 
and chaotic to emerge, she is excluded 
and punished. 
Patricia Battella, The ugly Woman: 
Transgressive Æsthetic Models 
in Italian poetry from the Middle Ages 
to the baroque ( 3 )
Fat. Few topics excite as much interest, 
emotion, or capital investment. With 
a multi-billion-dollar diet and fitness in-
dustry, tens of millions of joggers, bikers, 
and power walkers out on any sunny 
weekend all trying to banish fat, work off 
fat, atone for fat, health ideologues who 
talk of little these days besides fat, re-
search and development dollars working 
overtime to invent no-fat substitutes 
for fat—our intense wish for fat’s absence 
is just what ensures its cultural omnipres-
ence. 
Laura Kipnis, bound and Gagged: 
pornography and the politics of Fantasy 
in America ( 93 )
Coercive shaming, female body fat and the at-home-with-oneself feeling have all been linked to the concept of transformation 
in a number of problematic ways. Whereas today some of these ways 
appear to be more important than others, it is interesting to note that, 
globally, the cultural meanings attached to the concept of fat have 
been changing (quite radically) over time. The “cult of bodily thinness 
and obsession with banishing fat” that present day Western culture in-
dulges itself in, are “historically recent, and in sharp contrast to bodily 
æsthetics for the past four hundred years or so” (Kipnis 99):
141
d
e-sh
a
m
ed
In rubens’ time, for example, thinness had largely negative connotations 
of poverty and deprivation, along with the insinuation of disease and old age. 
being thin implied something dark and suspicious about the person’s inner 
being as well: a spiritual poverty or moral insufficiency. The thin lacked good 
fortune, not to mention will and zest: thinness connoted morbidity, a lack 
of life. previously, in the Middle Ages, thinness had been considered æsthet-
ically pleasing, given the way it echoed the Church’s teaching on the unim-
portance of the flesh. but by the time rubens came along, an emerging hu-
manism, represented in the renaissance faith in the limitless possibilities 
of the human mind and body, was expressed visually in depictions of bodies 
of weight and rotund sensuousness, with the full, solid body expressing 
a sense of social stability and order. (99)
Nowadays, conversely, fat is often read as a symbol of instability 
and disorder: it implies “something dark and suspicious about the per-
son’s inner being” because, as may be inferred from commonplace rhet-
oric, fat people, for reasons difficult to fathom, are believed to allow 
themselves to be fat. Fat, therefore, “seems to carry a certain imagi-
nary narrative with it, an origins tale of how the fat person got to be 
that way, the shameful revelation of clandestine (or overt) gluttony 
and overconsumption” (Kipnis 101). As fat, by and large, evokes “un-
disguised contempt,” and sometimes “an intense, unexamined, visceral 
disgust” (96), fat people should have known better. If they decide to 
disregard the holiest of laws of the beauty myth—and decide to re-
main obese, i.e., “ugly”—they expose themselves to various forms of 
punishment (or the corrective measures aimed at putting them back on 
the right track). “If the rest of us are struggling to be acceptable 
and ‘normal,’ we cannot allow them to get away with it; they must be 
put in their place, be humiliated and defeated” (bordo 1995: 203). Con-
sequently, as Laura Kipnis evidences, the fat are perceived as “public 
property whose bodies invite [not only] the vocal speculations and rid-
icule of strangers” (103), but also more direct forms of aggression and 
violence. As the author reports, “25 percent of fat men and 16 percent 
of fat women reported being hit or threatened with physical violence 
because of their weight. Furthermore, emotional violence is nearly uni-
versal: 90 percent of fat people surveyed report incidents of derision, 
ridicule, contempt, and scorn on account of their weight” (104).
Even though fat and the beauty myth are closely banded together, 
the cultural meanings of fat go beyond the mere problem of appear-
ance, and are related to a number of permeating cultural fears. “A re-
cent study done on girls in grades three and four”—writes Zahra Dha-
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nani—found that these girls would rather lose a parent than get 
fat” (33). Correspondingly, 
[w]hat we need to ask is why our culture is so obsessed with keeping our 
bodies slim, tight, and young that when 500 people were asked what they 
feared most in the world, 190 replied, “Getting fat.”  . . .  In an age when our 
children regularly have nightmares of nuclear holocaust, that as adults we 
should give this answer—that we most fear “getting fat”—is far more bizarre 
than the anorectic’s misperceptions of her body image, or the bulimic’s com-
pulsive vomiting. (bordo 1995: 140–141; italics in the original)
One of the answers to the question above, suggested both by Kipnis 
and bordo, is that fat 
conjures up  . . .  the terrifying specter of an insatiability that all we social citi-
zens have, to varying degrees, learned to suppress. Fat advertises “naked 
need,” need that surpasses the ability of the available resources—whether 
edible, monetary, or emotional—to quell it. (Kipnis 106). 
If fat is a metaphor for unrestrained desire and slenderness stands 
for “the correct management of [this] desire,” one 
must take into account the fact that throughout dominant Western religious 
and philosophical traditions, the capacity for self-management is decisively 
coded as male. by contrast, all those bodily spontaneities—hunger, sexu-
ality, the emotions—seen as needful of containment and control have been 
culturally constructed and coded as female. The management of specifically 
female desire, therefore, is in phallocentric cultures a doubly freighted 
problem. (bordo 1995: 205–206)
Consequently, fat, and the fear of it, appear to be closely bound 
to Woman (and the fear of her), confirming Naomi Wolf’s assertion 
that “above all fat is female” (192). This is why “fat” and “thin” are fem-
inist issues and subjects of a weighty feminist investigation.51 
Although the meanings that female fat carries are mostly negative, 
the fear that fat evokes stems from the cultural perception of it 
as “a site of deep  . . .  contradiction” (Kipnis 96), rather than as some-
thing straightforwardly “bad.” For example, the fat female body is also 
 51 Fat Is a Feminist Issue: A Self-Help Guide for Compulsive Eaters is a title of Suzie 
Orbach’s 1979 book, whereas “Thin Is the Feminist Issue” is a 1985 article by Nicky 
Diamond, which offers a critique of Orbach’s study. 
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commonly read as one of the “all-giving, nurturing, reliable, loving, 
caring earth mother who excels in feminine skills of caretaking, food 
preparation and sensual hugs” (Orbach 170). This stereotype trans-
forms fat Woman into a fertility goddess who—like the Venus of Wil-
lendorf—eludes identification other than through her large breasts, 
thighs, and buttocks, as well as emphasised genital area. This image is, 
most obviously, reductive—the fat person becomes the fat body. 
In the same vein, fat people are often believed to be good-humoured, 
entertaining, and ready to laugh at themselves.52 This conception is par-
ticularly striking as it falsifies the recurrent image of a fat person being 
“funny”: now, it is not Western culture which ridicules the fat, 
but the fat who ridicule themselves. In consequence, the cultural 
shaming of the fat may appear justified and harmless—one does not 
laugh at them, one laughs with them. These two examples point 
to the fact that the fat female body is often read as incongruous 
and oxymoronic: it is pornographic/asexual, amusing/preposterous, 
conspicuous/indiscernible, and victimised/rebellious. As terrifyingly 
not/me, fat is a truly abject, liminal substance, “expendable female 
filth; virtually cancerous matter, an inert or treacherous infiltration into 
the body of nauseating bulk waste” (Wolf 191).53 Described in medical 
research as unhealthy and, in fact, life-threatening, fat connotes both 
dirt and death, which partly explains the enormous success of the cul-
tural “tyranny of slenderness.”54 As corporeality in the extreme, the fat 
body represents “inevitable death of all bodies—a condition that, like 
plaque in the arteries, is universal but must be fought constantly 
and repeatedly, and is projected onto fat bodies” (Kent 135–136).
In the feminist theory, the fat Woman’s body has generally func-
tioned as either the figure of oppression or nonconformity, both 
of which are strongly connected to the concept of body metamor-
phosis. Within present-day Western culture, in fact, the fat female 
body is seen as “a transformation waiting to happen” (Kipnis 103). 
“The scandal of fatness,” as Kipnis suggests, 
 52 In “She’s a Joke: Fat vs. Fun in Margaret Atwood’s Lady Oracle” (Szatanik 2007) 
I discuss the apparently comical properties of the fat female body with the use 
of the feminist theories of humor. 
 53 I examined the connection between fat and waste in my article “big Fat Waste. 
Woman’s Fat as Cultural refuse” (Szatanik 2008), illustrating my theoretical prop-
osition with an interpretation of Janine Antoni’s installation titled Gnaw.
 54 “Tyranny of slenderness” is a term coined by Kim Chernin and adopted by Susan 
bordo in her Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body (1995). 
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is its insult to those collective transformative fantasies, the affront of a body 
that dares to remain fat and untransformed.  . . .  Although there must be 
some disavowed level of awareness on the part of the public that to be fat is 
largely beyond individual control, at the same time the culture’s deeply held 
belief is that the fat could change but have chosen not to.  . . .  The angry, con-
temptuous social reaction to the resistance of the fat to refashioning them-
selves is a testament to the very degree of our investment in the potential 
for change. (103–104; italics in the original)
In Kipnis’s terms, feminist theorists and fat-activists have respon-
ded to the ideas expressed in the quotation above either by taking 
“the genetic ‘born-that-way’ line”—thus claiming that the fat Woman 
has been unjustly criticised for refusing to do what is clearly beyond 
her capabilities—or by taking the “‘choosing to be queer’ position” 
(Kipnis 106), and thus suggesting that the fat body is a body in (con-
scious) protest. Woman who stays fat and refuses to conform to the so-
cial image of the proper (thin) Woman is interpreted as a threat 
to the patriarchal order. One who diets, on the other hand, conforms 
to this very order. Importantly, dieting—though offered as the only 
form of redemption—“is itself a precarious, unstable, self-defeating 
state for the body to be in—a reality that the ‘disordered’ cognitions 
of bulimics and anorexics are confronting all too clearly and painfully” 
(bordo 1995: 59). Dieting, in other words—as Naomi Wolf asserts—
keeps women pre-occupied with their appearance, physically weak 
and politically harmless. Woman on a diet is Woman disarmed; 
Woman disarmed, in turn, constitutes the groundwork for the patriar-
chal order. In Suzie Orbach’s phrasing, therefore, fat may be viewed 
as a “symbolic rejection of the limitations of women’s role” and
a response to many oppressive manifestations of a sexist culture. Fat is 
a way of saying “no” to powerlessness and self-denial, to a limiting sexual 
expression which demands that females look and act a certain way, 
and to an image of womanhood that defines a specific social role. Fat offends 
Western ideals of female beauty and, as such, every “overweight” woman 
creates a crack in the popular culture’s ability to make us mere products. (21)
At the same time, it is clear that the fat female body cannot really 
be assigned to the simplified either-or readings. On the level of sym-
bolic interpretation, the fat female body can be seen as both, the sign 
of rebellion against the demands of Western culture, and the product 
of these demands (as fat women often binge on food because they feel 
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the overwhelming pressure of the cultural norms of beauty). “[T]he co-
existence of anorexia and obesity”—writes bordo—“reveals the insta-
bility of the contemporary personality construction, the difficulty 
of finding homeostasis between the producer and the consumer sides 
of the self.  . . .  both are rooted in the same consumer-culture construc-
tion of desire as overwhelming and overtaking the self” (1995: 201). 
The fat female body represents “an extreme capacity to capitulate 
to desire” (1995: 201) which “by [its] very nature [is] excessive, irra-
tional, threatening to erupt and challenge the patriarchal order” 
(1995: 206). The fat body is rebellious in that it symbolises losing con-
trol, and losing oneself—its contours are growing, the body boundaries 
are transgressed. In this, the fat body again becomes a site of contra-
diction: its transgressive properties may be scary, but they also carry 
a potential for a change. In line with the contradictory readings 
of the fat female body, Lorna Crozier’s poem “The Fat Lady’s Dance” 
features the eponymous fat lady who transforms from a passive victim 
into a fearless offender.
The first stanza of the poem reads:
The fat lady can’t get out of bed.
He has done it before, his idea of a joke.
He has left her there and gone to work
after he has watched each greasy egg
slither down her throat, after he has made her
swallow every wad of buttered bread. (88)
As the passage makes clear, the fat lady’s immobility is a result 
of deliberate operations of the “he” of the poem, who stuffs her with 
food first, and then leaves her powerless and passive. The relationship 
between the two is undoubtedly hierarchical—she is the symbol 
of powerlessness and he is a representation of power. Consuming 
food—greasy, fattening, forbidden—is an element of a game that he 
devised. Although uncontrollable desires and hungers are traditionally 
ascribed to the female body, Crozier’s fat lady, as described in the first 
stanza, lacks the control that she could lose. She is the fat lady not be-
cause she yields to temptation or follows her appetite, but because he 
finds pleasure in her complete submissiveness. Therefore, the relation-
ship is reminiscent of one of the forms of feederism—a sexual fetish 
which may involve “force-feeding and bondage and is undertaken with 
the intention of fattening up the feedee to the point of immobility 
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and total dependence.”55 Thus understood, feederism corresponds 
to the ambiguous readings of fat Woman’s sexuality—on the one hand, 
construed as unattractive and repulsive, she is perceived as unsexy, 
and hence asexual. On the other hand, for the very same reason that 
she escapes the traditional definitions of “sexy,” she is construed 
as perverse, or pornographic. If she is sexual, it has to be “abnormal” 
sexuality. More importantly, the fat lady’s body is a plane over which 
the man can exercise power, maintaining the hierarchical division 
of gender roles—she is stuck in bed (the private sphere of pleasure 
and rest) while he—the active agent—goes out to work. The first stanza, 
therefore, introduces the fat Woman as the fruit of the patriarchal defi-
nition of femininity—she is, after all, a lady. 
“[T]he kind of perception human beings have of their bodies, 
the image they hold of them, is peculiarly involved in shame” 
(Lynd 137). In any shame-free perception “[the] inescapable intimacy 
with one’s own body is a two-way interchange, an interaction of ex-
ternal and internal” (137). Noticeably, however, the fat lady’s body—si-
multaneously judged not (good) enough and excessive, veiled in fat, 
yet overexposed, feasting on the negative images of itself— 
is, necessarily, a shamed body. Hence, what the fat lady is fed with 
apart from food are also the “external,” cultural meanings of “fat”: 
these “obsessive [messages which get] shoved down [women’s] throats 
like a probing insistent finger. Thin = healthy at any cost, vigilant, self-
disciplined, morally superior; fat = lazy, trash, morally corrupt, capital-
istic, greedy, desperate, disgusting, diseased, ‘American’” (polack 18). 
As the fat lady is incapacitated and bloated with the negative depic-
tions of herself, her body image is not a fruit of any free interchange 
or interaction. The “internal” ceases to function as a filter or barrier, 
as fat often “carries with it an enormous amount of self-disgust, 
loathing and shame” (Orbach 29). Typically, “these feelings arouse 
from the experience of being out of control around food,” but, evi-
dently, the lack of “control around food” translates into the lack of con-
trol in general. resultantly, “when [the fat lady] hears the door close, 
she snivels, / [and] starts to cry as she always does” (88).
“Something strange begins to happen,” however, when “somewhere 
under the globes of flesh / [the fat lady] feels a motion, a memory 
of movement”:
 55 World Wide Web <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Feederism> 
(19.02.2011).
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The fat lady thinks of feet.
She stops crying,
opens her mouth, sucks in all
the rage her belly can hold. 
With a massive heave-ho she rolls
off the bed to the floor and goes on rolling. (88)
The fat lady fights her way through a doorframe and a wall, 
and “rolls down the street.” uncontrollable in her infuriated rolling, 
she disturbs the composure of the town: she “caroms off a bus,  . . .  her 
flesh / slaps the pavement,  . . .  she fells trees,  . . .  bursts hydrants, 
[and] rolls . . .  up to the door of his office” (89). And then
with one great yell, one mighty heave
she rolls the building flat
then rises up on jiggling legs
and shaking the brick dust off her nightgown
she pirouettes out of town. (89)
What allows the fat lady to have her revenge, is a shift from the cul-
tural expectations to the actual experience of her fat body: unable 
to “gracefully float,” the fat lady has to find her own, curved way 
of moving. A deviation from the negative meanings commonly at-
tached to “fat”—through the actual, positive experience of fatness—
is advocated as a strategy of de-shaming of the fat female body 
by a number of feminist writers and fat activists. As they assert, the re-
claiming of the fat body is possible when the fat ladies “start living 
through [their bodies] as opposed to being locked in [their heads]” 
(Dhanani 34). It is getting in touch with her fat body that allows, 
hence, the heroine of Dhanani’s account to reformulate the fat body 
in the following way: 
I have decided to reframe all of the fat people that I have grown up with: 
my aunts, grandmother and mother  . . .  .  These people are not incredible cre-
ative spirits in spite of their weight “problems,” but their spirit is part 
and parcel with their fat. In my room, I keep a statue of the buddha with 
his jolly face and huge open round belly. I do this to remind myself that my 
belly is my vessel to enlightenment. I have learned that being fat, as much 
as I have felt the pain and the shame of it, has also been one of the greatest 
gifts that I have been given. I feel like I am wise and intuitive because 
of this fat, and that maybe I have even been able to more freely explore my 
sexuality because of my fat.” (35–36)
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Similarly, Evelyn Lau’s Inside Out: Reflections on a Life So Far  nar-
rates the significant process of re-defining fat: 
I hated the unaccustomed thickness of my body, yet I took a secret, per-
verse pride in the space I was filling up, the air I was pushing aside in the 
family home in order to make room for myself. I looked in scorn upon my 
mother, who wore tiny pink sweaters with pearl buttons, size XS. Her legs 
were like bleached sticks, the skin white and crêpey; her hipbones jutted 
visibly beneath her skirts, and she reminded me of a starving cow  . . .  .  (77) 
The fat body, therefore—although still perceived as “unaccus-
tomedly thick”—is, in Lau’s account, translated into big, noticeable, 
hence a powerful one. The big size becomes an attribute of potency, 
while thinness comes to signify weakness and malady. Most obvi-
ously, the fat lady can only pride on greatness if she looks beyond 
the patriarchal perception of genders; greatness, after all—as Na-
thanson claims—is a “natural” source of pride. In the contemporary 
Western culture “big size” already has positive connotations; the femi-
nist strategy is to claim them. Thus, a shameless experience of the power 
of fat leads beyond its negative definitions: Lorna Crozier’s “Fat Lady” 
heads somewhere “out of town.” 
In its focus on transformation and transgression, Crozier’s poem ad-
vocates “reconstructing subjectivity” (bordo 1995: 284), which, admit-
tedly, carries certain risks. In Susan bordo’s view, “when we give ex-
pression . . .  to those aspects of our identity forged in marginality, 
we may be seen as ‘spectacle’” (1995: 284). Correspondingly, Mary 
russo suggests that “making a spectacle out of oneself [seems] a spe-
cifically feminine danger,” namely, one of exposure:
Men, I learned somewhat later in life, “exposed themselves,” but that opera-
tion was quite deliberate and circumscribed. For a woman, making a spec-
tacle out of herself had more to do with a kind of inadvertency and loss 
of boundaries: the possessors of large, aging, and dimpled thighs displayed 
at the public beach, of overly rouged cheeks, of a voice shrill in laughter, 
or of a sliding bra strap—a loose, dingy bra strap especially—were at once 
caught out by fate and blameworthy. It was my impression that these 
women had done something wrong, had stepped, as it were, into the lime-
light out of turn—too young or too old, too early or too late—and yet 
anyone, any woman, could make a spectacle out of herself if she was not 
careful. (318; italics in the original)
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Exposure, therefore, is shameful when it is accidental (i.e., when 
it happens to Woman), not when it is consciously attained. As russo 
observes, Woman is always in danger of becoming shamefully visible: 
for the fat Woman, (in)visibility might be particularly problematic. 
Shame, size and visibility are inextricably linked: the experience 
of shame—often described as one of becoming too noticeable and hence 
too “big”—triggers a profound wish to disappear, to become smaller, 
which is why, as one might speculate, the fat Woman (taught that she 
is big/bad) is exceptionally vulnerable to shame.
Further in her article russo analyses the “feminine spectacle” with 
the use of Mikhail bakhtin’s notions of the grotesque/carnivalesque 
body, which the fat female body has been construed to represent 
in the contemporary culture of the West. These representations, 
on the one hand, have served the purpose of further othering of Woman 
(e.g. by means of presenting her as unruly and uncontrollable, and her 
body as strangely unclosed, leaking, and permeating/permeable). 
On the other hand, however, as Natalie Davis observes, 
[t]he image of the disorderly woman did not always function to keep 
women in their place. On the contrary, it was a multivalent image that could 
operate, first, to widen behavioral options for women within and even out-
side marriage, and second, to sanction riot and political disobedience for 
both men and women in a society that allowed the lower orders few formal 
means of protest. play with an unruly woman is partly a chance for tempo-
rary release from the traditional and stable hierarchy; but it is also part 
of the conflict over efforts to change the basic distribution of power within 
society. (qtd. in russo 321)
“The figure of the female transgressor as public spectacle is  . . .  power-
fully resonant” (russo 323). Indeed, the fat lady’s rolling transforms 
her (from a lady) into a “booming parade” and a “one piece band” (89) 
that children follow and dogs bark at. In her fight, the fat lady be-
comes shamelessly visible—in contrast to her passive invisibility re-
lated in the first stanza of the poem. Shameless, she is powerful enough 
to quit the space to which she had been ascribed for too long and leave 
it behind, crushed.
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toward a shame-less body
Shifting the relations of embodiment 
gives fat women a way to stop living 
their bodies as the “before” picture 
and to begin to have a body thought 
valuable in the present.
Le’a Kent “Fighting Abjection. 
Representing Fat Women” (131)
. . .  scholars, nonacademic intellectuals, 
activists, and lay people alike can begin 
creating and regulating a new social re-
ality through the use of words—spoken 
as well as written.
Kathleen LeBesco 
“Queering Fat Bodies/Politics” (76)
In Lorna Crozier’s “The Fat Lady’s Dance” the shamed, fat Woman finds her way to the (presumably) shame-free space. Her experience, 
and subsequent self-conscious exposure followed by destruction even-
tually lead her “out of town,” which, in the poem, is the realm 
of the “he.” yet, before she pirouettes to an apparent margin, she first 
ravages the centre: the destruction appears to be quite literal, i.e., ori-
ented toward specific actions and involving the modification of one’s 
behaviour. It corresponds to the postulates brought forth by a number 
of activists as well as scholars representing the disciplines of psy-
chology or feminist studies. Texts by members of various size-accep-
tance movements, specifically, express their anger at the dominant, pe-
jorative interpretations of the fat body and urge the fat to rebel. In her 
essay titled “Angry Naked Fat Woman,” for example, Miss Mariko Ta-
maki imagines a means of revenge which is similar to that resorted 
to by Crozier’s Fat Lady:
I have a plan. I’ll take my naked body to the streets in protest. I’ll pummel 
the public with what it insists on denying and avoiding: tons of moun-
tainous, sexy flesh. I’ll bare my bare boobs and squish my sweaty bum 
at strangers. I’ll squeak against every surface available and leave strange 
marks to embarrass the public. I’ll gather an army of fat angry naked sol-
diers and we’ll take to the streets. (26)
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In the same vein, Naomi Wolf urges women to “be shameless. 
be greedy. pursue pleasure. Avoid pain. Wear and touch and eat 
and drink what we feel like” (291). Such direct advice is also commonly 
given to women in therapy, or to those who belong to various support 
groups. Even though the talk of discovering one’s true self, or regaining 
a sense of wholeness to oneself, appears unfit for any academic discus-
sion (as is based on an essentalist assumption that there is a “true 
self”), it has been successful in de-shaming women in Western culture. 
At the same time, however, the possibility of redefining the cultural 
meanings of fat has been the subject of highly theoretical analyses.
In her “Queering Fat bodies/politics,” for instance, Kathleen 
Lebe sco uses theoretical concepts proposed by Judith butler and Eliza-
beth Grosz to talk about reinscribing, resignifying, and reconstituting 
fat identity. She argues, for instance, that “it is possible to theorize 
(or rather to re-theorize) the signs of fatness, rendering fat intelligible 
socially and culturally” (77). The transformation of the cultural under-
standing of fatness depends on the redefinition of the concept 
of the body as such: “Where one body  . . .  takes on the function of model 
or ideal, the human body, for all other types of body, its domination 
may be undermined through a defiant affirmation of a multiplicity, 
a field of differences, or other kinds of bodies and subjectivities” 
(qtd. in Lebesco 78). Another strategy—employed by Susan bordo 
and Naomi Wolf—is to consider the body as a text of Western culture, 
and to examine how social “codes, norms, ideals, and signs present 
themselves narratively on culturally invisible [or overly exposed] fat 
bodies” (Lebesco 79). Most importantly, however, as the title of Lebe-
sco’s article makes clear, the author proposes that the fat female body 
be queered, or, in other words, examined “through the lens of queer 
theory” (80). As I emphasised earlier, such a reading allows the con-
cepts of transformation and transgression to come to the fore, and it 
opens up the space for the exploration of subjectivity in its relation 
to playfulness and performativity. Lorna Crozier’s “The Fat Lady’s 
Dance,” accordingly, points to practical/theoretical sphere where 
the Fat Lady can, shame-lessly, “come out, plumply” (bryan 45).
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3.5. kissing and telling:
a résumé
I have to take the risk of offending, angering some of my readers. I have 
to name the places that, for me, have gone unnamed too long. Find 
the words. Speak the flesh. Kiss and tell with anger, grace, humour 
and sometimes, love.
Lorna Crozier “Speaking the Flesh” (94)
The driving force behind Crozier’s poetry—which the seven poems analysed in this chapter evidence—is the desire to “turn what’s been 
silent into language, whether it’s been animal or female or the silence 
of lost places” (Crozier qtd. in Hunter x). In many of her works, in-
cluding her confessional essay on alcohol addiction entitled “breathing 
under Ice” (2006), the silent that is being verbalised is not only deeply 
personal but also unquestionably shameful. To kiss and tell, one has 
to resist shame, as “resistance is often the place where poetry starts” 
(Crozier 2005: 56).
Shame seems particularly difficult to write, but writing as such may 
also be perceived as a shame-ful act—“to care intensely about what 
you are writing places the body within the ambit of the shameful: sheer 
disappointment in the self amplifies to a painful level” (probyn 131). 
The process of writing a text can evoke the shame of not being able 
to make “the writing equal to the subject being written about” 
(probyn 131), of failing to interest your readers, and of having readers 
evaluate your work. Such shame is likely triggered, to repeat the ob-
vious, in feminist authors who write against the dominant culture (with 
its institutions of power, traditions, literary canons and its readership). 
They write, to use a metaphor reminiscent of Virginia Woolf’s “angel 
in the house,” with “a Grinch, a gremlin, a gnome on [their] shoul-
der[s]—a little voice that pipes up in their ears every time they put pen 
to paper—should you?—is it correct?—how will this be evaluated?—
how many friends will you lose? ” (Hollingsworth 142). 
The seven of Crozier’s poems I discussed in this chapter—deliber-
ately feminist and insubordinate—transgress these shameful, silencing 
impulses. “Original Sin” and “What I Gave you Truly,” which I inter-
preted in the first subchapter, subvert the authority of the biblical Cre-
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ation Myth and “are part of a long and venerable tradition of feminist 
revisions of the bible, paying homage to the female figures whose 
voices are so seldom heard in Scripture” (Hunter x). “A poem For Sig-
mund” and “Tales for Virgins” undermine the authority of dominant 
theories of sex and gender and thus mock some of the most sacred pa-
triarchal truths. “Alice” and “Sometimes My body Leaves Me” unveil 
the disquietingly complex relationship between Woman to casti- 
gate the Western “ocular regime.” Finally, “The Fat Lady’s Dance” ridi-
cules the cultural images of the fat female body, simultaneously con-
fronting the beauty Myth dominant in culture of the West.
“Writing against,” unlike “writing along,” not only entails feeling 
shame, but, more importantly, ultimately requires that shame be con-
quered. As Elspeth probyn remarks, “shame forces us to reflect contin-
ually on the implications of our writing” (131–132), on how writing re-
lates to living, on “how we are related to history and how we wish 
to live in the present” (probyn 162). Consequently, one of the main as-
sumptions of the analytical chapter of this book was that Crozier’s po-
etic subversions translate into strategies of de-shaming Woman, which 
translate into a lived experience of women in Western culture.
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toward a revision of cultural practice?
. . .  shame is produced out of the clash- 
ing of mind and body, resulting in new acts  
of subjectivity consubstantial with the words 
in which they are expressed.
Elspeth probyn, Blush (147)
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If one accepts the basic tenets of the theory underlying the argument of the present book, it becomes clear why, in order to efficiently affect 
“physiology” and “politics” alike, feminist de-shaming strategies must, 
inevitably, target discourse. It is, in fact, the subversion of the domi-
nant patriarchal metanarratives of the West, achieved by directing the 
power of androcentric language (and thereto attributed values) against 
itself, that allows Woman to transgress the limitations of the cultural 
legacy of shame. Furthermore, if the element linking the “physiological” 
and “political” faces of shame is the reality-making language, then such 
a transgression will likely affect the female body as well as the social 
and political discourses policing femininity. yet, bearing in mind the 
achievements of feminist, queer or gender studies to date, such obser-
vations alone would not be particularly revelatory if not for the fact 
that the productivity of the theory proposed in the second chapter of 
this book seems to lie in its methodological consistency. Methodologi-
cally sound, it offers a unique point of view, in which it is not only pos-
sible to perceive discursive de-shaming acts as strategies, but, more im-
portantly, as strategies directly related to psychological mechanisms 
responsible for the workings of the shame affect. Thus, transplanting 
shame-oriented culture studies onto the fundament of a gendered revi-
sion of shame psychology results in the re-framing of both. 
Consequently, the proposed theory of Woman’s shame provides 
psychologically-oriented feminist studies with a disciplined perspective. 
The mechanisms of shame are not accidental, and thus discourses con-
cerning Woman’s self—whether centred on unconscious defence mech-
anisms resulting in suppression of shame-related traumas or on self-
conscious transgressive acts oriented towards self-empowerment 
through de-shaming—receive a dimension which may simultaneously 
warrant their productivity within the public space and a set of efficient 
tools for the analysis of cultural texts, including texts of literature. These 
two areas, needless to say, remain in a dynamic relation; shedding light 
upon each other, revisions of texts eventually impact the shape 
of the public discourse and, conversely, the growing awareness calls 
new texts and new interpretations of the canon into existence.
The proposed analyses of Lorna Crozier’s poetry, which inspired 
the argument of the present book in the first place, illustrate the appli-
cability of the theory. Albeit methodologically grounded in the find-
ings of androcentric shame psychology (e.g. of Michæl Lewis’s reading 
of the biblical origins of shame and the ensuing problems of shame- 
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determined socialisation, Donald L . Nathanson’s remarks upon 
the “classical” theories relating shame to genital organs, Léon Wurms-
er’s idea of “Look-at-ness” and benjamin Kilborne’s study on shame 
and appearance), the four case studies above depart from the analyt-
ical paradigm shame psychologists propose. Translated into a modern 
theoretical language—one which recognises not only the complexities 
inscribed in the concept of Woman, but also the variety of ways 
in which this concept is affiliated with shame, their observations con-
cerning the mechanisms of the affect became re-framed to account for 
their most prominent omission: the psychological consequences 
of the cultural values attributed to the construct of “Woman.” 
Emphasising the influence of Western culture on the formation 
of Woman’s subjectivity, and in light of the debate concerning shaming 
as a cultural strategy aimed at keeping the existing power relations in-
tact, the feminist theory of shame allowed me to go beyond the limita-
tions of the discourses of clinical therapy and to demonstrate that 
the central motifs of Lorna Crozier’s poetry lend themselves to being 
analysed in terms of being consistently construed as an effective coun-
termeasure against the dominance of the paradigm in which Woman 
is shamed to fit patriarchal definitions. What is more, where shame 
psychologists have mostly focused on negative aspects of the affect 
and remained content with the claim that the detrimental effects 
of the experience of shame should be overcome by means of positive 
reinforcement, my analyses demonstrate the transgressive potential 
of shame, which I discussed in light of queer theory and the equally 
ex-centric notion of Canadianness. In Crozier’s poetry, “transgression” 
itself is transgressed, rendering shame an open category, a queer stim-
ulus for a transformation beginning in the liminal space yawning 
abysmally where binarities underlying the traditional patriarchal meta-
narratives have collapsed.
Crozier’s strategies apply to the key cultural discourses responsible 
for the perpetuation of Woman’s shame: deconstructing the funda-
mental oppositions of the basic myth of creation, she prepares ground 
for the disempowerment of the authoritarian voices of the “classical” 
theoreticians of the psychology of Woman, granted to androcentric 
scholarship and science by the authority of the Judeo-Christian meta-
narrative. Depriving “institutionalised truth” of its momentum, she 
paves the path towards subverting the authority of the masculine gaze, 
which she effectively disempowers with a shameless counter-gaze, 
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thus questioning the elementary foundation of the beauty myth, im-
mediately translatable into the area beyond discourse: into physiolog-
ical body, often shamed into starvation, pain of surgery, or death.
Crozier’s strategies, analysed within the framework of the proposed 
theory of Woman’s shame, tackle shame as a cultural phenomenon, 
yet translate directly onto the bodily space: de-shaming Woman, Cro-
zier de-shames women, offering a point of departure for a therapy 
based on transforming individual intuitions into awareness of the es-
sential ungroundedness of shaming discourses. The once perplexingly 
(un)framed composition of Woman becomes redefined: Woman becomes 
transgressively (un)framed, and thus shamelessly empowered.
The congruity of their findings concerning the mechanisms of shame 
notwithstanding, strategies of de-shaming Woman advanced by shame 
psychologists are, evidently, incongruous with those possible to consis-
tently theorise on the basis of the bidirectional re-framing of the shame-
oriented disciplines of my interest. More importantly, they are incon-
gruent with the strategies demonstrably in-forming Lorna Crozier’s 
poems. Although keyed to psychological mechanisms of shame, femi-
nist de-shaming strategies rely on resisting and subverting the au-
thority of patriarchal orders. Such resistance is always problematic, be-
cause feminist narratives of transgression are not created outside 
of the patriarchal framework: yet, self-consciously, it is from within this 
framework that they attempt to go trans or across it; they often begin 
with presenting “descriptions of domination that might be starting 
points for questioning the rhetoric and structure of power” (bernstein 
39). As such, they do not necessarily aim to make (common) sense: in-
stead, they point to such a transgressive space in which shame ceases 
to be one of the regularised parameters of femininity.
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„wykroczenie” jako feministyczna strategia:  
przypadek poezji lorny crozier
Niniejsza książka poświęcona jest strategiom wykraczania poza do-świadczenie wstydu, które – jak wykazuje autorka – stanowi nieod-
łączny komponent wytworzonego przez kulturę zachodnią konstruktu 
„kobiety”. rozważania teoretyczne, dotyczące wstydu jako wykorzysty-
wanego przez dyskursy androcentryczne zjawiska kulturowego, autorka 
ilustruje swoimi analizami wybranych wierszy współczesnej kanadyj-
skiej poetki Lorny Crozier. Część teoretyczna pracy lokuje się więc na po-
graniczu studiów feministycznych i psychologicznych studiów nad 
afektem (tzw. psychologii wstydu). Trzeci z obecnych w pracy teoretycz-
nych dyskursów wywodzi się z pojęcia „kanadyjskości”, czy też kanadyj-
skiej tożsamości, przez wielu badaczy łączonego również z teorią queer. 
W skład części teoretycznej książki wchodzą dwa rozdziały. W 
pierwszym analizowane są najważniejsze pozycje z dziedziny psycho-
logii wstydu oraz ukazana jest nieobecność „kobiety” w owych opra-
cowaniach. Drugi rozdział koncentruje się na tych tekstach teoretycz-
nych z dziedziny teorii feminizmu i gender studies, w których temat 
wstydu został wyraźnie powiązany z kobiecością. Zasadniczym celem 
tej części jest przełożenie psychologicznej teorii wstydu (wypracowanej 
przez takich badaczy, jak Silvan Tomkins, Gershen Kaufman, Michæl 
Lewis, Donald L. Nathanson, Stephen pattison i Léon Wurmser) 
na język współczesnego feminizmu i zaproponowanie swoistej „femi-
nistycznej teorii wstydu”. Teoria ta stanowi podstawę do wypraco-
wania takich narzędzi interpretacji tekstu, które z jednej strony opierają 
się na badaniach psychologicznych, a z drugiej uwzględniają specyfikę 
obiektu badawczych zainteresowań autorki: kobiety jako uogólnionego 
konstruktu kulturowego. Kobiecy wstyd – afekt mający odmienne 
cechy niż inne rodzaje wstydu – okazuje się zjawiskiem wyjaśniającym 
wiele elementów dyskursywnych i pozadyskursywnych, jakie determi-
nują relację kobiecości do kultury zachodniej, wobec czego niniejsza 
(streszczenie/summary in polish)
propozycja teoretyczna może stanowić fundament nowego kierunku w 
badaniach feministycznych. 
Trzeci, analityczny rozdział pracy koncentruje się na strategiach 
wykraczania poza kobiecy wstyd – czyli „odwstydzania” kobiety – 
które wywodzą się z teorii oraz literatury feministycznej i obecne są 
w poezji Crozier. Cechą wspólną owych feministycznych technik od-
wstydzania jest kwestionowanie kulturowych „prawd” dotyczących 
kobiecości i kobiecego ciała. Tematem trzech omawianych w pracy 
wierszy są te przedstawienia kobiety, które w kulturze patriarchalnej 
funkcjonują jako szczególnie wstydliwe. Owe wizerunki to biblijna 
Ewa (wiersze pt. Original Sin i What I Gave You Truly), oraz Gruba 
pani (The Fat Lady’s Dance). pozostałe cztery analizy (wierszy zatytu-
łowanzch Alice, Sometimes My Body Leaves Me, Poem for Sigmund 
i Tales for Virgins) prezentują „normalną” kobiecość jako rzekome 
źródło wstydu.
Zawarte w rozdziałach interpretacyjnych rozważania, które ilu-
strują zastosowanie pojęcia kobiecego wstydu w praktyce analitycznej, 
prowadzą do konkluzji o możliwej zmianie istniejących teorii femini-
stycznych lub uzupełnieniu ich o stanowisko nowe. Feministyczna 
teoria wstydu, której zręby buduje niniejsza praca, stanowi propozycję 
nieco innego niż dotąd spojrzenia na główny obiekt badań studiów fe-
ministycznych – kobietę i relacje, w jakie wchodzi ona we współcze-
snym świecie. Zaproponowane interpretacje siedmiu wierszy Lorny 
Crozier są jednocześnie świadectwem zachodzących już teraz kulturo-
wych zmian w postrzeganiu kobiety, prowadzących do wytworzenia 
takiej transgresyjnej przestrzeni, w której kobiecy wstyd przestaje być 
jednym ze stałych parametrów kobiecości.
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stratégies feministes de transgression : 
la cas de la poésie de lorna crozier
Ce livre est consacré à des stratégies de dépassement de l’expérience de la honte qui est, selon l’auteure, une partie inhérente à  la constru- 
ction « femme » dans la culture occidentale. Le contenu théorique 
de ce travail, qui porte sur la honte en tant que phénomène culturel 
propre aux discours androcentriques, est illustré par l’analyse des poèmes 
choisis de la poète canadienne contemporaine Lorna Crozier. La partie 
théorique aborde donc les thèmes proches des études féministes et des 
recherches psychologiques sur l’affect (psychologie de la honte). Ces deux 
discours sont traversés dans ce travail par le discours sur la « canadia-
nité » voire l’identité canadienne que beaucoup de chercheurs et cher-
cheuses analysent dans le cadre de la théorie queer. 
La partie théorique se compose de deux chapitres. Le premier porte 
sur les travaux les plus importants dans le domaine de la psychologie 
de la honte et montre que « la femme » y est absente. Le deuxième cha-
pitre se concentre sur les textes théoriques du féminisme et des gender 
studies, qui se sont déjà proposés d’analyser la notion de honte par rap-
port à la féminité. L’objectif de la partie théorique est de rapporter 
la théorie psychologique de la honte, élaborée par des chercheurs comme 
Silvan Tomkins, Gershen Kaufman, Michæl Lewis, Donald L. Nathanson, 
Stephen pattison et Léon Wurmser, au discours féministe contemporain, 
et par conséquent de proposer une théorie féministe de la honte. Celle-ci 
permet d’élaborer les outils d’interprétation du texte qui sont basés 
sur les études psychologiques, mais qui tiennent également compte 
de la spécificité de l’objet d’étude qui intéresse l’auteure : femme géné-
rique. La honte féminine, affect qui est bien différent d’autres types 
de honte, est un phénomène qui explique de nombreux éléments discur-
sifs et adiscursifs qui composent la relation féminité – culture occidentale, 
et peut donner des fondements à une nouvelle piste de recherches fémi-
nistes. 
(résumé/summary in french)
Le troisième chapitre est analytique et se concentre sur des stratégies 
de dépassement de la honte féminine qui sont propres à la théorie et lit-
tératures féminines et qu’on peut retrouver dans la poésie de Crozier. 
En principe, ces techniques de dépassement de la honte consistent à re-
mettre en question les « vérités » culturelles pour ce qui est de la fémi-
nité et du corps féminin. Trois poèmes analysés dans le livre portent 
sur les représentations de la femme qui sont particulièrement honteuses 
dans la culture patriarcale : Ève biblique (« Original Sin » et « What 
I Gave you Truly ») et la Grosse Madame (« The Fat Lady’s Dance »). 
Quatres analyses (consacrées aux poèmes « Alice », « Sometimes 
My body Leaves Me », « poem for Sigmund » et « Tales for Virgins ») 
présentent la féminité normale comme la présumée source de la honte. 
Les chapitres interprétatives, qui mettent en application la notion 
de honte féminine abordée dans la partie analytique, arrivent à la conclu-
sion qu’il est possible de changer ou compléter les approches féministes 
existantes. La théorie de la honte féminine qui est à la base de ce livre 
propose une autre manière de voir la femme en tant qu’objet des études 
féministes et les relations qu’elle entretient dans le monde contempo-
rain. Les sept interprétations des poèmes de Lorna Crozier témoignent 
des changements culturels pour ce qui est de la perception de la femme, 
ces changements se situant dans un espace transgressif où la honte n’est 
plus l’un des apanages permanents de la féminité.
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